Concept
Conversion Seriousness Factors
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Conversion Seriousness Factors
Conversion requires more than an intentional interference with a chattel. The interference must be so serious that the actor may justly be required to pay the chattel’s full value.1 Section 222A(2) of the Second Restatement supplies the test for that seriousness: six factors that are important in judging how serious the interference was and whether justice requires the actor to pay full value.2
The Restatement uses factors because no single bright line separates conversion from trespass to chattels.3 The older forms of action mark the two ends of the range. Trespass to chattels assumed that the plaintiff remained the owner and that possession had merely been interrupted, so the owner took the chattel back and recovered for damage to it or for the time it was missing. Trover assumed that the defendant had “converted” the chattel to the defendant’s own use, appropriating the plaintiff’s property and owing its market value at the time and place of the conversion.4 Modern conversion keeps the second idea. It remedies a deprivation serious enough to make the tortfeasor liable for full value, and it “requires very substantial exercise of control or dominion inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights.”5 Property that is merely damaged, or interfered with only temporarily, usually supports trespass to chattels. Property that is stolen, or even used for a substantial period, likely supports conversion.6
The Restatement’s hat illustrations show that range on a single chattel. Horton takes Cobble’s hat by mistake, and the outcome depends on what happens next:
- Horton wears the hat home and does not look at it again until the following winter. When he realizes the hat is not his, he returns it to the restaurant. Cobble has a conversion claim, because he went without the hat for so long.7
- Horton returns the hat promptly and undamaged. This is not conversion, because the dispossession is brief and causes no damage.8
- Horton damages the hat. This is likely trespass to chattels under §218(b), but if the damage leaves the hat useless, Horton is liable for conversion.9
Horton makes the same mistake in each version. What changes is how long Cobble goes without the hat and what condition it comes back in, and those are the facts the six factors organize.
Three factors look at the actor: the extent and duration of the actor’s dominion or control,10 the actor’s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the owner’s right of control,11 and the actor’s good faith.12 Three look at the owner and the chattel: the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the owner’s right of control,13 the harm done to the chattel,14 and the inconvenience and expense caused to the owner.15 The Restatement calls the factors “important,” not required, so a court weighs them together and no single factor settles the question. The two groups can pull apart: an actor who holds a chattel briefly and honestly may still leave the owner with a ruined thing. On an exam, name the factors the facts raise, say which way each points, and weigh them. The subsections below take the factors in the Restatement’s order.
Extent and Duration of Dominion
The first factor asks how fully and how long the actor treated the chattel as the actor’s own: the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or control.16 Extent measures how complete the control was, from carrying a thing a few steps to keeping it, using it, and shutting the owner out. Duration measures how long the control lasted. The fuller and longer the control, the closer the actor comes to the “very substantial exercise of control or dominion inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights” that conversion requires,17 and the easier it is to say that the actor may justly be made to pay full value.18
The hat illustrations show the factor at both ends. Horton’s control of the hat lasts moments in the brief version, which is not conversion, and lasts a season in the long version, which is.19 The honest mistake is the same in both versions, and so is Horton’s purpose of picking up that very hat, so neither explains the different results. What differs is how long he treated the hat as his own. Returning the hat in the winter version does not change the answer, because Cobble has a conversion claim for having been deprived of the hat for such a long period.20
Carter’s ride on Puso’s horse marks the other side of the line. Carter takes Flora for three hours and returns her to Puso’s barn. He has probably committed trespass to chattels but not conversion, because he has not permanently deprived Puso of Flora’s use.21 Three hours of riding is a real exercise of control, yet it is limited and ends with the horse back where she belongs. The Restatement fixes no cutoff between a short exercise of control and a long one. Its illustrations anchor the two ends, and an answer should place the facts between them and say which end they resemble.
This factor describes only the actor’s side of events. The actor’s purpose, the actor’s honesty, and the owner’s actual loss each have their own factor, so a court weighs duration of control with the other five and does not treat it as the whole test.22
Intent to Assert Inconsistent Rights
The second factor asks what right the actor meant to claim over the chattel: the actor’s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other’s right of control.26 It differs from the intent that every conversion requires. An actor who does not intentionally exercise dominion or control over a chattel is not liable for conversion, even if the act or omission was negligent.27 Almost anyone who takes a chattel deliberately clears that threshold, so this factor asks something narrower: did the actor mean to hold the chattel as an owner would, or only to use it for a while? The words “in fact” most naturally point to a real conflict between the actor’s claim and the owner’s right, whether or not the actor recognizes the conflict.
The old forms of action explain why the answer matters. Trover rested on the defendant’s appropriating the plaintiff’s property to the defendant’s own use, while trespass assumed that the plaintiff remained owner and would take the chattel back.28 An actor who means to keep the chattel claims the power that trover treated as appropriation. Theft is the plain case, and the rule of thumb treats stolen property as likely converted.29 An actor who means to use the chattel and return it makes no such claim. Carter took Puso’s horse for a ride and returned her to the barn, and the result is trespass to chattels, not conversion.30 A defendant who removes another’s furniture and stores it in the defendant’s own name, intending to keep it, has committed a conversion.31
The factor weighs; it does not decide. A clear claim of ownership pushes toward conversion, but the other five factors still count.32 An actor who takes a chattel in the honest belief that it is the actor’s own asserts the claim, and the next factor asks whether the claim was honest.
Good Faith
The third factor is the actor’s good faith.36 An actor acts in good faith when the actor honestly believes the act is permitted, as when a diner takes another’s hat sincerely thinking it is his own. Good faith counts against conversion, because the more honest the actor, the harder it is to say that the actor may justly be required to pay the chattel’s full value.37
Good faith cannot defeat the tort, though. A mistake of law or fact that the owner did not induce does not relieve an actor of liability for trespass to a chattel or for conversion, whether the actor believed that he had possession or was entitled to immediate possession, that he had the owner’s consent, or that he was otherwise privileged to act.38 Honesty is therefore a weight and not a defense, and other factors can outweigh it. Horton’s mistake in the hat illustration was honest, yet he converted the hat by keeping it until the following winter.39 The same honest mistake produced no conversion when the hat came back promptly and undamaged.40 Horton’s honesty did not change between those versions. The length of the interference did.
The same rule reaches innocent recipients. Receiving a chattel is one of the listed ways to commit conversion,41 and a recipient’s honest belief that she is entitled to possession does not by itself relieve her of liability.42 A later section develops the rules on receiving.
Good faith can matter when the rest of the scale is close, but it cannot rescue an actor from a substantial interference. The next factor turns from the actor to the owner, where the loss is measured whatever the actor’s state of mind.
Duration of Resulting Interference
The fourth factor looks at the same events from the owner’s side: the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other’s right of control.46 It asks how much of the owner’s power to decide where the chattel is, who uses it, and what becomes of it was cut off, and for how long. A short, reversible interruption fits the picture that trespass assumed: the owner stays owner, possession is interrupted, and the owner takes the chattel back and recovers for the time it was missing. A long or permanent loss fits the picture that trover assumed: the defendant has appropriated the owner’s property and owes its value.47
The horse and hat illustrations show the contrast. Puso loses Flora’s use for the hours of Carter’s ride and gets her back, and the Restatement treats that as a temporary interference, since Carter has not permanently deprived Puso of her use.48 Cobble loses his hat for a long period, and that loss supports a conversion claim.49
A long deprivation can also satisfy the trespass standard. Cobble has been deprived of the hat’s use for a substantial time, which fits trespass to chattels under §219(b), so the two torts overlap on those facts, and the prudent course for a plaintiff in Cobble’s position is to assert both claims and let the court sort them out.50 The overlap runs the other way as well. One who totally deprives a possessor of a chattel is liable for trespass to chattels under §§217 and 218(a), even though total deprivations are usually treated as conversions.51
This factor and the first usually move together, but they need not. The first measures what the actor did, and this one measures what the owner lost.
An answer should state the owner’s actual loss from the facts, such as days without the chattel, a replacement bought, or a use missed, and say which way it pushes.
Harm to the Chattel
The fifth factor looks at the thing itself: the harm done to the chattel.54 Harm runs along a scale. At one end the chattel comes back untouched. In the middle it is stained, dented, or scuffed but still does its job. At the far end it is destroyed or so badly damaged that it is useless. The more harm the chattel suffers, the more likely a court is to find a conversion.
The scale tracks what each remedy does. Trespass to chattels remedies damage to personal property, or temporary interference with its use, even though the possessor is not permanently deprived of it.55 Conversion makes the actor liable for the chattel’s full value.56 When a chattel is merely damaged, the owner still has a usable thing and trespass damages for the harm fit the loss. When it is ruined, only its value replaces what the owner lost.
Mere damage therefore usually stays in trespass.57 If Carter throws a rock at Puso’s car and dents its door, he has committed trespass to chattels but not conversion, since Puso still has the car.58 The hat illustrations apply the same reasoning to a smaller chattel. When Horton damages Cobble’s hat, the claim is likely trespass to chattels, but if the hat is damaged to the point of being useless, Horton is liable for conversion.59 In both versions Horton handles the hat intentionally and by mistake. The only change is what the hat can still do.
Both passersby deliberately handled another person’s motorcycle and neither kept it, so possession and intent do not separate them. The condition of the machine afterward does. An answer on this factor should say whether the chattel can still be used and repaired or is gone. Two errors recur. One treats visible damage as conversion whatever its severity, which ignores the line at uselessness. The other treats an undamaged chattel as ruling conversion out, which ignores the other five factors that still have to be weighed.60
Inconvenience and Expense
The last factor asks what the interference cost the owner in trouble and money: the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.63 It differs from duration, which asks how long the owner’s control was cut off, and from harm, which asks what condition the chattel is in. Two interferences of the same length, neither harming the chattel, can differ sharply here. A chattel set down where the owner can collect it in an afternoon costs little to recover. A chattel carried to a distant place costs the owner a search, a trip, and a bill. The greater the burden the actor imposes, the more likely the interference is serious enough to require full value.
The remedies explain the pattern. Trespass lets the owner take the chattel back and recover for the loss of its use,64 which fits well when recovery is easy. It fits badly when the owner must absorb the cost of getting the chattel back.
Two furniture cases show the factor on similar facts. In Zaslow v. Kroenert, two tenants in common of a house were disputing ownership. The defendant told the plaintiff that she would have his furniture removed if he did not remove it himself, then had it removed and told him where it was. The court found no conversion, only a trespass to chattels for which the plaintiff could recover the actual damages caused by the loss of use.65 In Forsdick v. Collins, an 1816 decision, furniture was removed to a warehouse at a distance, so that the plaintiff faced substantial inconvenience and expense in recovering it, and the result was a conversion.66 Both defendants removed furniture deliberately. The results differ on the burden of recovery: the Zaslow plaintiff knew where his furniture was, while the Forsdick plaintiff had to retrieve his from a distant warehouse at real cost. A third variant, storing the furniture in the defendant’s own name with the intent to keep it, was also a conversion, but that adds the intent factor discussed earlier.67
Between those poles lie removals that are far but announced, or near but unannounced, and this factor does not sort them alone. A court weighs the owner’s burden with the other five.68 An answer should state the burden in concrete terms, such as miles, hours, dollars, and whether the actor said where the chattel went. Two mistakes are common. One treats any removal as conversion without asking what recovery cost. The other treats an undamaged chattel as proof that the owner lost nothing, when the owner may have spent weeks and a good deal of money getting it back.