Concept
Consent to Criminal Conduct
Consent
Consent to Criminal Conduct
Sometimes the act a plaintiff agreed to is also a crime, as an agreed fistfight may be. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892C answers in two parts. Subsection (1) states the general rule: except as subsection (2) provides, consent is effective to bar recovery in a tort action although the conduct consented to is a crime.1 Subsection (2) states the exception: if conduct is made criminal in order to protect a certain class of persons irrespective of their consent, the consent of members of that class does not bar a tort action.2
The two halves follow from the difference between a prosecution and a tort claim. A prosecution belongs to the public, and one person's agreement cannot bind it. A tort claim belongs to the person whose interest was invaded, and consent is that person's decision about that interest. The general rule keeps the tort inquiry tied to the plaintiff's choice. The exception applies where the legislature has already decided that, for a particular group, the choice should carry no weight.
Consent Despite Crime
Section 892C(1) governs conduct that is both a tort and a crime: consent that is otherwise effective bars the tort action even though the conduct consented to is criminal.3 The rule speaks only to the civil claim. It does not make the conduct lawful, and a prosecutor may still charge the participants, so a plaintiff who loses the tort suit on this ground has not been declared innocent of anything. What the rule settles is that the criminal character of the act gives the plaintiff no extra way around a consent that was otherwise effective. Capacity, scope, revocation, fraud, and duress still decide whether the consent counts, and illegality is not a further test.
The Restatement's reasoning is deterrence. A rule that denied the defense would discourage agreement to illegal conduct by attaching a civil price to it. But two adults who agree to a fight where fighting is criminal already risk fines or jail, and the added risk of damages to an opponent who joined the fight willingly is unlikely to change the choice of anyone the criminal law has failed to stop. On this view, tort liability has no realistic effect on the parties' decision to engage in the conduct.4 Denying the defense would also depart from the ownership reasoning behind consent generally: the interest was the plaintiff's, and so was the choice.
Many courts, perhaps most, reason differently in battery cases and treat consent to a criminal act as ineffective, on the theory that allowing the defense would condone violence and lawlessness.5 Their concern is what a judgment says. A court that throws out the injured fighter's suit seems to treat an illegal brawl as a private bargain the law will honor, while a court that lets the suit go forward shows that an agreement to break the law carries no legal weight. A strong minority of courts and the Restatement reject that reasoning and hold the consent effective.6 Both camps accept that the plaintiff agreed. They disagree about what a civil judgment accomplishes: one side finds that it deters little, and the other finds that it keeps courts from lending approval to violence.
Effective consent despite crime reaches only as far as the consent itself. A patient who agrees to an unlawful abortion has consented to that procedure, but the consent does not extend to the negligent infliction of harm or death in performing it.7 The illegality of the procedure removes no limit on scope, so the scope rules from earlier in this chapter still mark where the consent stops. Subsection (2) supplies the one exception to the general rule: consent by a member of a class that the criminal statute was written to protect does not bar a tort action.8
On an exam, a stem that says the agreed conduct violated a criminal statute has not yet described a winning plaintiff. Start from the Restatement rule that consent is effective despite the crime, note that many courts, especially in battery cases, hold the opposite, and follow the jurisdiction if the stem names one. Then run the ordinary consent requirements. Finally, ask whether the statute was written to protect a class of persons irrespective of their consent, because only a yes to that question reopens a claim the general rule would bar.
Statutes Protecting a Class
Section 892C(2) marks the limit of the rule that consent bars a tort action even when the conduct consented to is a crime: if conduct is made criminal in order to protect a certain class of persons irrespective of their consent, the consent of members of that class does not bar a tort action.10 The general rule lets consent stand because the interest belongs to the plaintiff and so does the choice about it. Subsection (2) applies where the legislature has itself decided that, for a particular group, the choice carries no weight. Two things must therefore be true before the defense is withdrawn. The statute must have been enacted to protect a class of persons whatever they themselves agree to, and the plaintiff must belong to that class.
The standard example is a statute fixing the age of consent to sexual intercourse. A minor below the statutory age who agrees to intercourse with an adult can still sue for battery, because age-of-consent laws exist to protect minors from their own immaturity.11 The legislature treats a minor below that age as unable to judge whether to engage in the conduct, so it forbids the adult's conduct whether or not the minor agreed. Tort law follows the criminal law: courts bar the adult from raising the minor's consent as an affirmative defense in a civil action based on the same conduct, which reinforces the legislative policy.12 This bright line differs from the capacity analysis earlier in the chapter, where a sufficiently experienced and intelligent minor could consent to everyday contacts such as sports. There the question was whether this particular minor could understand and weigh what was being accepted. Here the legislature has answered the question for the whole class, and an individual minor's maturity does not reopen it.
The reason the defense disappears follows from what the defense rests on. Consent protects an actor because the plaintiff made a choice about his own interest and the actor relied on it. A protective statute records a legislative judgment that, for this class, the choice is not one the law can trust. If the defendant could still point to the plaintiff's yes, the statute would be undone by the very thing it was written to discount, and the person who induced the conduct would escape civil liability on the strength of an agreement the legislature had declared worthless. The exception also keeps the civil and criminal results consistent. A defendant who is guilty of a crime because the plaintiff's agreement is legally meaningless cannot be blameless in tort because of that same agreement.
The class need not consist of children. Statutes that prohibit boxing matches because of the danger to the participants fall in the same category, so a fighter's agreement to box does not bar his action when the statute protects fighters irrespective of their consent.13
Dorsey and Kline's tavern fistfight in the prior section came out the other way in a court following § 892C(1). That plaintiff was equally willing and his injury equally real, yet the assault statute he and Kline violated protects the public generally and singles out no group of participants whom the legislature meant to shield from their own agreement. What changes the answer is the statute's purpose: whether the legislature made the conduct criminal in order to protect people in the plaintiff's position irrespective of their consent. Because § 892C(2) puts the inquiry on why the conduct was made criminal, a court reads the design of the statute, and a fixed age or a ban on a dangerous contest shows who the statute is for.14
The same refusal to credit a protected plaintiff's agreement appears when a defendant uses it to reduce damages instead of defeating the claim. In Christensen v. Royal School District, a Washington decision of 2005, a teacher had intentional sexual contact with a 13-year-old student, and the court held that neither the teacher nor the school officials accused of negligent supervision could assert the student's 'consent' as comparative fault.15 If the law treats the student's agreement as legally empty for purposes of the crime, a defendant gains nothing by relabeling it as fault. Withdrawing the defense does not establish the claim, however, and the plaintiff must still prove the elements of the tort.