Concept
Complete and Incomplete Privilege
Privilege as a defense to intentional torts; incomplete privilege
Complete and Incomplete Privilege
A privilege, in the Restatement's definition, is the fact that conduct which would ordinarily subject the actor to liability does not do so under particular circumstances.1 It gives the actor the legal freedom to act and immunizes the conduct.2 Once the facts point to a particular privilege, one question remains: how far does it reach? Some privileges free the actor from liability for the act and for every harm the act causes. Others protect the act and leave the actor to pay for the damage.
Two questions, asked in order, sort the cases. Was the actor privileged to act at all? Does the privilege reach the harm the act produced? A complete privilege answers yes to both, so the actor owes nothing, however serious the harm. An incomplete privilege answers yes to the first and no to the second: the act is lawful, and the actor must still compensate for the damage. The sources label the first kind “absolute” or “complete” and the second “conditional” or “incomplete.”3
Each kind has its own rationale. Self-defense answers a threat the plaintiff made, and proportionate force carries no duty to pay, however grave the injury.4 Necessity answers a danger that comes from nature or some other source unconnected with the plaintiff.5 When the danger threatens the community, individual property rights yield without compensation.6 When the actor alone benefits from using the owner's property, the owner can claim payment, in part because the actor would otherwise be enriched at the owner's expense.7
Excess is a separate matter that shares the vocabulary. Every privilege has boundaries, and an actor who crosses them answers for the harm the excess causes, even under a privilege that would otherwise be complete. The last part of this unit separates that problem from incompleteness.
Complete Privilege: Nothing Owed
Self-defense shows a complete privilege at full strength. Zilla is threatened with a push and answers with a push to ward off the blow, and the push impales Kong on a metal post. Zilla intended the push but not the impalement, so her liability turns on whether she committed a tort in the first place. If she did, she answers for the whole harm, though it exceeded what she expected; if her act was privileged, she owes nothing, although serious injury resulted. A nondeadly push in answer to a nondeadly threat is privileged, so the touching is not a battery and the gravity of Kong's injury never enters the analysis.8 The privilege does not stretch to force beyond what the threat requires, a limit taken up at the end of this unit.
Public necessity supplies the standard property example. When fire threatens a city, the court in Surocco v. Geary reasoned, a burning house and the buildings near it that carry the flames become a nuisance that it is lawful to abate, and “the individual rights of property give way to the higher laws of impending necessity.”9 The alternative is intolerable: one stubborn person might involve a whole city in ruin by refusing to allow the destruction of a building that would cut off the flames, even when it was perfectly evident that his own building must be consumed.10 Because the privilege overrides the owner's rights, the owner cannot lawfully block the demolition. The stubborn owner is the figure the rule exists to overcome.
The privilege depends on necessity. A building torn down without apparent or actual necessity exposes those responsible to an action in trespass, and in every case the necessity must be clearly shown.11 The court acknowledged that the rule can work hardship and that irresponsible people may destroy property without need, but it saw no cure in making the actors liable in every case, whether or not necessity existed.12 It left to the legislature the task of regulating how buildings may be destroyed and how compensation is to be made.13
The privilege matters most where the demolition made the difference. In some cases the property would have been destroyed anyway. In others it would not have been: the fire died out before it reached the demolished homes, or the enemy was unable to capture the installations. In those cases the defendant “must rest solely on the privilege,” and a complete privilege means the owner recovers nothing.14 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up that setting in Respublica v. Sparhawk.
The complete privilege for public necessity also sits in constant tension with the constitutional rule that the government must compensate owners whose property is taken for public use.15 In United States v. Caltex, Inc., the Court refused compensation for the demolition of an oil company's terminal facilities in Manila before the Japanese takeover, over the dissent of Justices Black and Douglas. In National Board of Y.M.C.A.s v. United States, the Court found no compensable taking when U.S. troops occupied the plaintiff's buildings in the Panama Canal Zone after rioting Panamanians had placed them under siege and already damaged them substantially.16
Public necessity is complete. A private necessity, in which an actor uses a stranger's property to save his own person or goods, is not, as the next part shows.17
Incomplete Privilege: Lawful but Not Free
An incomplete privilege makes the actor's conduct lawful and leaves the actor responsible for the harm. Professor Dobbs's skier shows both halves: “the skier who is lost in a snow storm may enter your cabin for shelter without liability. But if he burns the furniture to stay warm he must pay for its destruction.”19 The label “incomplete” fits because, although the actor may enter, she must pay for resulting harm to the property.20
Necessity is the privilege behind these cases. It is an affirmative defense to trespass to land: a defendant who acts to prevent a threatened injury from nature or some other cause unconnected with the plaintiff may use the property of others to save life or more valuable property.21 Trespass redresses actual physical intrusions on land,22 and necessity excuses the intrusion. In a private necessity, it does not excuse the cost.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. is the leading case. A ship lay moored at the plaintiff's dock under a contract; when a storm struck, the crew fastened additional cables to the dock to hold the vessel in position, and the dock suffered damage.23 The court accepted that the defendant had done nothing wrong and said that “the ordinary rules regulating property rights were suspended by forces beyond human control.” That is another way of saying that the ship was privileged to stay and that the dock owner had no right to exclude it in an emergency. But the court held the privilege conditional only: having saved the ship at the expense of the dock, the defendant was liable for the damage that resulted.24
The reasoning, as the dissent describes it, is that because the shipowner used the stronger cables to hold the boat in position, it voluntarily used another's property to save its own and became liable under that rule.25 Liability therefore follows the deliberate use of the dock, and it does not depend on carelessness. The dissent would have decided the case on whether the master, exercising reasonable care, could have sought a place of safety before the storm made leaving impossible, and on how the mooring contract allocated the risk of loss.26
The shipowner pays “reasonable rental value or compensation for lost or damaged property, as the case may be.”27 One rationale is unjust enrichment: the shipowner received the benefit of the dock and must compensate the dock owner for it.28
The same structure governs entry onto land. Chan, fleeing a pursuer, may cross Pasik's property, but he must pay for any resulting harm to it. The prospect of paying gives him an incentive to choose the least costly route across Pasik's land.29 The doctrine usually operates between strangers, but a business invitee or social guest who stays on after being asked to leave, to avoid facing the necessity, stands in the same position.30
Seen from the owner's side, the two halves fit together. Because the entry is privileged, the owner cannot exclude the actor; because the privilege is incomplete, the owner does not absorb the loss.31
Students commonly stop after finding the privilege and clear the actor, because a finding of privilege sounds like a finding of no liability. The privilege answers the trespass claim and leaves the payment obligation in place, so an answer should treat the two separately. A second slip ties payment to negligence, when the crew in Vincent had done nothing wrong and still paid.32
Excess Versus Incompleteness: Two Routes to Liability
A privileged actor can still be ordered to pay, and the law gets there by two routes that students tend to merge. On the first, the actor did more than the privilege allows, and liability attaches to the surplus. On the second, the actor did exactly what the privilege allows, and liability attaches anyway because the privilege makes the act lawful without making the harm free.
Excess comes first, because every privilege excuses only the conduct its underlying interest can justify. A defender may use only as much force as is, or reasonably appears to be, immediately necessary. A defender who becomes the aggressor exceeds the privilege, which does not encompass retaliation or revenge, and is liable to the extent of the damage the excessive force caused. Violence after the attacker is subdued, disarmed, or helpless, or has clearly withdrawn or ended the immediate threat, falls outside the privilege.34 The victim is not licensed to extract an “eye for an eye” but only to use the force she reasonably believes necessary to avert the threatened harm. Smith may not knife Jones in the ribs to avoid a slap in the face, though she would certainly be privileged to block the blow or push Jones away.35
Set Smith beside Zilla. Zilla's push impaled Kong, and she owes nothing because a push answering a push is privileged.36 Smith's knife answering a slap exceeds the privilege, and she owes for the harm the excessive force caused. The fit between the force and the threat decides both cases, and the severity of the injury decides neither.
The same ceiling governs property. An owner may not willfully injure a trespasser by force that takes life or inflicts great bodily injury, and so may not set spring guns or like devices for that purpose; the exception arises only when the trespasser is committing a felony of violence or a felony punishable by death, or is endangering human life.37 A possessor may not do indirectly what he could not do himself. Spring guns, concealed traps, and vicious animals calculated to cause death or great bodily harm are used at the possessor's risk, and he is liable for any harm he would not have been privileged to inflict had he been present.38 The Third Restatement permits a mechanical device only if, among other conditions, it is not intended or likely to cause serious harm.39
A teacher's privilege to discipline has a ceiling of its own. An instructor may use only reasonable and appropriate force and is liable if the force is excessive. The relevant variables are the nature of the punishment, the student's conduct, the student's age and physical condition, and the instructor's motive, including whether he acted in anger or dislike rather than to discipline.40 In Johnson v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., a physical-education teacher struck a boy repeatedly with a paddle that broke during the whipping, because the boy had failed to line up properly for a 200-yard dash, and the case is cited as an example of excessive force.41 Even public necessity has an outer edge: a building demolished without apparent or actual necessity leaves the actor open to an action for trespass.42
Incompleteness works differently, because the actor stays inside the privilege. In Vincent, the court held that the defendant, though it had done nothing wrong, had a conditional privilege only and was liable for the damage it did to the dock in saving the ship.43 The defendant may use or damage the dock, which it could not do deliberately without necessity, but, in contrast to self-defense, it pays for the privilege with reasonable rental value or compensation for lost or damaged property.44 Chan, privileged to cross Pasik's land, likewise pays for the harm he does.45
The payment follows the benefit. The owner created no danger and gains nothing from the use, while the actor gains the preservation of his person or goods, and unjust enrichment describes the result.46 Excess liability rests on conduct, because the actor went further than the interest could justify. Incompleteness liability rests on allocation, because the conduct was justified and the only question is who bears a loss that someone must bear. That difference explains why fault matters to the first route and drops out of the second.
The size of the injury cannot sort these cases. Zilla stays within her privilege and owes nothing for grave harm, while Chan stays within his and owes for harm to Pasik's property. The two questions in the steps above do the sorting.