Concept
Value of Converted Property
Remedies and damages for intentional torts
Value of Converted Property
Conversion is the intentional tort whose remedy is the whole value of the thing, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 927 says how that value is measured and what the owner may add to it. A plaintiff entitled to a judgment for conversion of a chattel, or for destruction or impairment of any legally protected interest in land or other things, may recover either of two measures of value under § 927(1). Section 927(2) then lists further items that the plaintiff’s damages “also include.”1 The measures in the preceding sections priced harm to something the owner still holds: a loss in value, a repair bill, a period of lost use. Conversion prices the chattel itself.
The reason is the forced sale. The most distinctive feature of conversion is its measure of damages, the value of the goods converted. The theory is that a “converting” defendant has treated the goods as his own, so the plaintiff can ask the court to decree a forced sale of the property from the rightful possessor to the converter.2 The owner is paid the value, and the converter keeps the goods. Because the price is the goods’ value, the physical damage done to the chattel does not cap the recovery: when the interference is substantial enough, the plaintiff recovers the full value even though the actual damage to the chattel was less than total, or nil. Trespass to chattels, by contrast, is available for any intentional interference but limits damages to the plaintiff’s actual harm. All conversions are therefore trespasses, but not all trespasses are conversions.3
Because the remedy compels a purchase, courts reserve it for serious interferences. Conversion “requires very substantial exercise of control or dominion inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights.” Property that is merely damaged, or whose possession is only temporarily interfered with, supports a claim for trespass to chattels. Property that is stolen, or even used for a substantial period, will likely support conversion.4 The line is hazy. The Second Restatement recognizes no single bright-line test and instead directs courts to weigh several factors in judging the seriousness of the interference and the justice of making the actor pay full value, beginning with the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or control.5 The rest of this unit assumes the plaintiff has cleared that hurdle. It asks what price the forced sale pays and what the owner may add to it.
Value at Time and Place
Section 927(1)(a) supplies the first measure: the value of the subject matter, or of the plaintiff’s interest in it, at the time and place of the conversion, destruction, or impairment.6 The measure fixes one moment and one location. It reaches land and other things as well as chattels, because § 927(1) applies to the destruction or impairment of any legally protected interest in them.7
When the property has a market, the measure is its market value at that time and place.8 The time is fixed because the law expects the owner to mitigate. If the chattel is available on the market, the owner should buy another, and the award is meant to fund that replacement.9 For an ordinary chattel, then, a fact pattern that reports what the owner paid years ago, or what the chattel is worth today, is offering the wrong date.
A chattel may have no market where it was converted. The measure then looks to its value at the nearest market in which it does have a value, less the cost of transporting it to that market.10 The deduction follows from the replacement idea. A mill price is available only after the goods have been delivered, so an owner paid the full mill price would collect money that the owner would have had to spend to earn it.
The award therefore shrinks as the place of conversion moves away from the market.11 The logs also show a limit on what can be converted. Standing timber is part of the real property on which it stands, and conversion applies only to personalty. Earth, sand, gravel, and timber count as real estate only while they remain in their natural position in the ground, and once they are wrongly severed and removed they become personalty for which a conversion action lies.12
Market value gives out when the property holds no real market value. Most courts then allow the owner to recover the actual value of the property to the owner, and other methods, such as manufacturing cost less depreciation, may also serve.13 In White v. Henry, claimants were permitted to offer evidence of a long family history of ownership of destroyed antique furniture and a set of table china.14
Ordinary household goods raise a related problem. As a practical matter, consumers must replace goods rather than simply adjust their balance sheets. Most jurisdictions therefore permit a “value to the owner” measure for items such as clothes and household goods, with age, condition, and the cost of replacement or repair as additional factors in the calculation.15
Whichever value results, § 927(2) adds interest, consequential loss, and compensation for lost use on top of it, and the last subsection of this unit takes those items up.
Fluctuating-Value Commodities
Section 927(1)(b) gives the plaintiff a different valuation date for “commodities of fluctuating value customarily traded on an exchange to which traders customarily resort.” For these the plaintiff may recover the highest replacement value of the commodity within a reasonable period during which the plaintiff might have replaced it.19 The provision is the other half of the either-or in § 927(1). It is an alternative to the value at the time and place of the conversion and supports no separate claim.20
The refinement exists because the ordinary measure assumes the owner can replace what was taken, and in a moving market a price fixed on the day of the taking may not let the owner do so. Any rule must then divide the gains and losses of price changes between the owner and the converter. A person who holds property for investment bears the risk that its price will fall before resale.21 The rule answers by giving the owner some of the potential profit lost while holding the owner to the risks of the market.
Under the New York rule, when converted property fluctuates in value, the plaintiff recovers the greater of two figures: the fair market value at the time of conversion, or the highest fair market value between the time the plaintiff learns of the conversion and the end of some reasonable period in which the plaintiff could buy substitute property.22 The rule rests on two rationales that restrain each other. First, it lets the owner recover the value of the potential profit lost. Second, the owner may not speculate on the market without assuming some risk of a losing market. An owner who wants the entire profit lost must buy substitute property and bear the risk of loss as well, and that requirement gives the owner a reason to replace promptly and mitigate the damages.23
Two features of the Restatement’s wording set the rule’s reach. The first is the kind of property. The commodity must fluctuate in value and be customarily traded on an exchange where traders resort, so an heirloom or a handcrafted piece stays with the ordinary measures from the last subsection. The second is the window. It closes after a reasonable time to replace, and the sources differ at its edges. The New York statement opens the window when the plaintiff learns of the conversion, and another statement speaks of the highest market price within a reasonable time after the owner has notice.24 A different formulation runs from the conversion itself. Some courts would give the owner the highest intermediate value up to the time of suit or judgment, but the rule most commentators approve stops at a reasonable time for making a replacement.25
The cutoff keeps the rule from becoming a free option. Inside the window, the owner cannot do worse than the value at conversion and can do better if the price rises, because the conversion took away the chance to replace. Once a reasonable time to replace has passed, that justification is gone. An owner who waits for a higher price is betting on the market, and counting later peaks would make the converter finance the bet. The owner who wants the full profit of a later rise must instead buy a substitute promptly and live with whatever the market does next.26
On an exam, first ask whether the property is a fluctuating-value commodity traded on an exchange where traders customarily resort. If it is, compare the value at the time of conversion with the highest price in the reasonable replacement window, and give the owner the higher. A trial-date price, or a peak after the window closed, is the wrong date. If the property is an ordinary chattel, the time-and-place measure and its fallbacks govern. Interest, consequential loss, and compensation for use are added to whichever value results.
Bad-Faith Improvements
The first item that § 927(2) adds to the value measure is “the additional value of a chattel due to additions or improvements made by a converter not in good faith.”29 The item fills a gap in § 927(1)(a), which values the thing as it stood when and where it was taken, so whatever the converter does to the goods afterward falls outside that figure.30 A converter who merely stores the goods creates no difficulty. One who spends months rebuilding them produces a chattel worth far more than its taking-day price, and the question becomes who gets the increase.
The forced-sale idea shows what is at stake. Conversion treats the converter as having bought the chattel at its value on the day of the taking, so a converter who pays only that figure and keeps the goods in improved form would also keep every dollar the work added. For a converter who knew the goods belonged to someone else, that result would reward the taking: take the goods, add labor, pay the lower figure, and pocket the difference. Section 927(2)(a) closes that route by counting the added value in the owner’s damages, so the knowing converter receives no credit for the work. The sources also say that proof of wrongful intent, knowledge, motive, mistake, or lack of good faith supports additional damages in conversion generally.31
The clause speaks of the additional value, so the figure is what the additions and improvements added to the chattel’s worth, and the cost of the converter’s labor and parts does not set it. A converter who sinks $5,000 into work that adds $3,000 of value leaves the owner $3,000 of added value to recover.
The good-faith converter is the contrast the rule is built around. The clause reaches only a converter “not in good faith,” so improvements by a converter who acted without notice of the owner’s rights are not added, and the measure remains the value at the time and place of the conversion even when the goods have been transformed.32 A converter who believed the goods were his own made no choice to disregard anyone’s rights when doing the work. Whether the owner may instead reclaim the improved chattel itself is a separate question, taken up in the later sections on return of converted chattels.
On an essay, the deciding fact is the converter’s state of mind, and the size of the improvement is secondary. A stem that dwells on how dramatic the transformation was describes the amount at stake, while the facts that decide who receives it are what the converter knew about the owner’s rights. Ask first whether the converter acted in good faith. If not, add the improvements’ additional value to the base value. If so, stop at the base value.
Consequential Loss, Interest, and Use
Three more items complete § 927(2): the further pecuniary loss that the deprivation has legally caused, interest from the time at which the value is fixed, and compensation for loss of use not otherwise compensated.35 Each fills a gap that the value measure leaves open. That measure pays the chattel’s price at one place on one day, and it says nothing about what the owner lost afterward. The owner may have lost income the chattel would have earned, waited for payment, or gone without its use. The three items answer those losses in that order, and because they sit on top of a forced-sale price, one limit controls all three: no single deprivation may be paid for twice.
The first gap is income. Under § 927(2)(b), the owner recovers any further pecuniary loss of which the deprivation has been a legal cause, so the loss must trace to the conversion and be one the law will charge to the converter.36 Ensuing losses can reach well past the wrong itself. A tort that cut off electricity to a factory, for example, might cost the factory its profits on a year’s production, not just the value of the power. As losses stray farther from the wrong, courts grow more doubtful that the defendant caused them, and causation, certainty, foreseeability, and avoidable consequences cut the recovery back.37 An owner who could have rented a substitute cheaply therefore cannot claim months of lost profits, and an owner who cannot prove what the chattel would have earned recovers nothing under this item.
Interest fills the second gap, which is time. Section 927(2)(c) awards interest from the time at which the value is fixed.38 Under the ordinary measure the value is fixed at the time and place of the conversion, so interest runs from the taking until judgment is entered.39 The judgment arrives long after the taking, and interest compensates the owner for the time the value went unpaid. A measure that fixes the value at a later date, such as the highest replacement value within a replacement window, moves the starting point with it.
Loss of use fills the third gap, and the clause reaches only use that no other item has already compensated.40 Even an owner who recovers the chattel may still sue for the reasonable value of its use and any loss in market value during the detention.41 The qualifier matters most when the owner has been paid the value. An owner who receives the value with interest from the day of the taking has already been compensated for the time spent without that value, and a rental charge for the same stretch prices the same deprivation a second time. Lost profits proved under the first item likewise cover the weeks in which the chattel would have earned them, so a rental figure for those weeks would count them again. The general rule points the same way: an item belongs in one damages category and only one, since omitting it undercompensates the owner and counting it twice overcompensates.42
Interest and lost profits can stand together, as they did for Whitfield, because one pays for delayed receipt of a sum and the other pays for income the business would have earned. Rental value and interest collide, because both put a price on keeping the owner away from the same asset for the same weeks.
Build a conversion problem in layers. Fix the value under § 927(1) first. Then ask what the deprivation cost the owner in income, what the delay in payment cost, and what use of the chattel the owner lost, and place each dollar in the single item that fits it. A stem that supplies a weekly rental figure, an interest rate, and proven lost profits for the same weeks is asking whether all three survive, and the answer is that only those that no other item has already paid for do.