Concept
The Self-Defense Privilege
Self-defense and defense of others
Self-Defense and Defense of Others
The Self-Defense Privilege
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 63(1) states the baseline rule: an actor is privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend himself against an unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm that he reasonably believes another is about to inflict intentionally.1 Self-defense does not enter at the start of a case. The plaintiff first proves the prima facie elements of the tort, such as battery. The defendant then answers with additional facts: the contact happened, but only because the plaintiff was about to attack, and the law allows a person to ward off that attack.2
A privilege is a rule under which particular circumstances justify conduct that would otherwise be tortious, so that liability disappears even though every element of the tort can be proved. That sets a privilege apart from a defense such as contributory negligence, which reduces or bars recovery but leaves the defendant's conduct tortious. Self-defense is an affirmative defense, so the defendant must plead and prove it.3 The burden falls there because the defendant asks the court to excuse conduct that was tortious on its face. The privilege exists at all because a person facing an imminent attack cannot count on a court or the police arriving in time, and the law tolerates a limited measure of self-help in that gap.
Mistake is what makes this privilege worth studying closely. A mistake, even a reasonable one, is ordinarily no defense to an intentional tort: a defendant who intentionally touches another is a tortfeasor even if he sincerely and reasonably believed the touching was allowed. Some privileges are the exception. They rest on the actor's reasonable belief about the facts and survive when that belief proves wrong.4 Self-defense is the leading example, because a person who reasonably sees an attack coming has no time to verify it. The belief is judged by what a person of ordinary firmness and courage would conclude from the circumstances the actor knew or should have known.5
Section 63(1) breaks into three questions, and the subsections below take them in turn. What kind of threat triggers the privilege? Was the actor's belief about that threat reasonable? Did the actor use force for a defensive purpose? How much force the privilege covers is a separate question, which later sections take up along with the stricter limits on deadly force.
Threat and Imminence
Section 63(1) answers the first question with timing: the actor may defend against a contact that he reasonably believes another “is about to inflict.”6 An attack can be finished, about to happen or already underway, or still distant, and only the middle position triggers the privilege. The word “unprivileged” does separate work, because no one may invoke self-defense against force the other is entitled to use, a limit taken up in a later section. The criminal law's necessity logic runs the same way: the right of self-defense arises when the necessity arises and ends when the necessity ends.7
Once an attack has ended, nothing remains to prevent, and force at that point is retaliation. The privilege extends only to acts done to protect the actor from a presently threatened aggression. It does not cover acts done as punishment for a past aggression or as a warning against its repetition, and an actor who believes the other's attempt has been frustrated or abandoned may not inflict any contact at all.8 The Restatement's illustration is a man struck with a whip who reasonably disarms his attacker. The disarming is privileged, but a similar beating administered afterward is not, and neither is a beating of a child who has thrown a snowball, whether meant as punishment or as a warning against doing it again.9 Germolus v. Sausser follows the same sequence. The defendant took a whip away from the plaintiff and then knocked him unconscious with it, and because the threatened battery had ended, the original victim himself became liable for battery.10
The line falls at the end of the attack because self-help is tolerated only to fill the gap before the law can act. Afterward the victim has peaceful legal remedies, and punishment belongs to the courts. Someone who is slapped and told “now we are even” therefore commits a battery by slapping back, since no further contact was threatened.11 A withdrawing attacker produces the same result. In Goldfuss v. Davidson, a homeowner inside a locked house, with the police already called, fired a shot from his kitchen window at two men who had broken into a pole barn a hundred feet away and were running off. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense.12
The privilege also reaches an attack that is already underway. The Restatement describes force used to stop the continuance of contacts the other has already begun and threatens to keep inflicting, so a person who is being held and struck need not wait for a fresh blow before responding.13 An attack that has ended still carries some weight, because the fact that the other has already committed or attempted an aggression bears on whether his later conduct signals an intention to renew it.14 The earlier attack is evidence about what is coming, and it does not by itself license anything.
Acting too early is the opposite mistake. Self-defense is a last resort: the actor is not privileged to use force so long as there is a reasonable likelihood that the other will abandon his aggressive purpose or that the actor will have a later opportunity to protect himself.15 A threat of future harm therefore does not justify a preemptive blow. The other may think better of it, and the actor has peaceful legal remedies and is expected to use them rather than take the law into her own hands.16
The same reasoning yields a narrow exception. Both reasons for waiting vanish when an attack in the near future is reasonably certain, the other's purpose reasonably appears fixed, and no later opportunity to prevent it will exist. If Jonah instead shows Priya what looks like a loaded pistol and says he will shoot her the instant she steps out of a room where no one else can help, nothing is gained by waiting, and force to disarm him may be privileged. Both conditions matter. A determined tone alone satisfies neither if the attack can still be met later.
Reasonable Belief and Mistake
Section 63(1) privileges force against a contact that the actor “reasonably believes” another is about to inflict, and the adverb makes the inquiry objective.18 The jury asks what a person of ordinary firmness and courage would have concluded from the circumstances the actor knew or should have known.19 Two results follow. A belief that is reasonable but wrong preserves the privilege. In the Restatement's illustration, a joker draws back his hand as if to strike, intending only to frighten, and the man facing him reasonably expects a blow and seizes his arm, accidentally scratching it. That man is not liable.20 A belief that is honest but unreasonable does not preserve the privilege. An abnormally timid person who has convinced himself, without cause, that another is a mortal enemy may not knock that other down when he reaches into a pocket for a handkerchief.21
The law settles on this middle position because each alternative fails someone. If the threat had to be real in fact, a defender would have to wait until the blow landed to learn whether the danger was genuine, and the privilege exists because a person facing an apparent attack has no time to verify it. If an honest belief were enough, a frightened or reckless defender could injure an innocent person and leave that person uncompensated. Some older criminal cases accepted honest belief, but tort law never has, because it attends to the victim's compensation as well as to the defender's blame. A trigger-happy subway passenger who honestly but unreasonably believes several youths are about to seriously harm him may not draw a gun and fire.22 A reasonableness requirement protects the defender who reads the situation soundly even when the reading proves wrong, and it charges the cost to the defender whose reading no ordinary person would share. The usual rule that mistake is no defense to an intentional tort gives way here, and the courts' stated reason is the importance they attach to “self-preservation as the first law of nature.”23
Courvoisier v. Raymond shows the choice between the two standards. The defendant fired at an approaching man who turned out to be a police officer. The trial court told the jury that self-defense excused the shot only if the officer had actually been assaulting him, an instruction that makes a defender liable for every mistake, even a reasonable one. The reviewing court held the instruction erroneous and said the proper question is whether the defendant reasonably believed that force was necessary.24 In effect the defender answers only for unreasonable mistakes. The jury decides whether the belief was reasonable, and it is not asked whether a real attack occurred.
An objective standard does not ask the jury to ignore who the actor is or what the actor has been told. The circumstances that count include everything the actor knew or had reason to know, so a history between the parties can turn an innocent-looking gesture into a threat. In Keep v. Quailman, the plaintiff had a reputation for shooting people and suddenly put his hand into his pocket. Believing he was about to draw a revolver, the defendant struck him on the head with a cane and knocked him down. The court held that the jury should have been told the defendant was liable only if he lacked reasonable grounds to fear an immediate attack.25 The Restatement reaches the same result with a notorious desperado who has threatened to shoot B on sight. B sees him approaching with a hand in a hip pocket and mistakenly but reasonably believes a shot is coming, so B may knock him down even though the man was reaching for a handkerchief.26 The gesture is the same one that failed for the timid neighbor, yet the answer reverses. In the desperado case the circumstances B knew would alarm an ordinary person, and in the timid-neighbor case they would not.
Information from other people can supply the missing context. The Restatement notes that the acts or statements of third persons can give another's conduct so threatening an appearance that it supports a reasonable fear, though the same conduct standing alone would not.27 In Crabtree v. Dawson, the defendant had ejected an intoxicated man named Noble from a dance and was then told that Noble was outside gathering bricks. The defendant stepped into the doorway to look into the darkness, and the plaintiff, a late arrival, came running up the dimly lit steps. Believing Noble was attacking, the defendant struck the plaintiff and knocked him down the steps, and he was held not liable.28 A running figure on a dark staircase is harmless by itself, and the warning about Noble made it frightening.
The criminal law supplies a parallel on why objectivity does not strip away the actor's situation. In People v. Goetz, a prosecution involving deadly force, the court rejected a reading of “reasonably” that would ask only whether the defendant himself thought his conduct reasonable, because a jury that believed him would then have to acquit regardless of what anyone else in his situation might have concluded.29 The same opinion said an objective test still takes in the defendant's knowledge about the other person, the physical attributes of everyone involved, and any prior experiences that gave a reasonable basis for his fear.30 Tort self-defense has the same structure: the yardstick is the ordinary person, applied to the actor's real circumstances.
The last piece of the standard is timing. The Restatement states the point for the amount of force: the test is what a reasonable person in such an emergency would believe permissible, taking account of the rapid decision the other's conduct has forced, and not what a reasonable person would recognize as sufficient after the event, once the emergency has passed.31 That comment addresses the choice of means, but the reasoning fits the belief about the threat as well, since both judgments are made in the same compressed moment. A person who sees an enemy raise a knife has no time to investigate motives. Striking first is privileged if she reasonably concluded a stabbing was coming, even if the enemy meant only to scratch his own back.32 Facts the actor did not know and had no reason to know cannot be used afterward to call the belief unreasonable. The court asks how the emergency looked from where the actor stood.
Everything above concerns an actor who defends himself. When the actor defends a third person instead, courts divide over mistake. Some hold that the defender assumes the risk of being mistaken and is privileged only if and to the extent that the third person was, while others, and Restatement (Second) § 76, hold that a reasonable mistake does not negate the privilege.33 Later sections return to defense of others.
Defensive Purpose
Section 63(1) privileges reasonable force used “to defend himself,” and those words make the actor's purpose part of the privilege.35 The comments spell out what the purpose must be. Intentionally inflicted bodily harm is privileged only if the actor inflicts it to prevent the other from inflicting a harmful or offensive contact, or to prevent the continuance of contacts the other has already begun and threatens to keep inflicting.36 The reason lies in what justifies the privilege. Force is excused because it protects, and a blow struck to avenge an insult or settle a grudge has no protective function, even if it lands at a moment when it also forestalls some harm. That coincidence is luck, and tort law does not excuse an intentional tort because it turned out to be useful. The same requirement explains why retaliation fails: once an attack has ended there is nothing left to prevent, and force at that point can only be punishment.37
The protective purpose need not be the actor's only motive. If the force is aimed at warding off harm that the other's conduct actually or apparently threatens, the privilege holds however strongly personal dislike or hostility influenced the decision to resist.38 The Restatement's illustration is a rough practical joke. A attempts one on B, and B, who has put up with similar jokes from other people, objects to this one because he dislikes A. B is nevertheless privileged to defend himself against A's attempt. The same comment adds that an actor may use force against an offensive contact threatened by someone he dislikes even though he would tolerate the same contact from a friend.39 The law tolerates mixed motives because the force still prevents a real threatened harm, so the justification stays intact whatever else the actor felt. A rule that asked whether the defender also resented the attacker would strip the privilege from anyone attacked by a person he dislikes.
Suppose the force does stop a real attack, but the actor was not responding to it. The Restatement's second illustration answers from the failing side. A points what appears to be a cane at B and addresses a gross insult to him, and B, to avenge the insult, knocks A down. The cane was a disguised shotgun, and A was attempting to shoot B and would have done so had B not acted. B is still not privileged.40 The blow did prevent a shooting, but B did not know a shooting was coming and so did not act to prevent it. Harm inflicted by an actor who is ignorant of the other's intent, and who therefore does not act for the purpose of preventing it, is unprivileged even though it was in fact necessary.41 Set that beside the practical joke. In both, the actor disliked the other person, and in both the force met a real attempt. The difference is what the actor was responding to. The first B saw the attempt and resisted it, while the second B saw only an insult and answered that. Purpose separates the two, and neither hostility nor the actual outcome does.
Pretext fails for the same reason. An actor is not privileged when he uses the other's attempt to inflict a contact as a mere excuse for applying force, and the Restatement concedes that telling genuine defense from excuse may present a difficult question of fact.42 Because purpose is a state of mind, the dispute usually turns on what the actor said and did. The same hostility that is harmless in the joke illustration becomes evidence when the other side claims the force was an excuse.
Two mistakes are common here. Dislike of the other person does not defeat the privilege, as the joke illustration shows. Actual necessity does not create it either, as the shotgun illustration shows, because the actor must also have been acting to prevent the harm.