Concept
Deadly Force
Self-defense and defense of others
Deadly Force
Self-defense law sorts force into two grades, and the grade decides how much a defender must show. Ordinary self-defense under § 63(1) covers reasonable force that is not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.1 Force that is intended or likely to cause such harm falls under § 65(1), which demands more.2
The added demand rests on a comparison of losses. A torn coat can be mended and a slap can be answered in court, but death and grave, lasting injury cannot be undone by any judgment. One analysis of the rule reasons that it is better for the victim of a minor intrusion to suffer temporary humiliation and be vindicated later in court than to cause serious injury or death to prevent it.3
Two questions follow, in fixed order. The first is whether the force is deadly, which depends on what the defender intended or should have realized was likely, and not on what happened. The second is whether the threat was grave enough, and the force necessary enough, to justify force of that grade. The first subsection answers the first question; the second answers the second.
What Makes Force Deadly
A means of self-defense is deadly when the actor intends it to cause death or serious bodily harm, or when a reasonable person in the actor's position would realize that it is likely to.4 The label matters because it selects the rulebook. Ordinary self-defense reaches only force that is neither intended nor likely to cause such harm, and § 65(1) governs the rest.5 A court therefore classifies the force first and then asks the questions that the classification brings with it.
Serious bodily harm is itself a defined category: harm so grave that it differs in kind, and not merely in degree, from other bodily harm.6 Three kinds qualify. One is harm that creates a substantial risk of fatal consequences. Another is harm whose infliction would be the crime of mayhem. The third is the permanent or protracted loss of the function of any important member or organ.7 The category is narrow. Even a blow likely to cause some fairly substantial injury is a lesser harm, one that deadly means may not be used to prevent.8 Section 65(1)(b) accordingly matches deadly force to a threat of the same grade: peril of death, serious bodily harm, or ravishment.9
Two routes lead to the deadly label, and both look at the actor's side of the encounter. The important fact is the harm the actor intends to inflict, or that a reasonable person in the actor's position would realize is likely to follow, and not the harm the act actually causes.10 A defender who aims to kill or cripple uses deadly force even when the attempt fails. A defender with no such aim who picks means that a reasonable person would see as likely to kill or gravely injure uses deadly force too. In the other direction, means that were neither intended nor likely to cause serious harm remain nondeadly even when they unexpectedly cause it, because the surprise is immaterial to the classification.11 The test follows the risk the defender created, so an unseen weakness in the other person cannot change which rules apply.
Criminal law frames the same idea in terms of the actor's state of mind. Deadly force is force that its user uses with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or that he knows creates a substantial risk of either.12 The tort comments ask what a reasonable person in the actor's position would realize, and the criminal formulation asks what the actor knows, but both reach the defender who fires with intent to kill or seriously injure. That defender uses deadly force even if the shot misses completely or leaves only a minor wound.13
Comment d lists four considerations that bear on whether a particular means is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm:14
- the amount of force applied;
- the means or weapon by which it is applied;
- the method of applying it;
- the circumstances in which it is applied.
No single consideration decides the question. The actor may know that the other's physical condition is such that a slight blow, harmless to a normal person, may well be fatal to this one. Knocking another down is usually unlikely to cause serious bodily harm, but it is obviously likely to do so if the other is known to have advanced heart disease or is standing on the running board (the narrow step along the side) of a rapidly driven automobile.15 The first example turns on what the actor knows of the other's body and the second on the surroundings, which is why one physical act can be nondeadly in one setting and deadly in another. Because the classification is made when the actor acts, the facts that count are those the actor knew or should have realized then. A hidden condition the actor had no reason to suspect, as in the workplace scene above, does not move the force into the deadly category.
The weapon matters, though it does not control. A weapon that ordinarily threatens death or serious harm may be used so as to threaten only a lesser harm, and a weapon that ordinarily threatens only trifling harm may be used so as to threaten serious harm or death.16 Criminal law shows the first direction in its treatment of a defender who points a gun with no intention of firing it. Merely threatening death or serious bodily harm, without any intention of carrying out the threat, is not using deadly force, so pointing the gun may be justified when pulling the trigger would not be.17
The classification cuts both ways. A defender who adopts means intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to prevent a lesser harm is liable, even if the harm actually inflicted is one a gentler means would have privileged.18 A shot aimed to kill and fired at an attacker whose threat is a slap is deadly force even if the bullet only grazes. A defender whose nondeadly force turns out to be fatal has not used deadly force at all, and the reasonable-force rules continue to govern.
When Deadly Force Is Justified
Section 65(1) privileges deadly force only when the actor reasonably believes two things: that the other is about to inflict an intentional contact or other bodily harm, and that the actor is thereby put in peril of death, serious bodily harm, or ravishment, which can safely be prevented only by the immediate use of such force.20 The two beliefs are joined by and, so a defender who satisfies the first and fails the second has no privilege to use deadly force. The same facts may still support the ordinary privilege to use reasonable nondeadly force under § 63(1).21
The first belief concerns the attacker's conduct and uses the trigger of ordinary self-defense: a reasonable belief that the other is about to inflict an intentional contact or other bodily harm.22 The earlier requirements of an imminent threat and a reasonable belief apply here as they do there. Reasonableness is objective. The circumstances the defender knew or should have known must be such as would lead a person of ordinary firmness and courage to the belief, with allowance for the rapid decision that the attack forces.23 A sincere conviction that one's own response was reasonable does not substitute. A court construing a state statute that authorized deadly force when the defendant 'reasonably believes' rejected the reading 'reasonable to him' and held that the legislature had kept an objective element in any provision authorizing deadly physical force.24 A separate and tighter rule governs force against conduct the defender recognizes as merely negligent: deadly force is privileged only if the defender reasonably believes that the conduct will cause death or serious bodily harm that can be prevented only by such force. A later section takes up that rule.25
The second belief carries the weight, and it has two parts. The gravity part matches threat to response: the peril must be one of death, serious bodily harm, or ravishment, a harm that differs in kind from ordinary bodily harm.26 The necessity part requires that the peril be preventable safely only by the immediate use of such force.27 Each word does work. Immediate ties the privilege to the last-resort principle in the § 63 comments: a defender may not use such force while there is a reasonable likelihood that the other will abandon the attack or that the defender will have a later opportunity to protect himself.28 Only means that a milder response that would stop the attack leaves no justification for the added risk to the other person's life. Safely protects the defender in the opposite direction, since the rule does not ask anyone to stake his own safety on a gentler response that may fail.
Necessity has deep roots in the common law. The old rule of 'retreat to the wall' ordinarily forbade deadly force by one who had a safe avenue of retreat, and it applied the strict necessity required to excuse the taking of human life.29 The necessity requirement in § 65(1)(b) rests on the same idea, and the next section takes up retreat itself.
Together the two parts draw a firm line: deadly means are not privileged to prevent a lesser harm, even when the lesser harm can be avoided in no other way.30 Smith raises her hand to slap Jones. Jones may use nondeadly force, retreat, or take the slap and sue for battery, but she may not shoot Smith or swing a hammer at her head.31 Goliath threatens to rip David's coat. David may not use deadly force to stop him, even if his only alternatives are to run or submit to the battery.32 The cost to David is temporary humiliation, and the law accepts it because a coat can be repaired and a death or serious injury cannot.
A deadly threat opens the door to deadly force, but it does not hold the door open indefinitely. A threat of deadly force does not automatically authorize similar force in response. It gives the victim a privilege to use the force she reasonably believes necessary to prevent the threatened battery, and that may include deadly force if such force appears necessary.33 In one illustration, Kong attacks Zilla, who could presumably have prevented the battery by closing and locking her car door. If so, she is not authorized to do more simply because Kong's attack threatens more serious harm.34 Many states do not require retreat before deadly force, yet Zilla might be liable even in those states, because the privilege reaches only force she reasonably believes necessary.35 The weapon in the attacker's hand does not settle the question; the defender's reasonable belief about necessity does.
Because every element is stated in terms of what the defender reasonably believes, a reasonable mistake preserves the privilege and an unreasonable one forfeits it. A defender who reasonably believes that force is necessary is protected even if there was in fact no necessity.36 Whether a threat is deadly is therefore decided from the defender's side, by characterizing the force the defender reasonably anticipates.37 Had Goliath's conduct led David to reasonably fear serious bodily injury, David could have answered with similar force.38 The force David uses could be identical in the two versions; only the threat he reasonably perceived differs.
Steps three and four repay the most attention, because a vivid weapon or a loud threat tempts a quick answer at step two. A defender who answers a slap with a gun fails step three. One who answers a real attack with a bat when a locked door was available fails step four.
Section 65(1) is stated to be subject to Subsection (3), which can withdraw the privilege from a defender who meets every condition above.39 Some jurisdictions, and the Second Restatement, require a victim of deadly force to retreat before using deadly force if retreat is safe, while many states do not.40 The next section takes up that rule and its exceptions. Until then, satisfying § 65(1) establishes the privilege only to the extent that retreat is not required.