Concept
Sorting Trespass from Conversion
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Sorting Trespass from Conversion
The Second Restatement ties the two torts together in one rule: a person who dispossesses another of a chattel is subject to liability in trespass for the damage done, and if the dispossession seriously interferes with the other's right to control the chattel, the actor may also be liable for conversion.1 The rule works in layers. Every dispossession supports a trespass claim for the damage done, and only the serious ones add conversion, so a fact pattern does not force a choice between rival labels. An answer needs an order of questions that gives each tort its own gate, and the earlier sections of this chapter supply the parts of that order.
The sequence matters because each step guards against a different error. Step three catches the harmless touching. Unlike trespass to land, which is actionable without any resulting harm, trespass to chattels is limited to the four listed consequences, so an actor can intermeddle and still owe nothing.5 A person who sits on the bumper of another's car has intermeddled, but is not liable if the car is undamaged. The same is true of a person who releases the brake on a parked car and pushes it forward a few feet to make room to park, because that actor neither dispossessed the owner nor damaged the car.6
Step four catches the opposite error. Conversion makes the actor pay the full value, so the real question is whether that result is just, and the Restatement concedes that no single bright line classifies the cases. It offers factors for courts to weigh instead, starting with the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control.7 Dobbs puts the same idea as a demand for “very substantial exercise of control or dominion inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights.”8 An answer that stops after step two over-finds liability, and an answer that leaps to step four on any wrongful taking over-awards full value.
One hat, handled three ways, shows the steps at work. Horton takes Cobble's hat and damages it, say by tearing the hat band, but the hat remains wearable. The damage impairs the hat's condition, so Horton is likely liable for trespass to chattels under § 218(b). Had he damaged the hat to the point of uselessness, he would be liable for conversion.9
Suppose instead that Horton keeps the hat for months. Cobble has now been deprived of its use for “a substantial time,” which fits trespass to chattels, and a deprivation that long is also a serious enough interference to raise conversion, so the two torts overlap.10 Cobble's lawyer should assert both claims and let the court sort out which one fits.11
Now suppose Horton, intending to steal the hat, grabs it, spots a police officer, and puts the hat back on the shelf seconds later. The duration factor favors Horton, but two others cut against him: he intended to assert a right in fact inconsistent with Cobble's right of control,12 and he did not act in good faith.13 Together those two factors may justify conversion despite the short interference. A diner who honestly takes the wrong hat and returns it the moment he notices keeps the same short duration but has neither bad intent nor bad faith, and the contrast shows what does the work: the factors weigh what the taker meant to do and whether he was honest, along with how long he held the chattel.
A ride on a horse supplies the basic contrast between the two torts. Carter takes Puso's horse, Flora, for a three-hour ride and returns her to Puso's barn. Trespass to chattels exists for just this kind of case, since it supplies a remedy for damage to personal property or for temporary interference with its use even though the possessor is not permanently deprived.14 Carter therefore answers in trespass if the ride produces one of the § 218 consequences, such as loss of use for a substantial time or harm to Flora. Conversion asks for more, because the interference must be serious enough that Carter should pay Flora's full value, and a ride that ends with her back in the barn points away from that result.15
Exam answers that earn credit follow the sequence and treat seriousness as a contest. In the flood problem, O'Hara takes Butler's canoe to escape rising water while Butler is away from New Orleans, and the canoe takes a gash in its side. The intent is her decision to take and use the canoe, the act is the taking and using, and the harm is the gash. Seriousness then cuts both ways. A hole defeats the very purpose of a boat, and taking and using the canoe for an indefinite time in unknowable conditions suggests serious interference with Butler's right to control it, which makes the point a question of fact.16 But she used the canoe for a relatively short time, and Butler, having left New Orleans, did not need it then, so trespass to chattels is the likelier classification, subject to the defense of private necessity.17 A strong answer closes by raising that defense.
The cornfield problem shows what an answer loses by stopping at the act. When Ben starts picking the corn, he actually intermeddles, and because the corn cannot be put back on the stalk, harm to the corn occurs. That harm raises a question of conversion, not just trespass.18 A student who treats Ben's picking as a bare trespass misses that question, and the same answer overlooks Jerry's possible conversion even though the facts tell us Jerry used a machete to hack a path through the field.19 The reason is the rule on destruction: one who intentionally destroys a chattel, or so materially alters its physical condition as to change its identity or character, is liable for conversion to a possessor or to one entitled to immediate possession.20 If the machete destroyed the plants, the rule turns on that destruction.
These examples keep producing overlap, and the law answers through pleading instead of a sharper line. The line between the torts is admittedly hazy.21 Conversion grew out of the action of trover and provides a remedy for a dispossession serious enough that the tortfeasor pays the full value of the chattel,22 while trespass to chattels covers damage and temporary interference even where the possessor is never permanently deprived.23 A plaintiff whose facts fit both torts therefore pleads both and lets the court match the remedy to what actually happened.24