Concept
Unintentional Entries
Trespass to land
Unintentional Entries
An intended entry is a trespass even though it harms nothing.1 An unintended entry raises two further questions: was the actor at fault, and did the entry cause harm? The Restatement answers them in two sections. Section 165 covers reckless, negligent, and abnormally dangerous entries and makes the actor liable “if, but only if,” the presence on the land causes harm.2 Section 166 covers the rest: an unintentional, non-negligent entry creates no liability, even when it causes harm, unless the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity.3
Trespass was not always a fault-based tort. With the shift to fault as the principal basis of tort liability, almost all jurisdictions have come to require that a trespass be intentional, reckless, or negligent, except where the rules of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities apply.4 The actor need not intend a wrong, only to enter or to cause the entry.5 The entries in this unit lack even that intent, so the possessor must look to fault.
On a fact pattern, a careless entry and a blameless one look alike, because the actor meant to be on the land in neither. Fault tells them apart. Fault selects the section, and the section decides whether the possessor must prove harm or has no claim at all.
Negligent or Reckless Entry
A reckless or negligent entrant is liable to the possessor only if the entry causes harm. Section 165 reaches the actor who recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally dangerous activity, enters land in another's possession or causes a thing or third person to enter it. It imposes liability “if, but only if,” the presence on the land causes harm to the land, to the possessor, or to a thing or third person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.6 Harm is an element of the claim. A possessor who cannot prove it loses, however careless the entrant was, and that is the sharpest contrast with intentional trespass, where the entry itself is actionable.
The fault terms in § 165 separate this claim from intentional trespass. A negligent entrant fails to use reasonable care, and a reckless one presses on despite a known risk; neither acts for the purpose of entering or is substantially certain that an entry will follow. A golfer who recognizes that his drive might veer into a neighbor's yard, but neither aims it there nor is substantially certain it will land there, has not committed an intentional trespass. Possibilities do not make an intentional tort, and the golfer's exposure lies in negligence, a different tort requiring a different type of fault.7 The third category in § 165, the entry resulting from an abnormally dangerous activity, rests liability on the activity and not on carelessness, but the section still conditions recovery on harm.
The required harm need not be damage to the soil. Section 165 places it in any of three spots: the land, the possessor, or a thing or third person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest. A car that skids onto a lawn and cuts ruts has harmed the land; one that strikes the possessor's parked truck has harmed a thing the possessor is entitled to keep secure. The harm must result from the presence on the land of the entrant, or of the thing or third person the entrant caused to enter.
Why does the law demand harm here when it excuses harm for intentional trespass? One explanation sometimes given for the no-harm rule is that a trespass action often tries title or vindicates a legal right, without which repeated entries might ripen into a prescriptive right.8 Neither purpose fits the careless entrant. Someone who runs off the road asserts no right to the land, and a single mishap does not set up a claim to keep entering. What remains is compensation, and compensation needs a loss to compensate. Negligent entries are accordingly governed by the ordinary rules of negligence, under which proof of some actual damage is essential.9
The standard illustration has Trish negligently run her car off the road and onto Paul's land. If she harms his land, she is liable for it in trespass.10 If she harms nothing, Paul has no claim, because a negligent entry is actionable only when it causes harm.11
Sources differ on the label. The Trish illustration calls the claim trespass, while another treats a merely negligent entry as an ordinary negligence claim.12 The difference has historical roots, since the modern action for negligence developed out of the action on the case rather than through trespass.13 Under either name the result is the same: ordinary negligence rules govern, and proof of actual damage is essential.14
The three results turn on two facts: whether Tom intended the ball to land there, and whether it did damage. Where the entry was not intended, the broken window is compensated and the mark-free landing is not. A fact pattern that dwells on how careless the entrant was points at the wrong fact, since carelessness without harm yields nothing, while a deliberate entry that left no trace still yields nominal damages.
Accidental Entry
An entry that was neither intended nor careless creates no liability, even if it harms the possessor. Section 166 provides that, unless the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in another's possession, or causing a thing or third person to enter it, does not subject the actor to liability, even though the entry harms the possessor or a thing or person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.19 The closing words matter, because a plaintiff with visible damage invites the instinct that damage ought to count. Under § 165, harm is necessary to a claim for careless entry; § 166 shows that harm is never sufficient by itself. Without fault, the possessor's loss produces no liability.
Danica, whose car ends up on William's land without her intending it, cannot be held for intentional trespass, because trespass to land is an intentional tort.20 Whether she answers on some other basis depends on fault. If she was negligent, § 165 asks whether she harmed the land; if she was not, § 166 ends the inquiry.21
The rule follows from the shift to fault described above. Once trespass required that the entry be intentional, reckless, or negligent, an entry with none of those behind it lost its claim to liability, and strict liability survived only for abnormally dangerous activities.23
The rule excuses only what the actor did not choose, a limit that shows most clearly in an emergency.
Hartley and Mbeki faced the same engine failure, and what separates them is what each did with the control that remained. Mbeki acted for the purpose of putting the plane on Larkin's pasture, and an intentional entry on land in another's possession is a trespass whether or not it harms anything.25 Section 166 speaks only to unintentional entries, so it never reaches her. Her remaining argument is a privilege: one who acts to prevent a threatened injury from a source not connected with the plaintiff may use another's property to save life or more valuable property.26 The two doctrines work at different stages. Necessity excuses an entry that is a trespass, while § 166 prevents a trespass from arising. A fact pattern that dwells on the emergency points at its cause, but the question that matters is whether the actor selected the place.
The shield that protects a blameless driver does not protect an actor engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. The opening clause of § 166 withdraws the no-fault rule from such an actor, and § 165 places the same actor on the liability side, so an entry resulting from the activity is actionable if, but only if, it causes harm.27 The strict liability rules govern these activities, and they do not ask whether the actor used care.28