Concept
Mistake Is No Defense
Trespass to land
Mistake Is No Defense
An entrant who means to be on the land but is wrong about his right to be there is a trespasser all the same. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164 states the rule in one sentence: one who intentionally enters land in another’s possession “is subject to liability to the possessor of the land as a trespasser, although he acts under a mistaken belief of law or fact, however reasonable, not induced by the conduct of the possessor.”1 The mistake may concern a fact, such as where a boundary runs, or the law, such as what one’s rights are, and either kind leaves liability in place. Reasonableness changes nothing, so a careful entrant fares no better than a careless one.
The rule follows from the intent element. Any intentional intrusion on land owned by another is a trespass, and liability is absolute: motive, extent, duration, and harm are irrelevant, though they may affect the amount of damages.2 An entrant who walks onto a parcel because he thinks it is his own has intended the entry, so the intent element is met before the mistake enters the analysis. Ownership, consent, and privilege are no part of what he must intend.
Someone must bear the loss when an unauthorized entry rests on a mistake, and trespass law places it on the person who caused it. One rationale is that this rule gives actors an incentive to investigate fully before venturing forth with a chain saw, and the same reasoning reaches an entrant who could have asked permission or confirmed a privilege before acting.3 The tort protects against unauthorized entries even when they are not morally reprehensible.
One carve-out runs through everything below: the rule reaches only mistaken beliefs that the possessor’s conduct did not induce. A possessor who leads the entrant into the error has undercut the expectation that the entrant will investigate, and § 164 does not charge the entrant in that case. Section 164 then sorts the mistaken beliefs into three kinds: that the entrant is in possession of the land or entitled to it, that he has the consent of the possessor or of a third person with power to consent on the possessor’s behalf, and that he has some other privilege to enter or remain.4 Each kind produces the same result. Exam stems that make the entrant sympathetic and his belief reasonable are testing exactly that point.
Mistake About Possession
Subsection (a) covers the entrant who believes he “is in possession of the land or entitled to it.”5 Either way he thinks the land is his to enter: he believes he already holds it, or that he has the better right to it. The belief may rest on a fact, such as where the boundary runs, or on the law, such as what a deed conveyed, and § 164 leaves him liable in both cases, however reasonable the belief, unless the possessor’s own conduct induced it.6 Boundary errors show the rule most clearly.
Albers cuts several maples at the back of his lot, believing they are his. They stand on Piaget’s land. Albers is liable: he intentionally went onto his neighbor’s land and cut the trees, and although he acted in good faith, Piaget will miss the trees no less for knowing that Albers “didn’t mean to.”7 Make Albers as careful as you like. A broker assures him the maples are his, and a survey places the line behind them. If both are wrong, a careful Albers who entered Piaget’s property and cut his trees is still a trespasser.8 The Restatement’s commentary pushes the rule to its limit: an entrant is liable even if, “due to the advice of the most eminent of counsel,” he believed he was on his own land.9
The mistake also leaves the entry volitional. A nonvolitional intrusion is not a trespass, but a mistake as to location does not make the entry nonvolitional.10
The rule is an old one. A classic account of the common law records that a man who crosses his neighbor’s boundary “by however innocent a mistake” is “said to be liable in trespass quare clausum fregit.”11 Glade v. Dietert, a 1956 Texas decision, adds in dictum that the trespass is intentional even when the defendant enters “in the honest and reasonable belief that it is his own.”12
A boundary mistake can stay hidden until someone orders a survey. Zarvas, preparing to sell his lot, has it surveyed, and the surveyor reports that Fox’s pipe runs under a corner of it. The pipe does no harm there and may even keep the lot dry, but it lies on Zarvas’s property.13 Removing it would cost a good deal, particularly because Fox has put expensive plantings above it.14 If Fox laid the pipe believing that corner was his own, that belief is no defense to the placement.
Albers would very likely escape criminal liability for the same act. Criminal prosecution generally requires a mens rea that examples like his lack, and statutes such as Pennsylvania’s require knowledge that the actor lacks a license or privilege.15 The tort asks a different question, whether the entry was authorized, and so the same facts can yield civil liability without a crime.
The carve-out in § 164 is narrow, and it turns on whose conduct produced the error. The broker and the surveyor in the Albers variations are outsiders to the possessor, so their mistakes leave the entrant exposed. A possessor who produces the error himself stands differently, because the incentive logic assumes the entrant is the one expected to investigate, and a possessor who leads the entrant astray has undercut that expectation.
Mistake About Consent
Subsection (b) covers the entrant who believes he “has the consent of the possessor or of a third person who has the power to give consent on the possessor’s behalf.”18 An entrant who actually has that consent is no trespasser, and the trouble comes with the entrant who only thinks he does. Section 164 holds him liable however reasonable his belief, unless the possessor’s own conduct induced it.19 The belief can fail in either of two places: no one may have agreed, or the person who agreed may have lacked power to speak for the possessor.
The reasoning matches the boundary cases. The entrant intended the entry, and his belief in consent helps him only if consent existed. A person who relies on someone else’s word is betting that the word was good, and he could have protected himself by asking the possessor or confirming the speaker’s authority. The Restatement illustrates the point with an entrant who is a trespasser although another person assured him that he had permission to enter.20
The two misinformers answer a different question from the entrant’s. Menlove answers for an entry he intended, whatever he believed about permission. The Restatement’s definition of trespass also reaches one who “causes a thing or a third person” to enter,21 but trespass is an intentional tort, so the person who caused the mistaken entry is liable only if he acted for the purpose of causing it or with substantial certainty that it would follow. Berle meant to send Menlove onto the land. Janowski acted neither for that purpose nor with substantial certainty that Menlove would come, so she is not liable to Snobbin.22
Serota v. M. & M. Utilities, Inc. tests the clause about a third person’s power to consent. The homeowner sold the property but did not tell the oil company, which duly appeared to refill the heating-oil tank. The tank had already been filled, and oil spilled. The court held the company liable to the new owner as a trespasser. It observed that the company intended to come onto the land and deliver oil, and then rejected the excuse: “His innocence and his mistaken belief that his visit was authorized is of no moment since his intent is clearly shown to have been to deliver oil.”23 The company’s belief that its visit was authorized could rest only on the former owner’s say-so, and the former owner had no power to consent for the new possessor. A belief that someone has authority is a mistake about consent like any other.
The one belief in consent that protects an entrant is a belief the possessor produced. If Snobbin himself tells Menlove to help himself, Menlove has consent and is no trespasser. If Snobbin’s conduct only appears to invite pickers, as with a sign left up from last season that Menlove reasonably relies on, the belief was induced by the possessor’s own conduct and falls outside the rule.25 The question is who produced the belief. A story told by a stranger, a broker, or a former owner leaves the entrant exposed, while a story told by the possessor does not. How reasonable the belief was never decides the case.
Mistake About Other Privilege
Subsection (c) sweeps in every remaining claim of right: the entrant who believes he “has some other privilege to enter or remain on the land.”27 The words “or remain” matter, because a claimed privilege can fail on the way in or on the way out. The opening clause of § 164 governs this belief as it governs the other two, so a mistaken belief that a privilege exists, however reasonable and unless the possessor induced it, leaves the entrant a trespasser.28 A privilege that actually exists defeats the claim, but believing in one does not make it exist.
If a sincere belief could stand in for the privilege itself, the possessor’s right to exclude would turn on each entrant’s opinion of his own entitlement. The incentive rationale points the other way. The entrant can check, before acting, whether the law recognizes the privilege he has in mind and whether its conditions are present, and the loss from a wrong guess falls on the person who made it.
A genuine entitlement can also fall short of the privilege the entrant claims. Title to real property is not an absolute privilege to enter. An owner may peaceably enter property that another possesses but may not use force, and in most jurisdictions forcible entry creates civil and criminal liability.30 Paul fell behind on his rent, and his landlord broke open the apartment door while he was away and removed his belongings. Although she is entitled to have him evicted, she may not commit this forcible entry and trespass. A landlord who believes her right to evict covers breaking in is mistaken about how far her privilege reaches, and § 164(c) protects that belief no more than it protects Doyle’s.
Some privileges do exist. A person may be entitled to enter another’s land to protect his property interests, but the right “is not a general license to wander about” and “is limited to such entry as is necessary to protect the property interest.”31 A neighbor who steps onto the adjoining lot to put out a fire that threatens her own house protects such an interest. She stays privileged only as far as the protection requires, and a stroll across the lot once the fire is out falls outside the privilege.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. concerns the “remain” half of subsection (c). A steamship had been moored at the plaintiff’s dock to unload, and it stayed after the unloading ended because of a severe storm. As the lines securing it were damaged, the crew replaced them, but wind and waves lifted the ship and threw it against the dock, damaging it.32 For § 164 purposes, the question about the crew’s staying is whether the law gave them a privilege to stay, not whether they believed they had one.
The two kinds of entrant now stand side by side. Doyle and the landlord relied on privileges that did not exist or did not reach as far as they assumed, so § 164(c) leaves them liable for the entry. The neighbor fighting the fire holds a privilege the law recognizes, so she is no trespasser while she stays within it. An exam stem that dwells on how reasonable a sympathetic entrant’s belief was asks the wrong question. The right question is whether the law recognizes the claimed privilege on these facts and whether the entrant stayed within it.