Concept
Ending Consent
Consent
Ending Consent
Consent ordinarily protects an actor only as long as the willingness behind it lasts. The earlier sections asked how consent was manifested, who could give it, and how far it reached. This section asks whether it was still in force when the contact occurred, because consent that fully covered conduct at noon may have ended before the conduct at one o’clock.
Once consent terminates, its effectiveness terminates with it. Two exceptions apply: the consent may have become irrevocable by contract or otherwise, or its terms may include, expressly or by implication, a privilege to continue to act.1
Consent ends in either of two ways. The person who gave it may withdraw it, or it may run out under its own terms, since consent conditioned on an event or restricted as to time, area, or other respects is effective only within the condition or restriction.2 Either way the ending works forward. One who effectively consents to conduct cannot recover for the conduct or for harm resulting from it,3 so contact that occurred while the consent stood stays protected, and contact after the ending has no consent behind it.
Withdrawal carries a second consequence. The actor loses the shield of consent, and the person who withdrew regains the privilege to resist, a point the second subsection develops.4 Entry on land has termination rules of its own, which come later in this chapter.
Revocation
Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur,5 and willingness can change in a minute. A plaintiff who was willing at noon and unwilling at one o’clock consented to the noon contact and to nothing after it. The plaintiff ends consent by revoking it, which the plaintiff may do at any time by communicating the revocation to the defendant.6
The two halves of that rule do different work. “At any time” means that agreeing to one contact does not bind the plaintiff to the next. The communication requirement protects the actor. Consent in fact need not be communicated to the actor,7 but words or conduct reasonably understood as consent are as effective as consent in fact,8 so an actor who has seen only signs of willingness stays protected until a contrary sign reaches him. Without the requirement, a plaintiff could wrestle through an entire match and then testify that he had privately quit minutes before the injury.
Revocation works forward only. Contact that occurred while the consent stood stays covered, and contact after the actor has received the withdrawal has no consent behind it.
Consent can also expire without anyone revoking it. A party who consents to a three-week drug treatment program cannot sue for false imprisonment if he is kept for three weeks.9 The consent is restricted as to time, so it does not reach a fourth week.10 Revocation differs because the plaintiff ends the consent by an act of his own, and may do so before any stated period has run.
Two exceptions soften the default, and each answers an arrangement that would make little sense if one side could leave at will. The first covers consent that has become irrevocable by contract or otherwise. The text gives no list of the “otherwise” cases, so an answer should name the facts that make the consent binding, such as a promise not to withdraw.11 The second covers consent whose terms include, expressly or by implication, a privilege to continue to act. Some activities make sense only if they run to completion, and a person who joins one may be taken to have agreed to see it through.
An ambiguous outcry tests the communication requirement hardest. The rule demands communication but sets no standard of clarity, so a close case likely turns on whether a reasonable actor would have understood the plaintiff’s words or conduct as a withdrawal, the same question that governs apparent consent.12
An IRAC answer to a stem like this states the rule, applies it to the words and the setting, and names the facts that would change the result.13 Marta’s words would convey withdrawal in any setting. Imani’s cry conveys it only if the setting lets a listener hear it that way.
A revocation does more than strip the actor’s defense. It also restores the person’s privilege to resist, which the next subsection takes up.
Consent and Self-Defense
Consent shields the actor, and it also costs the consenting person something: his own privilege to resist. A person who has consented to a particular bodily contact, or to any other invasion of his interests of personality, may not defend himself against it unless his consent was obtained by fraud or has been withdrawn. He keeps his normal privilege of self-defense against any contact or invasion not included within his assent.15 The rule has a core, two exceptions, and a boundary.
Self-defense is itself a privilege. Smith, sued by Jones for battery, may plead that she hit Jones to ward off a blow from him, and if she acted in self-defense she was privileged to inflict the contact and is not liable.16 The privilege answers a wrong. A contact the person has accepted is no wrong against him, because one who effectively consents cannot recover for it,17 so there is nothing to repel. A consenting person who answered an agreed contact with force would also turn the consent into a trap for the actor, who would meet a counterblow for conduct the consent made lawful.
Fraud is the first exception. Consent induced by a substantial mistake about the nature of the invasion or the harm to be expected, where the other knew of the mistake or caused it by misrepresentation, is not effective for the unexpected invasion.18 The person has accepted less than what was done to him, and the privilege to resist returns. A later section takes up defects in consent in full.
Withdrawal is the second exception. Once the person withdraws and the actor receives the withdrawal, further contact is unwelcome, and the person may resist it. The sparring match shows the shift. Marta had no privilege to resist the blows she had accepted, but after she told Kowalski plainly that she was finished and he heard her, she could defend against the two punches that followed. A withdrawal that has not reached the actor has not ended the consent, because a revocation operates when it is communicated.19
The last clause marks the boundary: contact the consent never covered. A stem that describes an agreed fight and a participant who claims he was only defending himself raises a first question: was the contact he resisted within what he agreed to? Vega agrees to a fist fight with Jones, and that agreement does not authorize Jones to use a shotgun if he fares poorly in the battle.20 While the fight stays with fists, each man has accepted the other’s blows, so neither can call his own punches defense against them, and each rests on consent instead. When Jones draws a shotgun, the analysis reverses.
The shotgun does double work. It takes Jones out from under the consent, because consent is not effective for the excess.21 It also returns to Vega the privilege to defend himself, because the shotgun is a contact he never accepted. The two results fit together: consent that cannot protect Jones’s shotgun cannot also disarm Vega’s resistance to it.
This subsection settles only the threshold question of whether the privilege is available. It is unavailable against contact the person himself consented to. It is intact where the consent was obtained by fraud, has been withdrawn, or never reached the contact.