Concept
Full Value and Forced Sale
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Full Value and Forced Sale
The definition of conversion carries its own remedy. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) describes conversion as an intentional exercise of dominion or control that so seriously interferes with another's right to control a chattel that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.1 That phrase explains why the line between conversion and trespass to chattels matters in dollars. A possessor who proves conversion recovers what the chattel was worth. A possessor who proves only trespass recovers what the interference cost and keeps the chattel. The first measure works as a forced sale: the defendant pays the price, and the chattel is, in effect, the defendant's.
Conversion damages are the chattel's fair market value at the time and place of the conversion, with interest running from the conversion until judgment.2 Each element answers a question about the owner's loss. The time and place fix the price where and when the owner lost the chattel, and interest pays for the period in which the owner had neither the chattel nor its value. When the chattel's market price fluctuates, the measure is the highest price within a reasonable time after the owner learns of the conversion, so a price that happened to be low on the day of the taking does not shortchange the owner.3 Proof of wrongful intent, knowledge, motive, mistake, or lack of good faith may support additional damages.4
Trespass damages track the harm the interference caused, not the worth of the chattel. The measure is the actual diminution in the chattel's value caused by the interference, and it does not reach the whole value of the property.5 The two torts also differ in what a plaintiff must prove: a judgment for conversion can be obtained with only nominal damages, while liability for trespass to chattels exists only on a showing of actual damage to the property interfered with.6 A converter, moreover, has no option of simply returning the chattel and paying for repairs or for the time it was gone.7
Marcus, the mixer, and his willingness to use it without permission were the same in both versions. What changed was how much of Priya's control he took: one night of it in the first version and all of it in the second. An answer that awards the mixer's price for the overnight use has confused the two measures.
Because full value looks like a price, a taker may read the remedy as a license to buy. It is not. Suppose Marcus asks to buy the mixer, Priya refuses at any price, and he takes it anyway, announces that he is keeping it, and offers $450. A court may order the mixer returned, and punitive damages may be available as well.8 If a tender of market value ended the claim, any taker willing to risk a lawsuit could override every refusal to sell at the taker's own price. Conversion does not let a wrongdoer commandeer property by being willing to pay for it. The full-value measure describes what a court awards after a serious interference, and a defendant cannot tender it in advance as the price of taking.9
A converter who gives the chattel back afterward stands in a different position from one who tries to pay beforehand. When the owner recovers the chattel, the claim survives but changes shape: the owner may still sue for the reasonable value of the chattel's use and for any loss in market value during the detention.10 The Restatement also suggests that a converter may reduce the damages by returning the chattel unimpaired.11
The two rules fit together because full value pays for a chattel the owner no longer has, and a chattel that has come back is no longer lost. Marcus's offer to pay asks Priya to give up the mixer. His return gives it back, and only the return reduces what she has lost.
The measures meet where one set of facts fits both torts. In the hat illustration, the interference with Cobble's hat fits the definition of conversion, but it fits trespass to chattels as well, because Cobble was deprived of the hat's use for “a substantial time.”12 In such cases the two torts overlap.13 A plaintiff in Cobble's position would assert both claims and let the court sort out which fits.14 The measure the plaintiff ends up with then depends on seriousness. Section 222A(2) directs courts to weigh the seriousness of the interference and the justice of requiring the actor to pay the full value, and it lists the factors that guide that weighing, which the next section takes up.15