Concept
Identifying the Privilege
Privilege as a defense to intentional torts; incomplete privilege
Identifying the Privilege
Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and the defendant has taken on the burden of proving a privilege, the question becomes which privilege the defendant is invoking. The Second Restatement answers by sorting privileges according to what they rest on.1 A privilege may rest on the consent of the person affected by the actor's conduct,2 on the need to protect an interest of the actor or of the public that is important enough to justify the harm caused or threatened,3 or on a function whose proper performance requires freedom of action.4
Naming the ground is worth the effort because the ground predicts the limit. Where the basis is consent, the privilege reaches only as far as the person's acceptance did. Where the basis is the protection of an interest, the law has weighed that interest against the harm to the plaintiff, so the privilege covers only the harm the interest justifies, and the amount of force becomes the central question. Where the basis is a function, the privilege follows the boundaries of the role. Each limit marks the point at which the reason for excusing the conduct runs out, and a student who can state the reason can usually derive the limit.
Acts that the law itself authorizes or requires form a further group, taken up at the end of this unit. The subsections below take each privilege in turn and state its trigger, its principal limit, and the reason for that limit.
Consent
Consent is a defense to virtually any tort. The law ordinarily has no interest in compensating a person who validly, knowingly, and freely agreed in advance to the invasion of an interest the law would otherwise have protected.5 In negligence and strict liability the same idea goes by the name assumption of risk.6 The burden of proving consent was settled above, so two questions remain: what counts as consent, and where does it stop protecting the defendant?
Consent in its plainest form is actual willingness. A defendant cannot see into the plaintiff's mind, however, and must act on what the plaintiff says and does. Words or conduct that reasonably manifest consent therefore create the privilege even when the plaintiff privately objects.7 In O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., a woman stood in a line of 200 women waiting for a shipboard vaccination, watched those ahead of her receive theirs, and held up her arm for hers. She later testified that she had been unwilling, but the court held the doctor “justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been,” because he could be guided only by her overt acts and the manifestations of her feelings.8 No one need sign a contract or utter a word to manifest consent.9 Silence and inaction can carry the same message, but only where a reasonable person would be expected to speak or move if he objected.10
The protection has three limits, and each marks a point where the plaintiff's agreement no longer covers what happened. The first is scope. Consent reaches the conduct agreed to and acts substantially similar to it, and nothing more. A kiss in the moonlight does not authorize intercourse, and agreeing to a fistfight does not authorize an opponent who is losing to produce a shotgun.11 Consent to right-ear surgery does not authorize surgery on the left, absent an unforeseen emergency.12 Within the scope of what was agreed, though, the plaintiff cannot complain of the consequences, even unforeseen ones: a player who accepts ordinary tackles consents even to one that leaves him quadriplegic.13 Sports draw the line clearly. Participants consent to the contacts consistent with the understood rules of the game, and perhaps even to contacts that result from rule violations during play, but ordinarily not to intentional harm unrelated to the play, such as a blow after the whistle; see Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.14
The second limit is capacity. The consent must be valid, knowing, and free.15 For minors above the age of infancy there is no blanket rule. A sufficiently experienced and intelligent minor may consent, expressly or impliedly, to everyday or necessary contacts, such as playing sports or receiving routine or emergency medical services.16
The third limit is deception about the essential nature of the act. Consent that rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the facts is not true acceptance. Two scenarios recur. A doctor obtains a patient's agreement to an examination by calling it treatment while actually seeking sexual gratification, and a defendant obtains agreement to intercourse while concealing a communicable venereal disease. In both, the consent is invalid, because the defendant's misrepresentation, or failure to reveal crucial facts relevant to the plaintiff's choice, kept the plaintiff from appreciating the true nature of the contact.17 The same result follows when the deception concerns who the actor is. In DeMay v. Roberts, the plaintiff consented to the presence of a man supposing him to be a physician. The court held that this did not bar her action once she learned his true character, because both defendants had obtained admission without fully disclosing it.18
The vaccination passenger and the plaintiff in DeMay each submitted without objecting, so silence does not separate the two cases. What separates them is understanding: the passenger knew what was being done and who was doing it, and the DeMay plaintiff did not know who the man was.
Self-Defense and Defense of Others
Self-defense rests on the instinct to defend oneself and the ethic that one has a right to do so. Together they justify a privilege to commit in self-defense an act that would otherwise be a tort, a self-help remedy for the moment when there is no time to resort to the law.20 It protects an interest of the actor, bodily safety, and so belongs with the second ground in the Restatement's list.21 The usual threat is a battery, but the privilege also covers force used against an unlawful confinement or arrest and even against threatened negligent harm.22 In its basic form, anyone may use reasonable force to defend himself against a threatened battery,23 and the defendant must plead and prove the privilege.24 The limits discussed below share one source: the privilege reaches only as far as the protected interest justifies the harm done to protect it.
An impending or ongoing battery triggers the privilege, and a finished one does not. The privilege permits force to forestall a battery, not to retaliate for a prior one.25 If Jones slaps Smith and announces, “There, now we are even,” Smith may sue Jones for the battery, but she may not slap him back, because the blow is over and nothing further threatens her.26 For the same reason the privilege does not extend to acts done in retaliation for a past aggression, or as a warning against repeating one.27 Mere provocation does not trigger it either: verbal abuse, insults, and threats of future harm ordinarily do not justify a physical attack in retaliation.28 A defender who becomes the aggressor exceeds the privilege and is liable for the damage the excess force causes.29
Even when the privilege arises, it allows only reasonable force, meaning the force the defender reasonably believes necessary to avert the threatened harm. The victim of an aggressor is not licensed to extract an “eye for an eye.” Smith may not knife Jones to avoid a slap in the face, though she may block the blow or push him away.31 A court tests the defender's belief objectively, against a reasonable person of average courage, in light of the circumstances of the event and any history between the parties.32 An honest but unreasonable belief does not suffice. Some older criminal cases accepted honest belief, but that has never been the rule in torts.33 Circumstances such as the relative size and strength of the parties bear on what force is reasonable; see Silas v. Bowen.
Proportion also decides who bears the cost when a privileged act goes worse than planned. Zilla pushes to ward off a threatened push, and Kong is impaled on a metal post. Zilla intended the push but not the impalement, so her liability turns on whether the push was itself tortious. If it was, she answers for the full harm, though greater than she expected. If it was a privileged response to a threatened push, she is not liable, although serious injury resulted.34
Force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm is privileged only where the defender reasonably believes he is in danger of similar harm.35 To fix the scope of the privilege, characterize the force the aggressor has threatened or, more accurately, the force the defender reasonably anticipates. If Goliath threatens only to rip David's coat, David may answer with reasonable nondeadly force. If Goliath's conduct leads David reasonably to fear serious bodily injury, David may use similar force.36
Whether the defender must retreat before using deadly force varies by jurisdiction, so an answer should flag the split. For nondeadly force, courts refuse to require retreat even when it could be done with perfect safety. A duty to run would cost the victim the right to walk the streets, and our culture places a high premium on personal choice and independence.37 For deadly force, some jurisdictions never require retreat, while others deny the privilege when the defender has a reasonable means of escape. Retreat is demanded only when it is obviously safe and expedient, and if there is reasonable doubt the defender need not flee.38 Section 65 of the Second Restatement takes the retreat position: a person attacked with deadly force must retreat, if she may safely do so, before responding with deadly force.39 The castle doctrine drops the retreat requirement in the home, and stand-your-ground statutes in many states extend that rule to anyplace the defendant may legally be.40
The privilege extends to the defense of others. The modern view is that one may come to the defense of any third person, consistent with the Good Samaritan principle.41 The intervenor may use the same force the person defended could use: reasonable nondeadly force against a nondeadly threat, and deadly force against a deadly one when necessary to forestall the battery.42 As in self-defense, the reported cases turn on how much force was reasonable. Compare McCullough v. McAnelly, where three teenaged boys attacked the defendant's son and would not desist when warned, and the father shot and wounded one, with Lopez v. Surchia, where the defendant shot a boy who was fighting with the defendant's son on the front lawn and the force exceeded the privilege.43
Jurisdictions divide when the intervenor misreads the scene. Suppose Galahad rounds a corner, sees Goliath swinging at David, and punches Goliath, not knowing that David had just threatened Goliath with a knife and that Goliath's swing was self-defense. Under the “shoe-stepping” approach, evidently the minority position, Galahad is privileged only if David actually was, and David, as the initial aggressor, was not.44 Courts of this view hold that the intervenor assumes the risk that he is mistaken.45 Under the Second Restatement and the courts that follow it, a reasonable mistake does not defeat the privilege, so Galahad is protected if it reasonably appeared that David faced a battery.46
Self-defense licenses force against the person who created the danger, and it does not travel to innocent third parties. When a defender accidentally injures a bystander, ordinary negligence principles decide liability. If the defender intentionally harms an innocent person because doing so is or seems necessary to escape the danger, there is no privilege, and the defender owes at least compensatory damages unless the harm was relatively minor compared with the harm threatened. Killing an innocent person to save one's life, or using a bystander as a shield against a bullet, produces liability, while knocking a bystander down or confining him briefly does not.47
Defense of Property
A possessor's interest in peaceful possession and enjoyment of property supports a limited self-help privilege against imminent intrusions.49 The interest counts for considerably less than the safety and bodily integrity of human beings, so the privilege is narrower than self-defense.50 The same force may therefore be privileged in defense of a person and unprivileged in defense of property.
The traditional rule required the possessor first to ask the intruder to leave or desist, unless the request would clearly be in vain or there was no time or opportunity. If the intruder stayed, the possessor could threaten or use reasonable force, but only the force minimally required to prevent or end the intrusion.51 An intruder engaged in the active destruction of property, such as tearing down a fence, need not be asked to leave first, unlike a simple entrant.52
The sharpest limit is a ceiling. Force calculated to cause death or great bodily harm is generally not permitted to protect property,53 and one can never use force likely to inflict death or great bodily harm for that purpose.54 It is not reasonable to use force calculated to inflict serious bodily harm to protect a property interest.55 Two qualifications matter. If the intruder also threatens bodily harm to the possessor or other occupants, the ordinary rules of self-defense apply, and the possessor may use whatever defensive force is required, including death or serious bodily harm against a threat of similar harm; the intruder has no privilege of self-defense against reasonable force used to protect the property.56 And in many jurisdictions the castle doctrine now lets a possessor use deadly force to defend the dwelling against unlawful entrants whom the possessor reasonably believes entered to commit a felony,57 so an answer should say which rule it applies. In M'Ilvoy v. Cockran, a possessor shot a man who was tearing down a fence on the possessor's land. The court held that no request to leave was needed, given the active destruction, but rejected the plea that the wounding was justified in defense of possession. A wounding could be justified only if the intruder had assaulted the possessor or the family, and then the assault, and not the property, would supply the justification.58
A possessor cannot do indirectly what he could not do in person. Spring guns, concealed traps and other mechanical devices, and vicious animals calculated to cause death or great bodily harm are used at the possessor's risk. The possessor is liable for any harm he would not have been privileged to inflict if he were present, in most cases notwithstanding posted warnings.59 In Katko v. Briney, the court found the overwhelming weight of authority behind a jury instruction that an owner may not willfully or intentionally injure a trespasser by force that takes life or inflicts great bodily injury, and so may not set spring guns or like dangerous devices for that purpose. That the trespasser is violating the law does not change the rule. The instruction allowed an exception only where the trespasser was committing a felony of violence or a felony punishable by death, or was endangering human life.60
The Third Restatement permits a mechanical device only if it is reasonably necessary to protect the property, the device is reasonable under the circumstances, the device is customarily used or the possessor uses reasonable care to warn probable intruders of its use, and the device is not intended or likely to cause serious harm.62 The last condition applies the in-person ceiling to devices.
One more difference from self-defense concerns the possessor's error. The same rules of apparent necessity apply, so a possessor may act on how the danger reasonably appears. A mistake about the intruder's status is another matter. If the intruder in fact has a privilege to be on the land or to touch the chattel, the possessor's ignorance or mistake about that privilege is no defense, unless the intruder caused the mistake.63
An owner who has already lost a chattel stands in a different position from one defending possession, and the law gives that owner a narrower privilege to retake it. The privilege was first recognized where the owner's possession had been only momentarily interrupted, so that the owner could be regarded as defending the original possession and not as interfering with another's. Later it was extended to a wrongdoer who obtained the chattel by force or fraud and made off with it, but only while the owner's pursuit was fresh, and those limitations have continued to apply.65 The force must be reasonable under the circumstances. In Hamilton v. Barker, a defendant could use only the force necessary to recover the plums the plaintiff had gathered from his tree, and force calculated to inflict serious bodily harm is never reasonable to protect a property interest.66 The force-or-fraud requirement keeps the privilege from reaching ordinary disputes. In Watson v. Rheinderknecht, a seller in a contract dispute, with no force or fraud by the buyer, was not entitled to take back his sheep.67
The shopkeeper's privilege applies similar thinking to a recurring commercial problem. A merchant who reasonably believes a person has unlawfully taken goods held for sale may detain that person for a reasonable investigation of the facts.68 In Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store, the store's agent, Reinhardt, motioned to Mrs. Bonkowski to return toward the store, told her someone had reported that she put three pieces of costume jewelry into her purse, and said he wanted to see its contents. On a step in front of the store she emptied her purse and produced sales slips for her purchases, and Reinhardt, satisfied that she had not committed larceny, returned to the store.69 The court adopted the rule of section 120A and sent the case back for a jury to decide two questions in order: whether the agent reasonably believed she had unlawfully taken goods, and, if so, whether the investigation that followed was reasonable under all the circumstances.70
The privilege therefore turns on reasonable belief and a reasonable investigation, and not on whether theft occurred. Mrs. Bonkowski had taken nothing, and the merchant was still privileged if both requirements were met. If the jury finds that the defendant does not come within the privilege, it may find a false arrest.71 Some states adopted the privilege by case law, as in Collyer v. S.H. Kress Co., and it is statutory in many jurisdictions, with the scope varying from state to state.72
Necessity
Necessity is the privilege to use another's property to avert a danger the plaintiff did not create. It is an affirmative defense, or privilege, to the tort of trespass to land. A defendant who acts to prevent a threatened injury from some source of nature or other independent cause not connected with the plaintiff is said to act under necessity, and has the right to use the property of others to save life or more valuable property.74 The tort it most often answers is trespass, which punishes actual physical intrusions on land, such as throwing stones on it, driving a truck across it, or mining gravel on it.75
The danger's independence from the plaintiff separates necessity from the privileges above. In self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property, the plaintiff is the aggressor or the intruder, and the law lets the defendant answer the person who made the danger. In necessity the plaintiff is blameless: the danger comes from nature or another independent cause, and the plaintiff's land or goods merely offer a way out.76 The case for overriding the owner's rights must therefore rest entirely on the weight of what the defendant faces, which is why the privilege is framed around saving life or more valuable property.
The classic application is a vessel that uses another's dock to escape a danger beyond human control; see Ploof v. Putnam. In Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., the defendant saved its ship at the expense of the dock, and the court held that the privilege was conditional only: although the defendant had done nothing wrong, it was liable for the damage that resulted.77 The court said that “the ordinary rules regulating property rights were suspended by forces beyond human control,” yet the point of a conditional privilege, it can be argued, is that an actor who may use the plaintiff's property must pay for any damage.78 The payment question belongs to the later discussion of incomplete privilege. For identification, it is enough to see that a justified entry can still leave the actor liable.
The privilege covers using or damaging property, and it stops short of seriously injuring an innocent person. If a defendant intentionally harms someone who did not cause the danger because doing so is or seems necessary to escape it, there is no privilege, and the defendant is liable for at least compensatory damages unless the harm was relatively minor compared with the harm threatened.79 A defendant who damages a garden to escape an attacker is within necessity, and one who seriously injures a bystander for the same purpose is outside it.
The second step does most of the work on an exam. A stem that supplies a sympathetic motive without a grave harm is testing exactly that line.
Parental Discipline
Some jobs cannot be done without touching or restraining other people, and orderly discipline is one of them. The law therefore gives those who control others the privilege of using reasonable force and restraint on them,81 and the function it protects is the third ground in the Restatement's list.82 A parent who could not take a child's arm, steer the child to a bedroom, or hold a door shut for a few minutes without risking a battery or false imprisonment claim could not raise the child. The same reasoning marks the limit, because the privilege protects only what the function requires, and force that serves no disciplinary purpose gets no protection.
The privilege belongs to a parent and to one who is deemed to stand in a parent's place; see Clasen v. Pruhs; Fortinberry v. Holmes.83 Its scope was rarely tested for many years because parents were immune from suits by their children. That immunity was first recognized in Hewellette v. George, a false imprisonment claim based on a parent's confining a daughter to a mental institution, a case in which the court may have been unwilling to delineate the scope of the privilege.84 For the reach of parental authority over a grown child, see Peterson v. Sorlien.
Whether particular conduct falls within the privilege depends on the factors the Restatement lists:
- the age, sex, and condition of the child;
- the nature of the child's offense and the apparent motive for it;
- the influence of the child's conduct as an example to other children in the same family;
- whether force or confinement is reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience; and
- whether the force or confinement is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.85
The factors fall into two groups. The first three describe how much correction the situation calls for, and the last two test the means against that need. Force that is disproportionate, degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm falls outside the privilege however the adult labels it.
The privilege also covers those who are only temporarily responsible for a child, including other family members, teenage babysitters, adult day-care providers, housekeepers, piano teachers, and school bus drivers. The amount of force acceptable for them is less than a parent could use.86 The facts of Single v. New York City Transit Authority show how such a question arises: a transit authority employee drove a school bus carrying some 65 to 70 boisterous students on the last day of the term, and a 14-year-old plaintiff was among them.87
An instructor may use only reasonable and appropriate force and is liable if the force is excessive. Courts look to the nature of the punishment, the student's conduct, the student's age and physical condition, and the instructor's motive, asking whether he acted in anger or out of dislike and not in an attempt to discipline; see Story v. Martin. In Johnson v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., a physical-education teacher struck a boy repeatedly with a paddle, which broke during the whipping, for failing to line up properly to run a 200-yard dash.88 Most school systems now tightly regulate corporal punishment, so much of the litigation turns on state statutes or school board regulations and not on the common law. In Rinehart v. Board of Education, an Ohio statute gave a teacher immunity so long as the teacher followed a particular protocol before paddling a student.89
On an exam the facts announce the actor's role, so identifying the privilege is the easy step. The analysis turns on scope: who the actor was, how much latitude that role carries, and whether the force fit the child's age, the offense, and the actor's motive. A school problem should also prompt a check for a controlling statute or regulation.
Public Interest and Authority
The second ground in the Restatement covers interests of the public as well as of the actor,91 and the law separately privileges whatever it authorizes or requires.92 Destroying a building to meet an emergency is the classic case of harm to private property justified by a wider interest. The old decision recognizes that the necessity of blowing up a house may not exist, or may not be as apparent to the owner, whose judgment is clouded by interest and by the hope of saving his property, as to others. The individual must act on his own judgment of the exigencies, and if a building is torn down without apparent or actual necessity, those responsible are liable in trespass.93 The privilege therefore protects action on actual or apparent necessity, and it gives no license to act on a hope that necessity will appear.
There is a privilege to do that which is authorized or required by law. The difficulties lie in determining what the law is and whether it is valid, questions that often vex the best lawyers, and in determining the effect of the actor's good-faith mistake about his legal authority. The execution of legal process by a public official is the common setting.94 An officer who arrests under a warrant or seizes goods under civil process does what a private person could not do without legal backing, and it would contradict the law to order the act and then charge the officer for performing it.
The law sorts official acts by how much judgment they call for. Ministerial acts are those requiring little or no personal judgment about whether or how to do them, such as closing an office at five o'clock or recording a deed. They are not privileged if done improperly, regardless of the actor's good faith. It has been exceedingly hard to distinguish them from acts that call for judgment, and the cases are in hopeless confusion.95 Good faith does count in some settings: where an officer acts under a law later declared unconstitutional, there is a tendency to hold the act privileged if done in good faith.96
An arrest under a warrant, like the seizure of goods under civil process, is generally ministerial, so the officer is privileged only if the officer's acts in fact conform to law.97 The warrant must come from a court with jurisdiction to issue such warrants. If the court has the general power to issue arrest warrants, the arrest is privileged when the warrant appears valid and proper on its face, even though errors or irregularities in its issuance would be regarded as divesting the court of jurisdiction over this particular case.98
The ministerial character of the act also means the officer must carry out the order as written. If a warrant commands the arrest of A and the officer arrests B, there is no privilege, even where the officer reasonably believed that B was A.99 The contrast with self-defense is instructive. A reasonable mistake of fact can preserve the privilege of self-defense, but it cannot extend an arrest to someone the warrant does not name. Defects in how the warrant was issued do not matter if the warrant is facially valid, while a departure from the warrant the officer holds does.
Arrests without a warrant may be made by a police officer or, in some circumstances, by a private citizen. The common law developed elaborate rules for them, statutes have largely superseded those rules, and such arrests are privileged only when in actual conformity to law.100 The Second Restatement devotes some 34 sections to the privilege of arrest, distinguishing arrests by private persons from arrests by police officers, arrests with warrants from arrests without, and arrests for felonies from arrests for lesser offenses. Constitutional guarantees and statutory variations complicate the picture further. In many circumstances there is a privilege to arrest based on a warrant or a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a crime, but where the privilege does not apply, the arrest is actionable false imprisonment, often called false arrest.101 An answer should identify the governing statute or flag the variation and should not recite a single rule.
Governmental immunity is a separate protection. Public officials and governmental entities are sometimes immune from tort liability for certain official acts, in addition to the privileges described here.102