Concept
Ways to Trespass on a Chattel
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Ways to Trespass on a Chattel
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 identifies two kinds of conduct that can amount to a trespass to a chattel: intentionally dispossessing another of the chattel, and intentionally using or intermeddling with a chattel that is in another's possession.1 The word intentionally imports the intent requirement developed in the preceding sections. What § 217 adds is the list of acts that qualify: taking the thing out of the possessor's hands, or using or touching it while the possessor still holds it.
Section 217 describes conduct only. It does not decide who recovers. Section 218 makes the actor liable to the possessor “if, but only if” one of four consequences follows: the actor dispossesses the possessor; the chattel is impaired in its condition, quality, or value; the possessor is deprived of its use for a substantial time; or bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm to a person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.2 Trespass to land is actionable without any resulting harm, but § 218 limits trespass to chattels to cases that cause one of these consequences.3 Stopping at § 217 is the usual way to over-find liability. Section 217 asks what the actor did, and § 218 asks what resulted.
This section takes up the conduct, starting with dispossession and then turning to using and intermeddling. The consequences that turn either kind of conduct into liability are covered in the next section.
Dispossessing Another
The first way to commit the tort is intentionally dispossessing another of the chattel.4 To dispossess is to deprive the possessor of the chattel, so that the thing that was in the possessor's hands, barn, or parking space is now somewhere the possessor does not control. How long the deprivation lasts does not decide whether it occurred. A possessor deprived of the chattel for even a short time has been dispossessed, even though the chattel is returned to or found by the possessor before any significant injury, and at least nominal damages (a token sum that vindicates the right without compensating a loss) may be awarded.5
The rule makes sense because possession is the interest the tort protects. A stranger who takes the chattel away intrudes on that interest even when nothing is scratched or lost. Section 218 confirms the point from the liability side. The first consequence it lists is that the actor dispossesses the possessor, so dispossession by itself supports liability, and the possessor need not prove some further injury.6
The line between dispossessing and merely touching is the one an exam is likely to probe, usually through a stem in which someone moves another's parked car. The question to ask is what became of the possessor's control. In the Restatement's illustration, D releases the brake on P's car and pushes it forward a few feet to make room to park behind it. If no harm is done, D is not liable, because D neither dispossessed P of the car nor damaged it.7 P still has the car, where P left it. D's push is an intermeddling, the subject of the next subsection, but intermeddling creates no liability unless a § 218 consequence follows.
How long and how serious a dispossession must be before it also becomes a conversion is a separate question. A person who dispossesses another of a chattel is liable in trespass for the damage done, and only if the dispossession seriously interferes with the right to control the chattel is there liability for conversion as well.8 The line is admittedly hazy, and there is no single bright-line test. Among the factors the Second Restatement suggests is the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control.9 A later section catalogs the particular forms a dispossession can take, such as taking a chattel from its possessor without consent or barring the possessor's access to it.10
Using or Intermeddling
The second way to commit the tort is intentionally using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.14 The clause names two kinds of conduct and one condition. Using a chattel means putting it to work, as a rider uses a horse. Intermeddling means interfering with the chattel without necessarily putting it to its ordinary use, and the Restatement's examples are physical: sitting on a car's bumper, pushing a car forward, denting a car door with a rock.15 The condition is that the chattel is in another's possession when the conduct occurs. That separates this clause from dispossession, which takes the chattel out of the possessor's hands, while § 217(b) reaches the stranger who acts on the chattel while the possessor still holds it.
Use intrudes on the possessor's control because the stranger has made a choice that belongs to the possessor, namely whether and when the chattel works. In the Restatement's example, Puso takes Carter's horse, Flora, for a ride. He used the horse, so he committed a trespass to a chattel under § 217(b).16 Whether Carter can recover is a further question for § 218. If the ride lasts three hours, Puso is likely liable under § 218(c), because he deprived Carter of the horse's use for a substantial time.17 If he rides her so hard that she develops shin splints, he may be liable under § 218(b), because the chattel was impaired in its condition, quality, or value.18 A three-hour ride that ends with the horse returned unharmed is probably a trespass to a chattel but not a conversion. The possessor was not permanently deprived of the horse, and the horse was not damaged.19
Intermeddling covers the cases in which the stranger touches or strikes the chattel rather than working it. Sitting on a parked car's bumper is an intermeddling, but the sitter is not liable if the car is undamaged. Throwing a rock that dents the car's door is also an intermeddling, and because it damages the car, it is a trespass to a chattel that supports recovery. It is not a conversion, because the owner still has the car.20 The pair shows why § 217(b) cannot be the end of the analysis. Both actors intermeddled, and only the one whose conduct produced a § 218 consequence owes damages.
The same two-step reasoning applies to computers, though the harm inquiry there has its own section later. In CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., the court treated the defendants' intrusions into the plaintiff's computer systems as actionable under § 218(d) insofar as they harmed the plaintiff's business reputation and goodwill with its customers. The court also reasoned that the defendants' mailings demanded disk space and drained processing power, so the equipment's value to the plaintiff was diminished even though nothing was physically damaged.21
Where using or intermeddling shades into conversion is a question of degree. No single bright line separates the two, and the Second Restatement tells courts to weigh several factors, including the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control.22