Concept
Intent and Mistake
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Intent and Mistake
Trespass to a chattel and conversion are intentional torts, and their intent requirement has a narrow target: the actor's physical act on the chattel. Section 244 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts then limits the excuses open to an actor who meant that act. The actor is not relieved of liability for either tort by a belief that rests on a mistake of law or fact the other person did not induce, whether the belief is that the actor has possession or a right to immediate possession, that the actor has the owner's consent, or that the actor is otherwise privileged to act.1
The definitions mark the other edge of the rule. A trespass to a chattel is committed by intentionally dispossessing another of the chattel or by using or intermeddling with a chattel in another's possession.2 Conversion likewise requires an intentional exercise of dominion or control, so a merely negligent act or omission will not support it.3
The two rules answer different questions. The intent requirement asks whether the actor chose to do a physical act to the chattel. Section 244 asks whether a mistaken belief about the surrounding facts or law cancels the liability that choice produced, and its answer is no. One source states the allocation plainly: an actor who is mistaken about the character of an act still bears the consequence of the mistake.4 The allocation is easy to defend, because the actor can check ownership, permission, and privilege before touching anything, while the possessor has only held or lost the property. The section's one exception covers a mistake the other person induced, since there the possessor's own words or conduct helped create the error.
The first subsection fixes what the actor must have meant. The next three take the beliefs that section 244 names, one at a time: a belief about right or title, a belief about consent, and a belief about privilege.
Intent to Act on the Chattel
Intent here has its usual meaning for the intentional torts. As with battery and assault, the actor must act for the purpose of causing the trespass, or with substantial certainty that it will result, and negligent interference with personal property will not support recovery for trespass to chattels.5 Because this intent is a tort concept, criminal-law definitions do not map onto it neatly: criminal assault, for example, was historically defined as an attempt to commit a battery, and the crime has not always been equated with the tort.6
What matters is the object of that purpose or substantial certainty. The actor must mean the physical act on the chattel, whether a taking, a use, or a movement. The actor need not mean to do wrong: no wrongful motive is necessary, and a good-faith but mistaken belief in ownership, or in some other privilege to deal with the chattel, is no excuse.7
The inquiry looks to what the actor actually meant, which is why mental disability does not by itself excuse. A defendant with a mental disability may be held responsible for an intentional tort if the plaintiff proves that the defendant formed the requisite intent. In a battery claim against a defendant with Alzheimer's disease, the Colorado Supreme Court in White v. Muniz reasoned that insanity is not a defense to an intentional tort but is a characteristic, like infancy, that may make the intent element harder to prove.8
Confining these torts to deliberate acts leaves carelessness to negligence law. If a defendant's negligence harms a chattel, as in an automobile collision, the plaintiff sues in negligence under negligence rules, for there is no negligent trespass to a chattel.9 Conversion draws the same line: one who does not intentionally exercise dominion or control over a chattel is not liable for conversion even though the act or omission is negligent.10
Intent can also cross from one tort to another. A defendant who intends one of the torts in the old trespass family, such as battery or trespass to a chattel, and accomplishes another tort in that family is liable for the tort accomplished, as in Corn v. Sheppard. The doctrine supplies intent only when some tort was intended, so it cannot help Thibeault, because Romeo's gesture aimed at nothing.
Once the act on the chattel is intentional, the actor answers for the harm that follows, even when it exceeds anything the actor expected. Damages in trespass cover all resulting harm to the chattel and to the possessor, however innocently caused, bodily harm included.11
Intent does not complete the claim by itself. In one case, a court held that a plaintiff's conduct toward a dog named Toby was not a trespass to the dog, because no one claimed the dog had been injured by it, so the conduct did not bar the plaintiff's recovery under the statute at issue.12 Later sections take up what harm makes an intentional interference actionable.
Mistake About Right or Title
The first mistaken belief that section 244 refuses to excuse is the belief that the actor has possession of the chattel or is entitled to its immediate possession.14 When that belief rests on a mistake of law or fact the other person did not induce, it does not relieve the actor of liability for trespass to a chattel or for conversion.15 The clause therefore reaches the most common error in the field, a sincere conviction that the thing is the actor's own. The mistake can be one of fact, such as taking the wrong hat, or one of law, such as misjudging whether a sale passed title; section 244 treats the two alike.
The standard illustration is the mistaken taking of a hat. Horton, leaving a restaurant, picks up Cobble's hat from a coat hook, thinking it is his own. When he reaches the street he realizes that he has the wrong hat and returns it.16 Horton had no malicious intent, but he had the intent an intentional tort requires: he meant to assert dominion over the hat, and did, by taking it. He was mistaken about the character of his act, and tort law places the consequence of that mistake on him.17 Courts have long applied the same allocation to sincere but mistaken takers; see Dexter v. Cole.
On Horton's facts, conversion and trespass to chattels overlap. Cobble was deprived of the use of the hat for 'a substantial time,' which meets the trespass definition, so a plaintiff in Cobble's position would assert both claims and let the court sort it out.18 A later section takes up the line between the two torts.
The same rule reaches a buyer who honestly believes the seller could pass good title. The buyer's conviction that she is entitled to the chattel is a mistake the true owner did not induce, so clause (a) gives her no relief.19 A later section treats receiving a chattel as one of the recognized ways of committing conversion.
The clause's only exception is a mistake the other person induced, because the possessor's own words or conduct then helped create the belief. The section says nothing more about that case. It simply stops treating the mistake as no excuse, so the owner's own statements may bear on consent or on other defenses.
Mistake About Consent
The second mistaken belief that section 244 refuses to excuse is the belief that the actor has the consent of the other, or of one with power to consent for the other.21 The rule again applies when the mistake of law or fact was not induced by the other.22 The clause turns on a distinction between two things that sound alike. Consent is something the owner gives, in words or conduct that communicate willingness to have the chattel used or taken. A belief in consent is something the actor holds, and it can exist when the owner has said nothing at all.
Actual consent is a defense. It defeats claims for trespass to land and for other intentional torts, trespass to chattels included.23 A taking with the owner's permission is not 'taking a chattel from the possession of another without the other's consent,' one of the recognized forms of dispossession.24
A borrower with permission and Wongsun both used the horse; what separates them is whether the owner actually agreed. Consent matters because it is the owner's choice. A belief that the owner would agree is only a prediction about a choice the owner never made, and the actor can remove the uncertainty at almost no cost by asking.
Consent can also come from one with power to consent for the owner, such as an agent authorized to lend the chattel. A person without that power cannot give it, and a mistaken belief that someone had the power fares no better than a mistaken belief that the owner agreed.25 The induced-mistake limit applies here as it did to title. If the owner's own words or conduct led the actor to think consent had been given, section 244 no longer forecloses the defense, and the question becomes whether those words or that conduct amounted to consent. 'Ride the horse whenever you like' communicates a choice; a neighbor who has never spoken about the horse has communicated nothing.26
Genuine consent has limits. In the land setting, an invitation to a birthday party is not general consent to fish in the host's pond a week later, because consent to entry on one occasion or for one purpose is not general consent.27 For chattels, one authorized to make a particular use who exceeds the authorization is subject to liability for conversion when the owner's right to control the use is seriously violated.28 A later section takes up that rule. The present clause covers the case where nothing the owner did supplied permission at all.
Mistake About Privilege
The third mistaken belief that section 244 refuses to excuse is the belief that the actor is otherwise privileged to act.30 A privilege is legal permission to do what would otherwise be a tort, and the word otherwise sweeps in every justification besides possession, title, and consent. As in the other clauses, the rule applies when the mistake of law or fact was not induced by the other.31
Genuine privileges exist, and the law of defenses treats them in detail. An owner who has been wrongfully and forcibly dispossessed of a chattel, or who lost it through fraud or duress, has a limited self-help privilege to recapture it by force or threats of force, provided the owner is in fresh pursuit.32 Where feasible, the owner must first demand its return. Only if the other refuses may necessary and reasonable force be used, and force calculated to cause serious bodily harm is never privileged.33
The privilege is narrow. When the chattel came into the other's hands rightfully and is merely wrongfully detained, or when the owner acquiesced in the other's possession for any period of time after a wrongful acquisition, the owner has no privilege and must pursue legal remedies.34
Private necessity is a second genuine privilege. It may be invoked when the actor, defending himself or his property from imminent harm for which the other is not responsible, intentionally does an act reasonably deemed necessary that would otherwise be a trespass or a conversion.35
How an honest mistake about a privilege fares depends on which privilege the actor invokes. For recapture of a chattel, a mistake about the privilege's existence is no defense unless the other party knowingly induced it; self-defense, by contrast, tolerates reasonable mistakes.36 For necessity, the source says that, as in self-defense, a reasonable mistake about the existence of the privilege does not negate it.37 Section 244(c) supplies the default for a belief that one is privileged, so when a problem invokes necessity, ask whether the actor's mistake was a reasonable one.
The strict rule for recapture follows from how a privilege works. It permits an invasion of the possessor's right only because particular facts exist, such as a forcible taking, a pursuit begun at once, and a refusal after demand. Those facts make the possessor's right give way. When they are absent, the possessor has done nothing to forfeit control, and the actor's honest belief cannot supply what the possessor's conduct did not.