Concept
Computers as Chattels
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Computers as Chattels
A computer system is personal property, so the chattel rules reach it, and the two-step test from earlier in this chapter carries over unchanged. The first step asks whether the defendant intentionally used or intermeddled with a chattel in another's possession, the conduct Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217(b) describes.1 The second step asks whether one of the four consequences listed in § 218 followed. The possessor recovers "if, but only if" the defendant dispossessed the possessor, impaired the chattel, deprived the possessor of its use for a substantial time, or caused bodily harm or harm to a person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.2
Contact is rarely the sticking point. A series of federal district court decisions beginning with CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. approved trespass to chattels as a theory of spammers' liability to Internet service providers (ISPs), and the California Supreme Court, though it rejected the claim before it, did so for want of harm to the system.3 The computer cases therefore turn on § 218. Dispossession is the one consequence that needs no further harm, but a message that reaches a server does not take the server out of its owner's hands.4 That leaves impairment of the system's condition, quality, or value under § 218(b), loss of its use for a substantial time under § 218(c), and harm to a protected interest under § 218(d).5
CompuServe shows the impairment route at work. The court treated a provider's equipment as worth what it can do for the provider's subscribers. To the extent the defendants' mailings demanded disk space and drained processing power, those resources were unavailable to serve subscribers, so the equipment's value to CompuServe was diminished even though nothing was physically damaged.6 That is impairment of value under § 218(b), shown through the way the system performed under the load. The court extended its temporary restraining order until final judgment and enjoined Cyber Promotions and its president from sending unsolicited advertisements to any email address maintained by CompuServe while the case was pending.7
The same case supplied a second route. Many subscribers terminated their accounts specifically because they received unwanted bulk email, and the court held that the defendants' intrusions, insofar as they harmed CompuServe's business reputation and goodwill with its customers, were actionable under § 218(d).8 A provider may therefore establish liability by showing a burden on its machines, harm to its goodwill, or both.
The crawler cases add a refinement. In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. and Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the courts reasoned that although the defendant's own activity alone would not have incapacitated the plaintiff's systems, others would soon follow and the combined effect would.9 Harm in these decisions is measured by the effect on the system, including the prospective combined effect of conduct like the defendant's, and neither decision asks for broken hardware.
The spam and crawler decisions can suggest that any flood of electronic messages is a trespass, and Intel Corp. v. Hamidi shows why that inference fails. Hamidi sent occasional bulk email messages to Intel's employees, and Intel claimed consequential economic damage: lost productivity as employees read and reacted to the messages, and the company's efforts to block them. The California Supreme Court held that the tort does not encompass an electronic communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning, because such a communication does not interfere with the possessor's use or possession of the system, or with any other legally protected interest in it.10 Intel's computers worked as intended and were unharmed. The lost productivity was no more an injury to Intel's computers than the distress of reading an unpleasant letter is an injury to the recipient's mailbox, or the loss of privacy from an intrusive telephone call is an injury to the recipient's telephone equipment.11
Both results come from the same § 218 inquiry, and harm to the machine is what separates them. CompuServe's subscribers lost capacity because of what the mail volume did to the system. Intel's workers, by contrast, were distracted not by the frequency or quantity of Hamidi's messages but by the assertions and opinions the messages conveyed, so Intel's complaint concerned their contents and not the functioning of its email system. Even accepting CompuServe's economic injury rationale, the court said, Intel's position would fictionally recharacterize the effect of a communication's contents on its readers as an impairment of the device that carried it.12 Volume counts when it burdens the machine; content does not.
Intel also tried to avoid the harm requirement by pointing out that it sought only an injunction. The court answered, as Justice Kolkey had observed in dissent below, that the fact the relief sought is injunctive does not excuse a showing of injury, whether actual or threatened, and that a plaintiff seeking an injunction must ordinarily show that the defendant's acts threaten irreparable injury that damages cannot adequately compensate.13 That answer follows the Restatement's structure. Dispossession alone is actionable, but other interferences require some additional harm to the chattel or to the possessor's interest in it, and the possessor's interest in a chattel's inviolability, unlike the interest of a possessor of land, is not protected by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings.14 The harm requirement therefore travels with the tort into electronic settings, and neither a request for equitable relief nor the mere fact of unwanted messages takes its place.
Intel narrows the tort for computers without abolishing it. The majority stated that its holding does not affect the remedies of ISPs against senders of unsolicited commercial bulk email, and it described the CompuServe line of decisions as resting on evidence that spammers' mail both overburdened the ISPs' computers and made the whole system harder for customers to use.15 It also noted that the ruling does not block remedies for interference with contract or economic relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, or publication of private facts.16 Those torts address what a message says and what it does to the people who read it, which is the effect Intel asked a property tort to redress. Assault is another example. It is the intentional creation of a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery,17 and the plaintiff must prove that the defendant threatened someone who understood that a physical attack was imminent.18 A grievance of that kind concerns the person threatened, and it is pleaded as an assault with those elements, not as a trespass to the device that carried the message.
A concurring opinion shows how narrow the holding is. It expressed sympathy for Intel but concluded that, because Intel had not shown that Hamidi's occasional bulk messages damaged its computer system or impaired its functioning in any significant way, Intel had not established the tort. Intel was not helpless, the opinion added, since it could instruct its employees to delete Hamidi's messages unread and ask Hamidi to remove their addresses from his lists.19 The missing element was harm to the system.
The same two-step analysis governs a device owner's complaint that a manufacturer's later software update interfered with the device, a setting illustrated by Grisafi v. Sony Electronics Inc. Loss off use for a substantial time is also the point at which trespass to chattels meets conversion, the tort treated next. A plaintiff deprived of a thing for a substantial time may fit both torts, and a careful pleader may assert both and let the court sort it out.20
An exam answer should state the field cautiously. Most courts that have addressed electronic trespass claims based on email spam or cyberattacks deny recovery absent some actual physical harm to the computer, a few have allowed claims in special circumstances, and the problem will probably be addressed by statutes in the future.21 The spam and crawler decisions supply the more generous view, which treats a measurable burden on a system's capacity or performance as impairment of its value even without physical damage. Once a trespass is established, the same broad damage rules apply as for trespass to land, and the defendant is liable for all resulting damage to the chattel and to the possessor, however innocently caused.22 These claims belong to the possessor as a private civil action, whereas criminal proceedings are generally initiated by government officials rather than by private citizens.23 An answer should say which showing the facts supply, and should not assume that either a flood of messages or an absence of broken hardware settles the question.