Concept
Damages for Harm to Land
Remedies and damages for intentional torts
Damages for Harm to Land
When a past invasion harms land without destroying all of its value, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929(1) tells the court what to compensate.1 Two limits in the opening clause fix its reach. The invasion must already have happened, so the section pays for harm the intrusion has produced. And the harm must fall short of total destruction of value, because a plaintiff whose interest is wholly destroyed recovers the value of that interest at the time and place of the destruction.2 Partial harm is the harder case. A parcel with a cracked foundation or a fouled stream still exists and still has worth, so no single figure obviously captures what the plaintiff lost.
Section 929 answers with three components: the difference between the land's value before and after the harm (or, at the plaintiff's election in an appropriate case, the reasonable cost of restoration), the loss of use of the land, and discomfort and annoyance to the plaintiff as an occupier.3 Each tracks a different way a plaintiff's interest in land can suffer: its worth as property, the plaintiff's ability to use it while the harm lasts, and the personal experience of the person who lives or works there. Section 929 also adds a separate rule for a thing attached to the land but severable from it, which lets the owner recover that thing's loss in value instead of the damage to the land as a whole.4
The section offers several measures, and sometimes a choice among them, because land can be neither moved nor replaced and harm to it takes different forms. A single fixed measure would sometimes overcompensate and sometimes leave the injury unrepaired. The aim is the one that ran through the personal-harm sections above: full compensation for the injury to the owner's interest, without a windfall. Possession decides who recovers, which is why the discomfort clause speaks of the plaintiff as an occupier. The subsections below take the components in order.
Value Loss or Restoration Cost
Section 929(1) gives the plaintiff two ways to price partial harm to land. The first is the difference between the land's value before the harm and its value after. The second, available at the plaintiff's election “in an appropriate case,” is the cost of restoration that “has been or may be reasonably incurred.”5 The first measure treats the land as an asset and compares what a buyer would have paid before the harm with what a buyer would pay now. The second treats the land as something the owner means to keep and asks what putting it back will cost. Because it reaches costs already incurred and costs that may reasonably be incurred, an owner can sue before the repairs end. Property cases generally pair these two yardsticks, diminution in market value and cost to repair.6
The election exists because neither yardstick is accurate in every case. A drop in market value records what strangers would pay, and it can understate the loss of an owner who keeps the land and must spend money to make it usable again. A restoration bill records an expense the owner will actually incur, so it measures the loss better whenever repair is reasonable. Both measures serve the same aim, which is to leave the owner no worse and no better off than before the invasion, and that aim also explains the limits on the choice. The plaintiff knows whether repair is planned and so makes the election, but the qualifier “in an appropriate case” tells the court that the plaintiff's preference does not end the inquiry.
The land's own worth caps the election. Restoring land can be difficult and costly, and many courts therefore limit recovery to the land's depreciated value, the diminution measure, to avoid economic waste.7 The cap follows from the aim of leaving the owner where he stood before the tort. An award several times the land's value would leave the owner far better off, and it would let him pocket the money and leave the land as it is, since a damages judgment does not compel repair. The rule of avoidable consequences points the same way, because an injured party must diminish the loss as reasonably as possible.8
The ratio of repair cost to land value separates this result from the pasture. The $4,000 repair was about two percent of the pasture's worth, while the $400,000 cleanup was more than six times the lot's value before the harm. An exam stem that supplies both a value figure and a repair estimate is asking which measure survives when the numbers diverge, and the answer depends on how far the repair bill outruns the land.
Whether the harm is permanent or temporary supplies a second framework. For permanent harm, the award is the diminution in value, meaning the fair market value immediately before the injury minus the value immediately after, and it takes account of the land's past and future diminished productivity.9 For temporary harm, the measure is the reasonable cost of restoring or repairing the land to its former condition.10 Harm that cannot be undone leaves a lasting loss in worth, and the value measure folds the future into one figure. Harm that can be repaired costs what the repair costs. The sources do not state the relationship in identical terms. One gives diminution for permanent harm and restoration cost for temporary harm; another says that after permanent injury the possessor may recover either the diminution or the cost of restoration.11 A student can reconcile them by treating the classification as the default, the election as the way to depart from it in an appropriate case, and economic waste as the cap on restoration in either setting. A single tract may also suffer both kinds of harm, as when permanent damage strikes one part and temporary damage another, and the plaintiff may recover for both provided he does not recover twice.12
The classification also controls injunctions. If the injury is permanent, courts will not issue a preventive injunction, because the diminution award already compensates the owner for future harm and an injunction would duplicate it and overcompensate him. A party with a temporary injury may benefit from an injunction, since damages cover the past interference and the order reaches future conduct, so the two remedies do not overlap.13 Where a trespass continues but the injury is not permanent, damages reach only injuries before the date of judgment, and the possessor may sue again for harm after it.14 Value and restoration compensate the land itself. The owner's separate loss of use and the occupier's discomfort, taken up next, come on top of either measure.
Loss of Use and Discomfort
Beyond the value or repair measure, § 929(1) gives the owner of partly harmed land two further items: compensation for the loss of use of the land and compensation for “discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupier.”18 The first is the economic side of the injury, and the second is the personal side. Both exist because the value and restoration measures look at the land at two moments, before the harm and after the repair, and say nothing about the interval between them. An owner whose land returns to full value on the day the work ends was still deprived of it for the weeks or months before, and a measure that ignored the interval would let the trespasser use the land for free. Each item also attaches to a particular plaintiff, the one in possession, which becomes decisive when the plaintiff is a landlord out of possession.
Courts usually price lost use by asking what the land would have rented for, and some courts use the fair rental value for the period of the injury to compensate temporary harm.19 The figure is an objective market measure. A trespasser remains liable for rental value whether or not he gained any benefit from the land, even if he lost money using it, and where the interference only reduced the land's rental worth, the measure is the diminished rental value.20 The objective rate serves both sides. The owner need not prove personal plans for the land, and the defendant cannot shrink the award by pointing to a poor result from his own use.
The rental measure has edges. It fits an interference that can be measured in terms of use or possession over a period, so it has no application to a single transitory trespass, where no stretch of lost use exists to price. Physical damage or destruction calls for separate damages, and damages for a permanent trespass normally are limited to the full market value of the property.21 The plaintiff also may not collect twice for the same loss. A diminution-in-value award for permanent harm already reflects the land's past and future diminished productivity, so stacking a rental figure for the same period on top of it risks counting one loss two times.22
Discomfort and annoyance is the personal counterpart of lost use. It compensates the occupier's interest in comfortable enjoyment of a home or land, an interest that lives in the experience of the person on the premises and cannot be read off a rental table. Because the clause speaks of the plaintiff as an occupier, the item belongs to the person who actually lives or works on the land and feels the invasion. The two items can coexist on one set of facts without overlap, since one measures what the land was worth to use and the other measures what the plaintiff endured while the land was disturbed.
A landlord out of possession shows that both items depend on who holds the land. A possessor may recover compensatory damages for the actual harm a trespass causes, while a person holding only a nonpossessory interest recovers for harm to that interest and no more.23 In a standard illustration, Trish trespasses on Paul's rented apartment. Paul recovers at least nominal damages, but his landlord recovers only for any permanent harm Trish caused to the apartment, and the landlord's mortgagee recovers only if Trish impaired its security. In a companion illustration, an easement holder with a right of way over a road recovers against a trespasser on that road only if the intrusion unreasonably interfered with her use.24 The landlord's claim is narrow because its interest is a reversion, which is harmed only if some lasting injury will still affect the property when it returns to the landlord.25 A landlord who lives elsewhere also has no household to be disturbed, so the discomfort clause has nothing to attach to, and the tenant's loss of use of the apartment falls on the tenant.
Occupier status supports discomfort and annoyance, but the manner of the trespass can raise the stakes. Johnson v. Marcel allowed emotional-distress damages without physical injury where the alleged trespass was deliberate and accompanied by aggravating circumstances.26 The two authorities turn on different facts. In the Trish illustration the question is who holds possession, and the landlord loses most of the claim because the landlord is not the occupier. In Johnson the question is how the trespass was committed, and the occupiers' claim grows because the trespass was deliberate and aggravated.
On an exam, a stem that describes an invasion of a home should be sorted by plaintiff and by conduct. The first question is who possesses and lives on the land, because the occupier takes loss of use and discomfort while the out-of-possession owner takes only permanent harm to its own interest. The second is whether the entry was deliberate and aggravated, which opens emotional-distress recovery without bodily injury. A rental-value figure then prices the lost use, and a separate award answers the discomfort, so an answer that folds the two into one number, or awards both to the landlord, has merged items that are kept apart.
Severable Things on the Land
Section 929 also addresses harm to something attached to the land but separable from it, such as trees or a fence. When such a thing is damaged, the owner may elect to recover the loss in value to the thing instead of the damage to the land as a whole.29 The rule gives the owner a second route beside the before-and-after measure for the parcel, and it applies only to injuries that fall on a thing that can be valued apart from the soil it stands on.
The election exists because a parcel and an object on it can carry very different values. A before-and-after comparison treats the parcel as one asset priced by what a buyer would pay for the whole. A stand of mature trees may be worth thousands of dollars to a timber buyer while the market price of the lot barely moves, so the whole-parcel measure would leave the owner of valuable trees with almost nothing. The same measure can overcompensate when the thing destroyed was trivial and the parcel's price swings for unrelated reasons. Letting the owner pick the measure that tracks the actual loss avoids both results, and the owner is the right person to choose because the owner knows what the thing is worth and whether the land measure would pay more.
Severability is what makes a separate valuation possible. Earth, sand, gravel, and timber count as part of the real estate while they remain in their natural position in the ground, but once they are wrongly severed and removed they become personal property with a value of their own.30 The trespass remedy reflects the same idea: a trespasser who removes assets from the property may be liable for their value, or may be required to return them or pay a royalty for them.31 A defendant's honest belief that the land is his own does not defeat liability for the entry, because an actor who enters another's land believing she is on her own is still a trespasser.32
An exam stem that supplies both a drop in the land's value and a separate price for the damaged trees or fence is testing the election. The owner may take the loss in value to the thing in place of the land measure, and will take whichever tracks the real loss. The choice is exclusive. The trees' value is already part of what the parcel lost, so adding the two figures would count one loss twice and pay the owner more than the harm. The election therefore cannot be used to collect both measures for the same injury.