Concept
Ways to Commit Conversion
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Ways to Commit Conversion
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 223 lists seven ways to commit conversion.1 An actor commits the tort by intentionally doing any one of the following, and each entry points to the section that supplies its detail:
- dispossessing another of a chattel (§§ 221 and 222);2
- destroying or altering a chattel (§ 226);3
- using a chattel (§§ 227 and 228);4
- receiving a chattel (§§ 229 and 231);5
- disposing of a chattel (§ 233);6
- misdelivering a chattel (§§ 234 and 235);7 and
- refusing to surrender a chattel (§§ 237 through 241).8
The adverb intentionally governs the whole list. One who does not intentionally exercise dominion or control over a chattel is not liable for conversion, even if the act or omission was negligent, so carelessness fits none of the seven.9
Ordinary disputes over goods fit these headings easily. A thief dispossesses. A neighbor who deliberately backs a truck over a bicycle destroys it. A borrower who keeps a delivery van for three weeks uses it. A buyer who takes goods from a thief receives them. A repair shop that sells a customer's bicycle disposes of it, and a warehouse clerk who releases a pallet to the wrong person misdelivers it. A neighbor who ignores a demand for a loaned kayak refuses to surrender it. The repair shop, the warehouse, and the borrowers are all bailees, people who hold another's goods for a limited purpose.
Because § 223 catalogs ways of committing one tort, fitting the facts under a heading does not finish the analysis. Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel that so seriously interferes with the owner's right to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay its full value.10 The factors of § 222A(2) measure that seriousness.11 The heading tells you what the actor did, and the factors tell you whether the act cost the owner enough control to justify full value. A diner who takes the wrong hat and carries it straight back has dispossessed its owner, which is the first heading, and has still not converted the hat, because the dispossession was brief and did no damage.12 The Restatement concedes that the line between trespass to chattels and conversion is hazy, and it offers factors in place of a bright-line test.13 The list shows where owners most often lose control of their goods, and the factors keep it from reaching trivial interferences.
One episode can satisfy several headings, and each person involved answers for that person's own conduct. Suppose Wongsun borrows Brooks's horse, Flora, with permission and sells her to Interloper, a passing motorist who pays in good faith. Wongsun disposes of the horse, and Interloper receives her. Brooks has lost Flora altogether, and total deprivations are usually treated as conversion.14 Interloper's honesty does not remove her from the receiving heading, because § 223 lists receiving as its own way of committing the tort15 and good faith is only one factor in weighing seriousness.16 An exam answer should name every heading the facts support for each defendant and then run the factors for each.
The subsections below follow § 223's order. For receiving, disposing, misdelivering, and refusing to surrender, the discussion works from § 223's wording and the general rules of conversion, because the Restatement's detailed sub-rules lie beyond its scope.
Dispossession as Conversion
Section 223(a) lists dispossession first and divides its detail between two sections: § 221 supplies the acts, and § 222 supplies the consequence.17 Section 221 names five ways to dispossess a possessor: taking the chattel without consent, obtaining it by fraud or duress, barring access to it, destroying it while it is in another's possession, and taking it into the custody of the law.18 Section 222 then states what follows. A person who dispossesses another of a chattel is liable in trespass for the damage done, and if the dispossession seriously interferes with the owner's right to control the chattel, the actor may also be liable for conversion.19 Dispossession is therefore the bridge between the two torts. Every dispossession supports a trespass claim, which may be worth little, and only some dispossessions are also conversions.
One dispossession can end in two different remedies because the two torts began with different pictures of the owner's loss. Trespass to chattels assumed that the owner remained the owner and that possession was merely interrupted, so the owner took the chattel back and recovered for harm to it or for the time it was missing. Trover assumed that the defendant had appropriated the owner's property, and it made the defendant pay the market value.20 That second remedy works as a forced sale, and a forced sale is fair only when the owner has, in practical terms, lost the chattel. If every dispossession were a conversion, a person who carried off an umbrella and brought it back at the next corner would have to buy it. If none were, a thief who kept a chattel for years would owe only for its use. Section 222 avoids both results by granting trespass liability in every case and reserving full value for serious interference with control. Its word may marks that step as a judgment, which the factors of § 222A(2) guide by weighing what the actor did against what the owner lost.21
A restaurant coat hook shows the range. Horton picks up Cobble's hat, believing it his own. If he notices the mistake at the door and puts the hat back, the dispossession was brief and harmless, so there is no conversion.22 If he damages the hat, the damage makes the episode a trespass to chattels, and only damage that left the hat useless would make him liable for conversion.23 If he keeps the hat for a long period, Cobble has a claim for conversion, because he has been deprived of his hat for so long.24 In the last two versions Horton is a tortfeasor though he meant no harm. He meant to assert dominion over the hat, and did, and tort law places the consequence of his mistake on him.25 What moves the result across the three versions is how long Cobble lost control of the hat and how much harm the hat suffered, and Horton's belief does not.
Jo's months without her canoe fit conversion, and they also fit the trespass consequence of being deprived of a chattel's use for a substantial time.26 A total or very long deprivation is usually treated as a conversion, yet it satisfies the trespass rules too, so conduct amounting to conversion may also support recovery for trespass to chattels.27 The line between the torts is a matter of degree. A plaintiff in Jo's or Cobble's position would therefore plead both claims and let the court decide whether the interference reached the level that justifies full value.28
Destroying or Altering
Section 223(b) names destroying or altering a chattel and turns to § 226 for the rule. One who intentionally destroys a chattel, or so materially alters its physical condition as to change its identity or character, is liable for conversion to a person in possession of the chattel or entitled to its immediate possession.31 The section describes two kinds of conduct. Destruction ends the chattel's existence as a usable thing. Alteration leaves physical matter behind but changes it so far that the chattel has become a different thing, or a thing of a different character. Both branches look at what became of the chattel, so the actor need not carry it off or keep it.
These branches earn their own heading because of what the two remedies assume. Trespass to chattels leaves the owner holding the chattel and pays for the harm done to it or for the time it was missing, so it works only when something remains to hold.32 Conversion makes the actor pay the chattel's full value.33 A destroyed chattel cannot be handed back, and a transformed one cannot be handed back as what it was, so damages for repair or lost use would leave the owner holding wreckage. Full value is the only measure that replaces what the owner lost. The same logic puts the harm done to the chattel among the § 222A(2) seriousness factors, and destruction sits at the far end of that scale.34
The words identity or character keep the second branch from swallowing ordinary damage. A chattel that is stained, torn, dented, or scuffed is still the thing the owner had, so the owner takes it back and is made whole by the cost of repair or the loss in value. A damaged but usable hat supports trespass to chattels, and only damage carried to the point of uselessness would make Horton liable for conversion.35 A rock that dents a car door is a trespass, because the owner still has the car, and a three-hour ride on a horse returned unharmed is a trespass, because the owner is neither permanently deprived of the horse nor injured by the ride.36 In each case the chattel survived as itself. The useless hat shows where the two branches meet: a chattel damaged until it serves no purpose has lost, in practical terms, what made it worth having.
Destruction is the clearest case, and it corrects the instinct that conversion means taking. Rafferty, angry at a neighbor, shoots the neighbor's goat in her pen and leaves her lying there. He took nothing and kept nothing, but killing an animal exercises control over her as completely as control can be exercised, and § 226 makes the intentional destruction a conversion. The same shooting is also a dispossession under § 221, because it destroys a chattel while it is in another's possession,37 and that supports a claim in trespass. The overlap is the familiar one: conduct that deprives a possessor of a chattel totally can support recovery under either tort.38 That is why § 223 lists destroying separately from dispossessing. An actor can end the owner's control without ever gaining any.
United States v. Arora offers a laboratory version of the destruction branch. A researcher contaminated a colleague's cell cultures and destroyed the cell line, and the court treated the loss as a conversion.39 The act was brief, but the loss was permanent, which is why this branch looks to the result and not to how long the act lasted.
The adverb intentionally governs both branches, and it keeps accidents out.
The usual analysis for a damaged chattel therefore asks first whether the act was intentional and then whether the chattel survives as the same thing. If it does, the claim is usually trespass, measured by the harm done.41 If the chattel was destroyed or transformed, the claim is conversion, measured by full value, and trespass remains available on the same facts.
Serious Unauthorized Use
Section 223(c) lists using a chattel and refers to §§ 227 and 228 for detail.44 Section 227 states the general rule: one who uses a chattel in a manner that is a serious violation of another's right to control its use is liable to that person for conversion.45 The rule aims at a use the owner never agreed to. Ownership includes deciding who works the thing, when, and for what, and an actor who takes over those decisions for long enough or completely enough has displaced the owner's right and has done more than brush against it. A forced sale at full value is a fair response to an actor who behaved as though the use were his own.46
Section 227 does not make every unauthorized use a conversion, and the word serious prevents that. Using a chattel in another's possession is already a trespass to a chattel,47 and the possessor can recover for it when the use impairs the chattel, deprives the possessor of it for a substantial time, or causes one of the other consequences that make a trespass actionable.48 Section 227 adds liability for full value only when the use cuts so deeply into the owner's control that a forced sale is justified. The ordinary seriousness factors do the measuring: how fully and how long the actor used the chattel, what right the actor meant to assert, the actor's good faith, how long and how much the owner lost control, the harm to the chattel, and the owner's inconvenience and expense.49 A passing use that leaves the owner holding the chattel is an ordinary trespass. A use that substantially deprives the owner of control is a conversion.
A case about copied documents shows the passing use. The defendants removed documents from an office's files at night, photocopied them, and returned them undamaged before the office reopened. The court found no conversion of the physical documents, because the owner was not substantially deprived of their use as records of the business.50 The use was deliberate and unauthorized, yet it displaced almost none of the owner's control.
Priya and Barlow each used a vehicle without asking and brought it back, so neither the missing permission nor the return separates them. What separates them is how much of the owner's control each displaced. The host lost the car for under half an hour. The florist lost the van for three weeks and got it back worn. Barlow's sincere belief that the florist would not mind would not change the result. A mistaken belief, not induced by the owner, that one has the owner's consent does not relieve liability for either tort,51 and good faith enters only as one weight among the seriousness factors.52
The use heading overlaps with dispossession, and an exam answer can name both. Barlow's taking of the van is a dispossession,53 and his driving it for three weeks is a use. The use heading matters most for an actor who came by the chattel lawfully and never had to take it from anyone, such as a bailee who works the goods in a way the bailment does not allow. Section 228 governs that situation, and the next subsection takes it up.54 Intent is required here as everywhere, since an actor who does not intentionally exercise dominion or control over a chattel is not liable for conversion even if the act or omission was negligent.55
Exceeding Authorized Use
Section 228 governs the borrower who begins with permission. One who is authorized to make a particular use of a chattel, and uses it in a manner exceeding the authorization, is liable for conversion to another whose right to control the use of the chattel is thereby seriously violated.58 The section is the companion of § 227, which reaches the actor who had no authority at all, and § 223(c) lists both under the single heading of using a chattel.59 What § 228 adds is a lawful starting point. A renter, bailee, or borrower holds the chattel with the owner's agreement, so no one has been dispossessed, and the only question is what the holder did with the chattel once it was in hand.
The rule imposes two requirements, and the second does the work. The use must exceed the authorization, and the excess must seriously violate the owner's right to control the use. Overrunning the permission is not enough alone, because using a chattel in another's possession is already a trespass, which supports recovery only for what the interference actually cost the possessor.60 Conversion goes further and makes the actor pay full value, a forced sale that is fair only when the interference is serious.61 The shape of the rule follows from what permission does. Permission fixes the scope of the borrower's rights, and a borrower who goes well beyond it takes on risks the owner never accepted. When the excess endangers or ruins the chattel, the borrower should bear its value, because the owner agreed to a modest, known use and got back something else. A harmless extension has no comparable justification. The owner still holds a usable chattel, and a forced sale would turn a harmless overrun into a purchase.
Old horse-rental cases mark the two poles. In Doolittle v. Shaw, an Iowa decision of 1894, the defendant rented a horse to drive to Manchester and back, drove it six or seven miles into the country beyond Manchester, and did it no harm. The court held that this was not a conversion. Had the horse been seriously injured in an accident beyond Manchester, with or without the defendant's fault, the answer would have been different.62 Courts point to Palmer v. Mayo for that second pole, where an excess use ended in serious injury to the horse and was held a conversion.
Both renters overran the agreed limit on purpose, so neither the permission nor the overrun separates the cases. Distance does not separate them either, since an owner whose horse comes back unhurt from a few miles past the limit has lost very little. What moves the result is the harm that occurs during the excess. That harm is the clearest evidence that the owner's right to control the horse was seriously violated, and it is one of the § 222A(2) factors.63 Fault does not matter here. The renter intentionally made the excess use, and that is the intent the tort requires, so the accident need not have been anyone's fault.64 The borrower who took the chattel where the owner had not agreed to let it go bears the risk of what happens there. Mistaken beliefs are allocated the same way, because the actor can check the limits of the permission before acting and the owner cannot prevent the error.65
The excess need not be one of distance. In Swish Mfg. Southeast v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Insurance, the Eleventh Circuit, applying Georgia law, considered a lease that permitted use of an aircraft for transporting passengers. The lessee used it to carry contraband. The case is cited for the rule that a conversion may occur when one who is authorized to use a chattel uses it in a manner exceeding the authorization.66 A different kind of use overruns the permission as surely as a longer trip does, and § 228 asks the same question about it: whether the owner's right to control the use was seriously violated.
A borrower's sincere belief that the owner would not mind the extra use does not alter the analysis. Consent protects an actor only as far as the owner actually gave it, and an honest assumption about the owner's wishes is the kind of uninduced mistake that does not relieve liability, though good faith remains one of the factors a court weighs in deciding whether the interference was serious.67
Receiving a Chattel
Section 223(d) lists receiving a chattel and sends the reader to §§ 229 and 231.70 The category reaches the person at the end of a chain: the buyer or other taker who accepts goods from someone who had no right to hand them over. That person never reached into the owner's hands. A rule limited to dispossession would catch the thief and miss the one who ends up holding the goods, so § 223 lists receiving as a way of committing conversion in its own right.
The detailed rules of §§ 229 and 231 lie beyond this discussion, but the general rules already show how the category works. A receiver must intentionally exercise dominion, and a person who takes goods meaning to own them has done so, as Horton did when he took the hat.71 Honesty is no excuse. Conversion does not require that the defendant know the property belongs to another, and wrongful purpose is not a component of it.72 A buyer who believes the seller has title is mistaken about the buyer's own entitlement to possession, and a mistaken belief of that kind, not induced by the owner, does not relieve liability.73 Tort law puts the consequence of an honest mistake on the person who made it. The buyer's good faith survives only as one weight in judging seriousness.74
The allocation makes sense because the buyer is the one who can prevent the error. The owner lent the chattel or lost it and had no chance to stop a sale between strangers. The buyer, before paying, can ask for proof of ownership, ask how the seller came by the goods, or walk away from a price that looks too good. Charging the buyer rewards that care, while charging the owner would leave the one who made no mistake to absorb the loss.
Not everyone who ends up holding the goods is a receiver. A person who holds a chattel only to keep it safe for its owner claims no right of his own and exercises no dominion against the owner's, so the factor of an intent to assert a right inconsistent with the owner's right of control is missing.75
Disposing of a Chattel
Section 223(e) names disposing of a chattel and points to § 233.78 To dispose of a chattel is to part with it by sale, lease, pledge, or a similar transaction that passes the chattel, or an interest in it, to another. The typical actor is a bailee who sells goods entrusted to him. The adverb that governs every way of committing conversion applies here, so the actor must mean to make the transaction.79 A bailee who merely lets the goods be stolen through carelessness has disposed of nothing.80
The law gives disposition its own category because a sale or pledge does two things that mere handling does not. It asserts ownership, since only an owner may decide a chattel's fate for good, and that claim is the clearest instance of an intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the owner's right of control, one of the § 222A(2) factors.81 It also sends the chattel into a stranger's hands, often beyond the owner's reach, so the owner must find the buyer and may have to sue to get the chattel back. An interference that claims ownership and takes control away for good is the case in which making the actor pay full value is fair.
Wongsun's sale of Brooks's horse is the paradigm. The borrowing was lawful, so nothing Wongsun did at the outset dispossessed Brooks. The wrong lay in the sale, which deprived Brooks of her horse altogether and is the kind of total deprivation usually treated as conversion.82 Each defendant is judged on his or her own conduct. Wongsun disposed of the horse, and Interloper received her.
The operator never sold the motorcycle outright, and the kind of transaction does not matter. A sale, a lease, a pledge, or a similar transaction will do. The seller's state of mind matters less than students expect for the reason given in the receiving discussion. The actor can check his authority before acting, while the owner, who only entrusted the goods, cannot prevent the error. Fitting the facts under this heading still leaves the seriousness question open, but a completed sale or pledge ordinarily scores high on the factors, since it asserts ownership and carries the chattel beyond the owner's reach. That is why a bailee's wrongful sale is the paradigm of this way of committing conversion.
Misdelivering a Chattel
Section 223(f) lists misdelivering a chattel and points to §§ 234 and 235.87 A misdelivery occurs when someone who holds goods for another, such as a warehouse, a carrier, or another custodian, hands them to a person with no right to them. The paradigm is a delivery to the wrong person that leaves the owner without the goods.
The category exists because of who controls the handoff. An owner who leaves goods with a custodian gives up the chance to watch who comes for them. The custodian stands at the counter, can ask for identification or a claim ticket, and decides to whom the goods are released. If the custodian chooses wrongly, the owner is as thoroughly deprived as if the custodian had sold the goods, and nothing the owner did contributed to the loss. Putting the cost on the custodian rewards a check that is cheap at the moment of release and impossible for the owner to make from a distance.
Misdelivery fits the intent requirement even though the custodian meant no harm. What the custodian must intend is the act of delivering, which is an exercise of dominion over the goods, and the custodian did intend that. The mistake concerns who was entitled to receive them, and a mistaken belief that the owner has consented to the release, which the owner did not induce, does not relieve liability.88 The rule that a negligent act is not an intentional exercise of dominion keeps the category from absorbing carelessness. A custodian who leaves a loading door unlocked and lets a thief take a crate has delivered nothing, and the owner's claim lies in negligence, while a custodian who hands the crate across the counter to the wrong person has acted on it deliberately.89 The wrong handoff is the act, and what became of the goods afterward decides whether full value is a fair price.90
Both clerks did the same wrongful thing by delivering goods to a person not entitled to them, so the act itself does not separate the two customers. What separates them is how long and how completely each owner lost control, and the factors of duration, harm to the chattel, and inconvenience and expense all point the same way in each scene. A misdelivery that ends with the goods lost to the owner is the paradigm for this category, and a misdelivery quickly undone is a mistake that the seriousness test screens out.
Refusing to Surrender
Section 223(g) lists the last of the seven ways to commit conversion: intentionally refusing to surrender a chattel, as stated in §§ 237 through 241.93 To surrender a chattel is to hand it over to the person entitled to have it, so a refusal is a holder's decision to keep what someone else has the right to take back. The detailed rules of §§ 237 through 241 lie beyond this discussion, which rests on § 223(g) and on the statement of the rule in Popov v. Hayashi.
This heading fills a gap the other six leave open. Taking, destroying, using, receiving, disposing, and misdelivering describe how a defendant got control of a chattel or what the defendant then did with it. A bailee or borrower began with permission, so no one was dispossessed at the outset, and the holder may never have done anything to the chattel that the owner could complain of. Refusal reaches the later moment when a lawful holding turns wrongful. As the Popov court put it, wrongful withholding can be an actual interference with the owner's dominion even where the defendant lawfully acquired the property, and when a person entitled to possession demands its return, the unjustified refusal to give the property back is conversion.94 The plaintiff there claimed that the defendant intentionally took a baseball from him and refused to give it back. He did not claim damage to the ball or interference with his use of it, so a wrong, if there was one, would be conversion and not trespass to chattels.95
The demand is what transforms the holder's position. Before anyone asks for the chattel, a holder who keeps it is relying on the owner's permission or has simply let a deadline slide, and that silence says nothing about who controls the thing. Once the owner asks for the chattel back and the holder says no, the holder has taken over a decision that belonged to the owner, namely where the chattel will be. That choice is the intentional exercise of dominion that conversion requires. It also explains why a holder who merely forgets or carelessly loses track of the chattel is not a refuser, since an actor who does not intentionally exercise dominion over a chattel is not liable for conversion even if the act or omission was negligent.96
Two features of the formulation limit the category. First, the person demanding the chattel must be entitled to it, since the rule speaks of a person entitled to possession.97 A custodian who declines to hand goods to someone with no right to them has refused no one entitled to them. The custodian's exposure runs the other way, because handing goods to the wrong person is a misdelivery and refusing the rightful claimant is a refusal, and § 223 lists both.98 Second, the refusal must be unjustified, and sincere belief does not supply the justification. Conversion does not require that the defendant know the property belongs to another or intend to dispossess the true owner, and a belief resting on a mistake the owner did not induce does not relieve liability.99 What does count as a justification is worked out in §§ 237 through 241, which this discussion does not reproduce.
Both borrowers held the chattel past the permitted time, so the overstay does not separate them, and the length of the holding does not either, since Ines's silent delay was only three days. What separates them is the demand and the answer to it. Ines never claimed the digger against Thibault, and she gave it up when asked, while the skiff's holder announced that he would keep it when Orla asked. A long, silent overstay might raise other questions under the use heading, but a short delay ended at the owner's first request leaves the seriousness factors little to weigh.
A refusal usually scores high on seriousness for reasons that follow from its nature. It is strong evidence of an intent to assert a right inconsistent with the owner's right of control, and it often keeps the owner without the chattel for a long and indefinite time.100 The skiff owner lost a summer of use to a holder who said openly that he would keep it, which is the kind of interference that justifies full value. A short refusal quickly undone faces the usual seriousness screen.