Concept
Consent and Chattels
Consent
Consent and Chattels
Consent defends against interference with goods as it defends against a touching or an entry onto land.1 A chattel is movable personal property, such as a car, a laptop, or a bicycle, and trespass to a chattel and conversion are the torts that protect an owner's control of it. The questions developed earlier in this chapter carry over without a new test: Was the owner willing? What did the consent cover? Did a lie or a threat corrupt it? Goods add two complications. They move, so a person who got an item through a corrupted consent can sell it to a buyer who knows nothing of the defect. And they are lent, so a borrower may put an item to uses the owner never described.
Three rules answer those complications. The first states the defense itself. The second withdraws the defense when an owner surrendered goods because of fraud or duress, unless the defendant is a bona fide purchaser. The third makes a borrower liable for harm that follows a use beyond what the owner allowed. Stems on this topic usually describe an item that left the owner's hands by loan, repair, or sale, and the facts point to one of the three rules.
Consent to Interference
One who would otherwise be liable for trespass to a chattel or for conversion is not liable to the extent the owner has effectively consented to the interference.2 The rule applies to goods the general principle that one who effectively consents to conduct intended to invade his interests cannot recover in tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.3 The words to the extent make the defense divisible. Consent bars the claim for the interference the owner accepted and leaves the claim alive for anything beyond it.4
Two ideas support the rule. An owner's right to control goods includes the right to lend them, leave them with a repairer, give them away, or let someone carry them off, so an owner who does one of these things has exercised the right and has not suffered a wrong. Reliance supplies the second idea. People handle other people's things informally all the time: a neighbor borrows a ladder, a friend stores a bicycle, a roommate is left with what the departing tenant did not take. If a later suit could punish someone who took the owner at his word, no one could safely accept a casual invitation to use or take anything. The limits in the rule guard against the opposite risk. The owner chose a particular interference, and an actor who goes past it relies on nothing the owner showed. Conditional consent, or consent restricted as to time, area, or other respects, is therefore effective only within its limits, and consent that the actor exceeds is ineffective for the excess.5
The consent that matters here is the consent analyzed earlier in this chapter. Consent is willingness in fact for the conduct to occur. The owner may manifest it by action or inaction and need not communicate it to the actor.6 Words or conduct that the actor reasonably understands as intended to be consent are apparent consent, and they are as effective as consent in fact.7 With goods, apparent consent produces most of the disputes, because owners seldom write anything down when they lend a lawnmower or leave a futon in a hallway. The test is objective: what would the owner's behavior reasonably convey to someone in the actor's position? It also looks to what the owner manifested. An actor's private conclusion that the owner would not mind, formed without anything from the owner behind it, is not consent.
The two results come from one rule applied item by item. Consent covered the sales that stayed within what Okafor's words conveyed. As to the guitar, the roommate exceeded the consent, which leaves it ineffective for the excess while it still covers the rest.8 The outcome tracks what the owner actually chose. An owner who disclaims a futon has decided something about a futon, and a rule that read the disclaimer to cover the whole apartment would hand the roommate a decision the owner never made.
Both sellers believed the goods were fair game, and the difference lies in where each belief came from. Okafor's words produced the first roommate's belief. Lindqvist's note contradicted Vance's, and nothing else she did supplied a basis for it. Apparent consent protects reliance on what the owner manifested, and an actor who relies on his own conclusion has nothing to protect.
The fourth step previews the next section, because goods obtained through a corrupted consent can pass to a buyer, and the rules for that situation come next. The fifth step does the most work in practice, since most chattel stems describe a defendant who did somewhat more than the owner agreed to.
Fraud, Duress, and Purchasers
An owner who hands goods over because of a lie or a threat has not consented in the way the defense requires. Consent to possession of a chattel obtained by fraud or duress is not effective to prevent recovery for trespass to the chattel or for conversion against anyone other than a bona fide purchaser of the chattel.10 The rule qualifies the base defense, under which a defendant is not liable to the extent the owner effectively consented.11 An owner who lends a ladder has consented, and the borrower has a complete answer to a claim for using it. An owner who surrenders the same ladder because a swindler deceived him or a bully frightened him has made the same physical delivery, yet the rule refuses to count that delivery as consent against the person who produced it. A bona fide purchaser is a buyer who takes the chattel in good faith, meaning without notice of the defect, and for value. Only that buyer keeps the benefit of the owner's handover.
The defense protects an actor who relied on the owner's willingness. A swindler who persuaded the owner with a false story relies on a picture he painted himself, and a person who frightened the owner into delivery relies on the fear he created. The general rules describe both defects. Consent given under duress is not effective.12 Neither is consent induced by a substantial mistake about the nature of the invasion or the extent of the harm to be expected, when the other party knows of the mistake or caused it by misrepresentation, and in that case the consent fails as to the unexpected invasion or harm.13 The chattel rule uses the plainer labels of fraud and duress, so the work in an answer is to find the lie or the threat and to show that it produced the delivery.
The exception for purchasers resolves a contest between two blameless people: the owner who was deceived or threatened, and the buyer who paid for goods the seller seemed to own. The rule leaves the loss with the owner as against the buyer. The buyer acted on appearances, since a person who holds goods and offers them for sale looks like their owner, and buyers could not safely deal with anyone if they had to fear that a seller's possession rested on some earlier fraud or threat.14
Each word in the label does its own work. Good faith ties the exception to the reliance that justifies it. A buyer who knew of the fraud or threat, or had reason to know, relied on nothing the owner manifested and stands where the wrongdoer stands. Value points to a buyer who has parted with something on the strength of the seller's apparent ownership, and the word purchaser points toward that buyer and away from a person who received the goods for nothing.
Both buyers paid for goods that came from the same threat, and the notice each had decided the result. Wen cannot reach the laptop in Hale's hands, but the rule exempts only the purchaser, so his claim against Garrity survives.
A stem that says the owner handed the goods over voluntarily has therefore not ended the inquiry, since the real question is what produced the handover. The exception also never helps the wrongdoer. A person who obtained the goods by the lie or the threat does not become a bona fide purchaser by selling, keeping, or renaming the transaction, because the protection belongs to the innocent buyer who relied on the wrongdoer's apparent ownership.
Use Exceeding Consent
The third rule concerns a person who holds another's goods lawfully because the owner agreed to it. One who uses a chattel with the consent of another is subject to liability in trespass for any harm to the chattel which is caused by or occurs in the course of any use exceeding the consent, even though such use is not a conversion.16 The rule addresses borrowers, renters, and repairers, whose possession starts out privileged. The owner's consent answers a claim for the interference it covers, and only to that extent.17 This rule says what follows when the holder goes past that extent, and it is the chattel counterpart of the general rule that consent is ineffective for the excess.18
The clause saying that the excess use need not be a conversion does necessary work. Conversion is interference serious enough that the actor is treated as having taken over the owner's rights in the thing, and much misuse falls short of that line. A borrower who takes a tool to a different job than the one agreed has not made himself its owner. Without the clause, he could argue that the owner handed over possession, that the deviation was no taking, and that nothing remains to complain about. The rule closes that argument. Consent to possession and to one kind of use does not cover a different use, so the owner may sue in trespass for the harm the different use brings, without proving that the borrower came close to taking the thing.
The rule reaches harm by two routes. Harm caused by the excess use is the straightforward case, because the borrower's departure from the terms produced the damage. Harm that occurs in the course of the excess use covers more ground, because the owner need not trace the damage to the particular feature of the use that went beyond the consent; it is enough that the damage happened while the borrower was using the thing in a way the owner never accepted. The reason runs through the consent itself. The owner accepted one kind of use with its particular risks, and nothing the owner agreed to covers the hazards of the use the borrower substituted. Those hazards fall on the borrower, who chose to leave the terms and could have avoided every one of them by staying inside them.
The rule also keeps owners willing to lend. A borrower takes a chattel on the owner's terms, and those terms are the only thing that makes the borrower's possession privileged. An owner who feared that any deviation short of an outright taking would leave him without a remedy would hesitate to lend a mower, a bicycle, or a truck to anyone. Letting the owner recover for harm that follows the borrower's overreach keeps casual lending safe. The result also matches the general limits on consent, under which conditional or restricted consent is effective only within its limits and fails for the excess.19
The two borrowers had the same machine and the same loan, and the line fell between a home lawn and a client's job. That comparison is the hinge in every problem under this rule: what the owner agreed to, measured by the item, the purpose, the place, and the time, set against what the borrower did. The comparison can also divide a single episode. A borrower who mows his own lawn with the owner's permission and later uses the mower on a paying job is within the consent for the first use, while harm that happens during the second falls within the rule. A stem that reports the owner lent the item has therefore not decided the claim, because it leaves open what the item was lent for. Where the borrower did exceed the consent, the owner need not prove a conversion, and an answer that stops at the observation that the use fell short of conversion has stopped too early.