Concept
No Actual Harm Required
Trespass to land
No Actual Harm Required
A trespass to land does not depend on harm. One who intentionally enters land in another's possession is liable to the possessor even though the entry hurts neither the land, nor the possessor, nor any thing or person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163 states that rule. The master rule of § 158 states it from the other side, imposing liability irrespective of whether the entrant harms any legally protected interest of the possessor.2 Damage is therefore missing from the elements. The plaintiff proves an intentional entry on land the plaintiff possesses, and at least nominal damages follow: a token sum, often a dollar, that marks the violation of a right when no loss can be measured.3
A backyard picnic shows how far the rule reaches. A host lets a party spill onto the lot of a neighbor, Carl, who is away for the weekend and has told the host never to enter without permission. The guests clean up so thoroughly that not a blade of grass is out of place, and the host leaves Carl a six-pack of his favorite beer. The picnic is still a trespass. The entry was intended and unauthorized, and the tidy departure bears only on the amount of damages, which is nominal.4 Carl's absence matters as little as the neatness does. A possessor's right to keep land free of intruders continues while the possessor is elsewhere, and it does not depend on the possessor's noticing the entry.5
Dougherty v. Stepp, which appeared earlier on honest mistake, makes the same point about harm. The plaintiff proved only that the defendant had entered the land with a surveyor and chain carriers and surveyed it, claiming it as his own. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that every unauthorized entry into another's close is a trespass, that the extent of injury goes only to the amount of damages, and that from every such entry against the possessor's will the law infers some damage, if nothing more than the treading down of grass or shrubbery.6 The inference is the court's way of explaining a rule that has no place for proof of loss. The harm lies in the entry, so a plaintiff who proves the entry has proved enough.
Three reasons explain why the law dispenses with damage. The first lies in what trespass protects. The interest is exclusive possession, which includes the right to use land for nothing or to leave it entirely alone, so the invasion of that control is itself the injury, and the law infers some damage from every entry against the possessor's will.7 A requirement of measurable loss would protect the possessor only after something had been broken or killed. Whenever the intruder left no trace, the right to keep others off the land would go unprotected.
The second reason is title. The tort has historically been used to try title, because a court could not decide whether an entrant was a trespasser without deciding who held the right to possess the land, and a judgment for nominal damages confirmed the plaintiff's title.8 It also keeps a pattern of entries from ripening into a prescriptive right, the entitlement a long-time user can acquire to keep using land in a particular way without the owner's explicit permission.9 Trujillo crosses Genet's land every day to reach the bus stop and damages nothing. Genet may still sue for an injunction, a court order that the crossings stop, because the right he asserts is to exclusive enjoyment of his land, not to be paid for harm.10 He needs that remedy before any harm appears, since harm may never come and the right could be lost anyway.
The third reason is deterrence. Individuals and society both have significant interests in deterring intentional trespass to land, regardless of the lack of measurable harm.11 Property is also a personal right, not merely an economic one. People choose rural land for privacy and solitude, and an intentional interference with property of any kind tends to engender indignation or outrage.12 A one-dollar judgment is a thin answer to a deliberate invasion, which is why the law pairs nominal damages with the possibility of punitive damages.13
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. shows the deterrence reason at work. Steenberg Homes had a mobile home to deliver to the Jacques' neighbor and, over the Jacques' repeated refusals, bulldozed a path through the snow across their field to do it.14 No compensatory damages were proved, so the question was whether punitive damages could rest on a nominal award alone. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that when nominal damages are awarded for an intentional trespass to land, punitive damages may, in the jury's discretion, be awarded.15 The court accepted the Jacques' argument about the interests at stake and concluded that the earlier Barnard rule should not apply when the tort supporting the award is intentional trespass to land.16 The general statement is that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages when the trespass is deliberate or malicious, even if only nominal damages are awarded for it.17 Liability for the entry never asks whether the defendant defied the possessor, but the punitive question does. An entrant who honestly misjudged a boundary has committed the same trespass without defying anyone.
Neither the usefulness of the defendant's conduct nor a benefit to the possessor changes the result. In Longenecker v. Zimmerman the defendant trimmed the plaintiff's trees, and even if the jury found that the trimming helped the trees, at least nominal damages were available.18 The possessor decides what happens on the land, and a good outcome the possessor did not choose still takes that decision away. When an entry does cause loss, the possessor recovers for it as well, and the recovery reaches harm that directly results from the trespass even if the entrant neither intended nor foresaw it, a rule taken up in the section on liability for resulting harm.19
The no-harm rule belongs to the intentional tort alone. A merely negligent or reckless entry is actionable only if the entrant's presence, or the presence of a thing or third person the entrant caused to enter, harms the land, the possessor, or something in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.20 A negligent entry that leaves no trace gives the possessor no claim at all, and the section on unintentional entries develops that line. Negligence and nuisance, both of which grew out of the action on the case rather than out of trespass, cover much of what the no-harm rule leaves out.21
Intrusions too small to see lie at the opposite edge from the picnic. When a factory's emissions settle as invisible particles on a farm, most courts ask for something more than the bare presence of the particles. They want harm, or appreciable harm, or an invasion significant enough to be likely to provoke conflict between neighbors, and a growing number treat such intrusions as never a trespass and send them to nuisance.24 The reason lies in the alternative. If any airborne matter that crossed the boundary counted as an entry without more, a neighbor's shout would be a trespass, because air molecules travel across the line with it. The rule that harmless entries are actionable therefore holds for things of normal size, like the picnickers, and the law of nuisance, taken up in the last section of this chapter, handles the rest.25
A fact pattern that stresses how little the entry hurt, that the possessor never noticed it, that the entrant cleaned up, or that the entry helped the land is describing a trespass with at least a nominal remedy. The absence of harm is no ground for denying liability for an intentional entry. Harm becomes an element only when the entry was negligent or reckless, and it becomes a live question when the intrusion is as intangible as airborne particles.