Concept
Forms of Dispossession
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Forms of Dispossession
Dispossession is the first of the two ways to trespass on a chattel, and the Restatement defines it by listing the acts that count.1 Under § 221, a dispossession may be committed by intentionally doing any one of five things:2
- taking a chattel from another's possession without the other's consent;
- obtaining possession of a chattel from another by fraud or duress;
- barring the possessor's access to a chattel;
- destroying a chattel while it is in another's possession; or
- taking the chattel into the custody of the law.
The list follows the possessor's control, not the chattel's location. Possession is control, and control can end while the chattel stays where it was: a padlock does it, and so does a fire. A rule that counted only carrying away would let the padlocker and the arsonist say that nothing was taken. Section 221 asks instead how the possessor's control ended, and it names five routes. Each route stands alone, so a plaintiff must fit the facts into only one.
Every route has the same consequence. Loss of possession is itself a ground of liability under § 218(a), so the possessor need not prove further harm,3 and one who dispossesses another is liable in trespass for the damage done. If the dispossession seriously interferes with the possessor's right to control the chattel, the actor may also be liable for conversion.4 Section 223(a) lists dispossession among the ways of committing conversion and points back to §§ 221 and 222,5 but the seriousness factors that decide that question come later in this chapter. Here the only question is whether a dispossession occurred.
Taking Without Consent
A taking from another's possession without that person's consent is the plainest dispossession, and the possessor's consent is the whole question.6 The clause has two parts. Someone other than the actor must hold the chattel, which makes the act a removal of another's control; and the possessor must not have agreed. Consent means the possessor's actual agreement, shown by words or conduct, and what the actor supposed does not substitute for it. A mistake of law or fact that the possessor did not induce does not relieve the actor of liability, whether it concerns possession, privilege, or the possessor's consent.7 An actor who wrongly believes the possessor agreed is therefore a taker without consent.8
Consent draws the line because possession includes the power to decide who else may have the thing. A taking the possessor has agreed to uses that power; a taking the possessor never agreed to overrides it. The line also keeps ordinary life workable, since lending a ladder or a car would be hazardous if every borrowing were a tort. And the actor can resolve any doubt by asking, so the rule leaves the risk of a wrong guess with the person who could have avoided it.
A standard teaching example shows the clause at work. Horton, leaving a restaurant, picks up Cobble's hat from a coat hook, thinking it is his own; when he reaches the street he sees his mistake and returns it.9 Cobble never agreed to anyone's taking the hat, so Horton took it without consent and dispossessed him. Horton meant no harm and returned the hat as soon as he saw his mistake, yet his honest error does not undo the dispossession. The commentary on the example adds that it fits trespass to chattels as well, because Cobble lost the use of the hat for “a substantial time,”10 and that trespass to chattels and conversion overlap in cases like this one.11 Its author, standing in Cobble's place, would assert both claims and let the court sort it out.12
How long the taking lasts goes to a different question. Suppose Carter takes Puso's horse, without Puso's consent, for a three-hour ride and returns her to the barn. Carter has probably committed trespass to chattels but not conversion, because he did not permanently deprive Puso of the horse and did not damage her.13 Brevity leaves the dispossession intact and keeps the trespass from growing into a conversion.
Two limits keep consent from being found too easily. A handover that looks like permission may not be real permission, as the next subsection explains: possession obtained by fraud or duress is a dispossession even though the possessor placed the chattel in the actor's hands.14 And permission has a scope, so a person authorized to make one use of a chattel who goes beyond it may be liable for conversion when the possessor's right to control the chattel's use is thereby seriously violated.15 Neither limit changes the basic rule. Where the possessor really agreed, the taking is no dispossession; where the possessor did not, it is one, whatever the actor's good faith. Good faith, brevity, and the absence of damage bear on the amount recoverable and on whether the trespass grows into a conversion, not on whether a dispossession happened.16
Fraud or Duress
A handover that fraud or duress produced is a dispossession, even though the possessor placed the chattel in the actor's hands.18 Fraud is deceit: a deliberate false statement or impression that leads the possessor to part with the chattel. Duress is coercion: a threat that leaves the possessor no real choice. The clause covers a case that taking without consent seems to leave out. Under § 221(a), a taking the possessor agreed to is no dispossession,19 and a possessor who hands over a chattel looks very much like one who agrees. Section 221(b) answers that the physical handover does not end the analysis.
The reason lies in what agreement requires: a choice made with knowledge of what is being agreed to and freedom to refuse. Fraud corrupts the knowledge. A possessor lied to about who the actor is or what the actor will do has agreed to a transaction that does not exist. Duress corrupts the freedom. A shopkeeper who surrenders a bicycle to a man threatening to break her wrist is carrying out his will, not exercising her own. In both cases the actor decided where the chattel would go, and that decision is the intrusion on control that the tort exists to prevent. If a lie or a threat could turn a taking into consent, the manipulation would supply its own defense.
A fact pattern that says the possessor handed the chattel over invites the conclusion that consent was given. The better question is whether the agreement was real, and the answer lies in what the actor said or threatened. Odalys and the customer each placed a chattel in a stranger's hands, so the physical handover cannot separate them. Deceit separates them.
Do not confuse this clause with two nearby rules. Section 244 asks whether the possessor induced the actor's mistake: a mistake the possessor did not induce is no excuse.20 Section 221(b) runs the other way, because here the actor induces the possessor's handover and the law refuses to call it agreement. And a borrower who exceeds an authorized use may be liable for conversion, but the permission was genuine as far as it went;21 under § 221(b) it was never genuine at all.
Barring Access
Intentionally barring the possessor's access to a chattel is a dispossession even though the chattel never moves.23 To bar access is to put something between the possessor and the chattel, such as a locked door, a chained gate, or a blocked lane, so that the possessor cannot reach the thing and use it. Nobody has carried the chattel off or lied to get it, so neither taking without consent nor fraud or duress describes the conduct, and a separate clause is needed. As with every § 221 form, the act must be intentional;24 the actor must act for the purpose of shutting the possessor out or with substantial certainty that the lockout will result.25
The clause follows from what possession is. Control is worth having only if the possessor can get to the thing when it is needed. A possessor standing outside a locked shed without a key has lost control of what is inside as surely as if a thief had carried it away, though every item sits where it was left. A rule that recognized only physical removal would let a stranger lock up, block in, or occupy someone else's property and answer that nothing was taken. Section 221(c) closes that gap by asking whether the possessor can still reach the chattel.
That accident case matters. If the jam came from carelessness and not purpose, the trespass claim fails, because negligent interference with personal property will not support recovery for trespass to chattels.26 How long an intentional lockout lasts bears on whether the trespass is also a conversion, a question for the seriousness factors later in this chapter; it does not bear on whether a dispossession occurred.27
Destroying a Chattel
Intentionally destroying a chattel while it is in another's possession is a dispossession, and the most complete one.29 The clause carries one condition, that the chattel be in another's possession when it is destroyed, because that identifies the possessor whose control the destruction ends. The three forms taught so far leave the chattel in existence somewhere, so in principle the loss of control can be undone. Destruction removes the chattel and with it any prospect of recovery.
An objection comes readily: someone who destroys a chattel takes it from no one, so no one has been dispossessed. Section 221(d) answers by asking what became of the possessor's control, not whether the actor acquired the chattel. A rule that required carrying away would also invert the ordering of wrongs, since a stranger who kept a bicycle for ten minutes would be liable while one who burned it on the spot would not.
Because destruction takes the chattel from the possessor for good, it is also where trespass and conversion meet most plainly. Total deprivation of a chattel is usually treated as conversion, yet the same conduct supports trespass to chattels, and the two remedies overlap.30 Conversion has its own rule for destruction: one who intentionally destroys a chattel, or so materially alters its physical condition as to change its identity or character, is liable for conversion to a person in possession or entitled to its immediate possession.31 Section 223(b) lists destroying or altering a chattel among the ways of committing conversion,32 and a later section takes up the line between mere damage and a destroyed identity.
Damage short of destruction falls below this clause. One who throws a rock at a parked car and dents its door commits trespass to chattels by damaging the car but not conversion, since the owner still has the car.33 A claim of harm to a chattel also needs a basis in the facts. In one dog case, no claim was advanced that the plaintiff injured the dog, and the court therefore held that her conduct was not a trespass to it that would bar her recovery under a statute.34 And the destruction must be intentional, because negligent interference with personal property will not support trespass to chattels.35
Custody of the Law
The fifth form is the only one that involves public authority: a dispossession may be committed by intentionally taking a chattel into the custody of the law.37 The usual case is a levy on goods, in which an officer holding a writ of execution (a court's order to seize a judgment debtor's property so that it can be sold to pay the judgment) takes the property into official hands. Once the officer does, the person who held the goods cannot use, sell, or retrieve them until the process ends.
The clause belongs in the catalog because the possessor's loss is the same whoever takes the goods. The tort protects possession, possession is control, and a possessor whose truck sits in a sheriff's storage yard has lost control of it as completely as one whose truck a thief drove off. Because an officer acts for the court, a student may be tempted to treat an official seizure as a different kind of event. Section 221(e) keeps the analysis where the other forms put it: on what became of the possessor's control.
The test comes when the officer seizes the wrong person's goods. Wintringham v. Lafoy, an early New York case, involved an officer's levy on goods. An officer who levies on the wrong goods believes the writ reaches them, which is a belief that he is otherwise privileged to act,38 and a mistake of that kind does not relieve him of liability unless the possessor induced it.39 The owner of the wrong goods did nothing to cause the error, and loss of possession is itself a ground of liability, so the owner recovers without showing separate harm to the goods.40 The rule puts the risk of error on the actor, who can check ownership before acting.
The clause defines the act and leaves privilege to the rules on defenses. A levy on the debtor's own goods under a valid writ raises a different question, whether the officer was privileged to take them, which belongs to the treatment of defenses. When a fact pattern says an officer levied on goods that belonged to someone other than the judgment debtor, the owner has been dispossessed, and the officer's sincere belief does not excuse the levy.