Concept
Implied Consent in Emergencies
Consent
Implied Consent in Emergencies
A person pulled unconscious from a wreck cannot agree to anything, yet the surgeon who operates without asking may owe nothing. The Restatement accounts for this with the rule of § 892D on when consent is not necessary, which it applies to intentional invasions of interests of personality.1 The actor is protected when two conditions are met. First, an emergency makes it necessary or apparently necessary, in order to prevent harm to the other, to act before there is an opportunity to obtain consent from the other or from one empowered to consent for him. Second, the actor has no reason to believe that the other, given the opportunity, would decline.2 Earlier sections of this chapter asked whether the plaintiff manifested willingness and whether that willingness was effective. This section takes up the plaintiff who was never asked. Treatises list the doctrine as the fourth category of consent, emergency consent, alongside actual, apparent, and presumed consent.3
The word ‘implied’ overstates what the doctrine does. The Restatement’s special note calls the implied consent a fiction and explains that the immunity rests on a privilege arising independently of the other’s consent, a privilege that requires affirmative proof of the circumstances that create it. The rule appears among the consent rules only because it is so closely related to consent and has so customarily been treated as a form of it.4 Two practical consequences follow. The defendant has no word, gesture, or custom to point to, because the plaintiff supplied none, so the defendant must prove both the emergency and the absence of any reason to expect refusal. And because the privilege answers to the circumstances and not to the plaintiff’s state of mind, the plaintiff’s private unwillingness does not defeat it unless the actor had reason to know of it, which is exactly where the privilege ends.
Each condition has its own logic. The first confines the privilege to cases in which time runs out before anyone with authority to agree can be asked, so a person who can be asked, or a substitute empowered to consent for him, must be asked. The words ‘apparently necessary’ protect the actor, who must judge the scene as it looks in the moment. The second condition rests on prediction: most people would accept generally acceptable emergency treatment, so going ahead probably implements this person’s choice.5 Once the actor has reason to think the person would decline, the prediction fails and the privilege fails with it.
The Restatement’s illustrations show the privilege at work in three settings. A delirious man threatens to throw himself from a window, and B, who locks the door and windows to stop him, is not liable. A, using no unnecessary force, pushes a blind man out of the path of an approaching automobile, throwing him to the ground, and is not liable. A man run over by a train is carried unconscious to a hospital, where the resident physician, finding that his foot apparently requires immediate amputation to save his life, amputates before he regains consciousness; the physician is not liable.7 In each scene the harm is imminent, no one can be asked in time, and nothing suggests the person would refuse. The third scene involves the most drastic invasion, and a treatise notes that treatment destroying a major bodily function, such as an amputation, may call for a stricter showing: that delay would risk death or very serious harm to the patient’s health.8
The privilege also reaches a surgeon who meets the unexpected in mid-operation. In the Restatement’s fourth illustration, a patient consents to a particular operation and submits to anesthesia, and on opening the body the surgeon discovers conditions that make it necessary to extend the operation or perform a different one. The conditions apparently require the new or extended operation to save the patient’s life or accomplish the cure he wanted, postponing it would bring pain and distress out of proportion to the risk of the new operation, and a reasonable person who knew of the conditions would consent. The surgeon who proceeds is not liable.9 Emergency consent can thus cover conduct that exceeds a limited consent the patient gave earlier, so long as the actor had no reason to believe the patient, given the chance, would have refused.10
Nothing in the rule limits the privilege to doctors, nurses, or emergency technicians. It speaks of ‘the actor’ and requires no professional qualification.11 The Restatement’s first two illustrations involve a person who locks a delirious man in a room and one who pushes a blind man from the path of a car, neither with any stated medical role.12 The actor must satisfy the two conditions, not hold a credential. Nor is the privilege the ordinary private-necessity defense. Under private necessity, courts hold that an actor privileged to interfere with property or person must nevertheless pay for the resulting harm, and the source says that result does not seem right for the rescuer.13 The person who throws a blind man to the ground to save him from a car owes him nothing for the fall.14
The second condition keeps the privilege tied to the person’s own choice. If, in the fourth illustration, the surgeon also knows that the patient would not consent to the new or extended operation, the surgeon is subject to liability.15 The rule asks whether the actor had reason to believe the person would decline, which reaches beyond actual knowledge, and a refusal need not be spoken. In a published example, an unconscious patient named Carella wears a bracelet declining transfusions. The privilege normally covers generally acceptable emergency treatment, but the bracelet tells Dr. Langone that Carella does not accept a treatment that others would, and it rejects the touching just as clearly as if he had sat up on the table and said, “Hey, no transfusions!” She must honor that choice despite her disagreement, even if she expects the refusal to prove fatal, and if she transfuses him anyway she is liable for battery.16
Emergency departments apply the same two-sided logic. They treat the unconscious patient on an assumption of implied consent, but a medical record indicating that the patient wants no extraordinary measures or no resuscitation, or the presence of a health care proxy, will likely mean that documented orders take precedence over that assumption.17 The fiction covers the silence of a patient who has said nothing and gives way before a patient who has said something.