Concept
The Consent Defense
Consent
Consent as a Defense
The Consent Defense
A person who effectively agrees to another's conduct cannot sue over it. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A states the rule: one who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.1 The last clause carries weight. A plaintiff who agreed to an act usually sues over what followed from it, such as a bruise or a broken wrist, and the rule bars recovery for that harm along with the act. The old maxim volenti non fit injuria, “to one who is willing, no wrong is done,” says the same thing.2
The law protects a person's interests for that person's benefit, so it ordinarily has no interest in compensating someone who validly, knowingly, and freely consents in advance to the invasion of an interest the law would otherwise have protected.3 Each of those adverbs marks a place where the defense can fail. The agreement must be genuine, informed, and voluntary, and the later sections test consent on exactly those points.
The rule is not confined to one tort. Consent is a defense to virtually any tort, and it works the same way whether the interest invaded is a person's body, land, or goods.4 It answers battery, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels alike.5 In negligence and strict liability the same idea goes by the name assumption of risk, which has grown into its own body of law and is not developed here.6 Lawyers classify consent as a privilege, meaning a set of added facts that justifies conduct that would otherwise be tortious. If those facts are present, the defendant has committed no tort. That separates a privilege from a defense such as contributory negligence, which reduces or bars recovery but leaves the defendant's conduct tortious.7
An exam fact pattern that describes an offensive touching has therefore not yet described a winning claim. The first question is whether the plaintiff agreed to the contact, and the second is whether that agreement was effective. Section 892A(2) supplies the framework for the second question. Consent must come from one who has the capacity to consent or from a person empowered to consent for that individual, and it must be to the particular conduct or to substantially the same conduct.8 The sections that follow take those requirements in turn. They ask how consent is manifested, who may give it, what it covers, when it ends, and what defects, such as fraud and duress, make consent that exists in fact ineffective in law. They then apply the same ideas to land and to chattels.
One pleading puzzle divides the authorities: who must prove the presence or absence of consent? Battery involves an unconsented-to physical contact, and most courts accordingly regard lack of consent as an element of the tort that the plaintiff must prove.9 Other cases treat consent, like most privileges, as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise and prove, and Sims v. Alford, an Alabama decision of 1928, is an example.10 The shift is under way. Some jurisdictions that once made the plaintiff prove lack of consent now treat it as a defense, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons takes no position on the burden, and many courts that call lack of consent an element in theory handle consent as a defense in practice.11
The two views reflect two ways of seeing the same fact. If the wrong is an unwelcome contact, consent negates an element and the burden stays with the plaintiff. If consent is a privilege that excuses an otherwise complete tort, the burden moves to whoever invokes the agreement. Even where the burden formally rests on the plaintiff, consent operates so much like a defense that it is studied with the defenses.12 On an exam, note that the allocation of the burden varies, then analyze the facts of consent, because effective consent defeats recovery under either view.