Concept
Capacity and Authority
Consent
Capacity and Authority
Consent protects an actor only when the right person gives it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A(2)(a) makes that the first condition of effective consent: the consent must come from one who has the capacity to consent or from a person empowered to consent for him.1 The earlier sections asked whether the plaintiff consented at all, through actual words, apparent conduct, or the surrounding context. This section asks about the person behind the consent. A willingness that is real in fact, and even one every bystander could see, can fail here because of who expressed it.
The condition follows from why consent works as a defense. The law treats a body, a parcel of land, or a chattel as its holder's own, so the holder's decision to accept an invasion carries legal weight. That reasoning assumes a holder who can understand what is being accepted and weigh it. A very young child, a person delirious with fever, and someone too intoxicated to follow events may each seem willing, but none has made the choice the rule protects.
The rule cannot end with incapacity, because people who cannot decide for themselves would then be unable to receive even necessary care; no one could accept the contact on their behalf. Section 892A(2)(a) therefore offers a second route to effective consent, through a person empowered to consent for the plaintiff. That route has limits of its own, because a substitute stands in the plaintiff's place only as far as the power reaches. The first subsection asks whether the person who agreed could agree at all. The second asks when someone else may agree for the plaintiff.
Capacity to Consent
Capacity, in this setting, is the ability to understand what is being accepted and to weigh it. Infancy, intoxication, or mental incapacity that is known or obvious to the actor ordinarily vitiates consent, which means it strips the agreement of its legal effect.2 A plaintiff's visible “yes” therefore does not settle the question. The court must also ask whether the person who said it was able to say it.
Each half of the rule has its own reason. Capacity matters because consent defeats a claim only when the holder has chosen to accept the invasion, and choosing takes some grasp of what is chosen. A patient delirious with fever and a toddler facing a procedure may each say yes, yet the word carries none of the understanding that gives consent its force. The knowledge requirement matters because the defense protects an actor who reasonably relies on what the plaintiff showed. An actor who sees the incapacity cannot reasonably rely on the agreement, while an actor who sees only ordinary outward signs has no warning of a hidden defect. Limiting the rule to incapacity that is known or obvious keeps liability from resting on a defect no one could detect.
When incapacity is known or obvious and the contact calls for consent, as medical treatment does, the consent must first come from a person empowered to give it on the plaintiff's behalf. An adult family member or guardian may hold that power for a minor or an incapacitated adult, before or during the procedure.3 The next subsection explains how far that power reaches. For now, incapacity in the speaker closes the route that runs through his own word but leaves open the route that runs through someone empowered to speak for him.
Minors are not all treated alike, because capacity depends on the experience and judgment an activity demands, and a birthday cannot settle it. Above the age of infancy there is no blanket rule. A sufficiently experienced and intelligent minor may consent, expressly or by conduct, to everyday or necessary contacts, such as playing sports or receiving routine or emergency medical services.4 A fifteen-year-old who has played hockey for years can therefore accept the body checks that come with the game, because the activity demands a kind of judgment she has already shown. A very young child sits on the other side of the line, within infancy, where incapacity ordinarily vitiates the agreement.
Medical care shows the variation most plainly. A parent or guardian may speak for a minor patient, and the rule above already lets a sufficiently experienced and intelligent minor consent to routine or emergency services on his own.5 Some jurisdictions have built the second idea into a mature minor doctrine, but the doctrine has limits: in In re Cassandra C. (Conn. 2015), a seventeen-year-old with Hodgkin's lymphoma was forced to undergo chemotherapy against her own and her mother's wishes.6
When an exam stem gives a plaintiff's age, it is asking whether this minor, for this contact, had the experience and judgment the activity demands. In a medical setting it may also be asking which rule the jurisdiction follows. If the stem does not name the jurisdiction, say that the answer varies, then analyze the minor's maturity and the nature of the contact.
The same capacity requirement governs well beyond the clinic. The incapacity rule of § 892A(2) applies to intentional invasions of interests of personality, the bodily and dignitary interests that battery, assault, and false imprisonment protect.7 It applies as well to entering or remaining on land. A possessor whose incapacity is known or obvious to the visitor cannot give an effective invitation, so a salesperson who walks in on the say-so of a plainly confused homeowner meets a trespass claim open to the same challenge.8
Consent Given for Another
The second route to effective consent runs through a person empowered to consent for the plaintiff.10 Consent is ordinarily personal. The body at stake belongs to the patient, so no one else can accept an invasion of it unless the patient conferred the power or the law supplies it. A patient who can decide may name a health care proxy to decide for him, and where a proxy is present, documented orders will likely take precedence over any assumption of implied consent.11 When a patient cannot decide and has named no one, the law looks to a guardian, a parent, or next of kin: an adult family member or guardian may be empowered to consent for a minor or an incapacitated adult, before or during the procedure.12
Either way, the substitute stands in the patient's place only as far as the power reaches, and the power exists to carry out the patient's own wishes. That purpose explains the limits. A competent patient may not be treated over her objection, even when the treatment is required to save her life. When a patient is incompetent, family members, doctors, hospitals, and others may not override the patient's wishes either, so the caregiver must first try to learn what those wishes were before the rules on substituted consent apply.13
A standard illustration shows how firmly known wishes bind. Carella arrives unable to speak for himself, wearing a bracelet that refuses transfusions. The privilege to treat a patient who cannot consent rests on the idea that most people would accept such treatment, so going ahead probably implements the patient's own choice. Carella's bracelet tells Dr. Langone that he is not one of those people, and it rejects the touching as clearly as if he had sat up on the table and said, “Hey, no transfusions!” Dr. Langone must honor that choice even if she disagrees with it and expects it may prove fatal; if she transfuses anyway, she is liable for battery.14 If a patient's known refusal defeats even the privilege to treat in an emergency, a relative's signature cannot do more.
The Restatement carries both halves of this analysis into every intentional invasion of interests of personality. The rule on the person by whom consent must be given applies,15 and so does the rule on the person to whom consent must be given.16 The first rule catches a signature from someone who has no power over the patient. The second bears on a patient who agreed to one person's performance when someone else acts.
Most battery claims against medical practitioners arise from inadequate consent, and the reported cases show failure at each question.17 In Vitale v. Henchey, a Kentucky case, a surgeon believed he was authorized to operate but had not obtained that authorization from someone able to consent for the patient.18 His belief could not stand in for the missing power, so an exam stem that says the surgeon honestly believed the signer could consent is not describing a defense. In Richter v. Epstein, a Massachusetts case, the plaintiff alleged that she had consented to a non-urgent procedure by Dr. Epstein, a highly skilled and experienced surgeon and chief of service at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston. A scheduling error led a less-qualified surgeon to perform it, and she proved that damages resulted.19 A patient who chooses a surgeon for skill has agreed to that surgeon's hands, and ordinarily has not agreed to whoever the schedule supplies.
For any authorization an exam stem describes, ask four questions: who signed; whether that person held the power to decide for this patient; whether the patient's own known wishes point the other way; and whether the person who acted is the person the authorization named.