Concept
First Amendment Limits
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
First Amendment Limits
A plaintiff can prove every element of intentional infliction of emotional distress and still lose, because the First Amendment limits a state's authority to protect its citizens from the tort.1 Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) imposes liability on one who, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly causes another severe emotional distress, and for any bodily harm that results.2 When the conduct is speech, the Constitution decides how much of that liability a state may enforce. Two decisions mark the boundary. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell holds that a public figure or public official may not recover for a publication such as a parody without proving a false statement of fact made with actual malice.3 Snyder v. Phelps keeps a state from punishing, through a distress claim, speech on matters of public import that is delivered peacefully on public property.4
The two decisions ask different questions. Hustler asks who the plaintiff is and whether the publication asserts a falsehood. Snyder asks what the speech addresses, where it occurs, and how it is delivered. Purely private disputes get little help from either.
The Hustler Rule
Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister and commentator on politics and public affairs, sued Hustler Magazine, a magazine of nationwide circulation, and its publisher, Larry Flynt, for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 The suit arose from an ad parody that the Court described as offensive to Falwell and “doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most.”6 The jury rejected the libel claim, finding that the parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or actual events in which [he] participated.” It nonetheless ruled for Falwell on the distress claim and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages from each defendant.7
The court of appeals treated the defendants' state of mind as sufficient. In its view, the New York Times decision emphasized the heightened culpability that “knowing . . . or reckless” conduct reflects, not the falsity of the statement, so the state-law requirement that the defendants act intentionally or recklessly, together with the jury's finding to that effect, satisfied the constitutional standard. It also rejected the argument that the parody, which the jury found described no actual facts, was protected opinion.8
The Supreme Court demanded more. Public figures and public officials may not recover for this tort by reason of publications such as the one at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact made with “actual malice,” meaning knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was true.9 The added showing concerns truth. The tort's own mental-state element concerns something else: the defendant must intend to cause emotional distress or at least act in conscious disregard of a high probability of it.10 That intent, however clearly proved, does not stand in for knowledge of falsity.
Two points in the Court's reasoning explain why intent cannot carry the claim. The law gives the intent to inflict emotional distress little solicitude, and most if not all jurisdictions make it civilly culpable when the conduct is sufficiently “outrageous.” But in debate about public affairs, many things done with less than admirable motives are protected, and a speaker or writer moved by hatred or ill will keeps the protection of the First Amendment.11 Falsehoods, for their part, have little value in themselves yet are “inevitable in free debate,” and strict liability for false factual assertions would chill speech about public figures that does have constitutional value, because freedoms of expression require “breathing space.”12
Falwell's own verdict shows what the rule prevents. His libel claim failed because the jury found that the parody described no actual facts about him, yet his distress claim succeeded on the same ad.13 Under the Court's rule, a public figure cannot use the distress tort to recover for a publication that asserts no false fact.
The Court did not call the protection absolute. It recognized that speech that is “vulgar,” “offensive,” and “shocking” is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances, that a state may punish insulting “fighting” words, and that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. But expression like the parody fell within none of those exceptions.14
A public figure's distress claim over a publication therefore raises two questions before anything else: does the publication assert a fact that could be false, and did the defendant know it was false or recklessly disregard the truth?
The Snyder Rule
Snyder v. Phelps arose from Westboro's picketing at the funeral of Matthew Snyder, and the Court examined the speech itself. To decide whether speech is of public or private concern, the Court independently examines its content, form, and context as revealed by the whole record. No single factor is dispositive, and every aspect of the speech must be weighed.16
On the record before it, the Court found that Westboro addressed matters of public import, on public property, in a peaceful manner, and in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. The picketing was planned to coincide with the funeral, but it did not itself disrupt the funeral, and the choice of that time and place did not change the nature of the speech.17 The Court did not minimize the harm. Speech “can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.” Even so, “on the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.”18
The Court confined its holding to those facts. In First Amendment cases it must carefully review the record, and it called its holding “narrow,” with a reach “limited by the particular facts before us.”19 A separate opinion read the decision the same way: the Court did not hold or imply that the State is always powerless to give private individuals necessary protection, and it reviewed the underlying facts in detail, as will sometimes prove necessary where First Amendment values and state-protected interests, privacy-related interests for example, seriously conflict.20
Reading Snyder as ending distress liability for speech overreads it. A sound answer names the facts that carried the result: a public subject, a public place, a peaceful manner, compliance with local officials, and no disruption of the funeral.
Private Matters Stay Actionable
Hustler's rule does not reach every distress claim based on speech. The Falwell decision does not protect a publisher or speaker where the attack is directed at a private individual in a matter of no public interest.23 The setting that Hustler and Snyder protect, debate on public affairs and matters of public import, is missing in such a case, and without it the ordinary tort elements apply.
In Esposito-Hilder v. SFX Broadcasting, the defendants identified a plaintiff who worked for a rival radio station in an “Ugliest Bride Contest.” The court held that an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress could lie, although no defamation action would, because the contest asserted no facts about the plaintiff.24 The contest and Falwell's parody share a feature, since neither asserted facts about its target, yet the outcomes differ. Esposito-Hilder involved a private person mocked in a matter of no public interest, while Falwell was a public figure suing over a published parody.
How far Hustler reaches beyond public figures remains debatable. Its decision is limited to public figures, but its rationale may not be: outrageous speech by a private figure about public affairs raises the same concerns, although one may fairly ask why the First Amendment should protect outrageous speech intended to do harm.25 An opinion reading Hustler narrowly stresses that the plaintiff there was a public figure, that the Court did not suggest its holding applies to private figures or to every distress claim, and that the holding reached only “publications such as the one here at issue,” a caricature in a magazine. Unless a caricature of a public figure can reasonably be read as stating provable facts, it lacks the same potential to wound as a personal verbal assault on a vulnerable private figure.26
The same line between public debate and private exchange appears in a dissent from a decision that protected the disclosure of an unlawfully intercepted private conversation. The dissent argued that the speakers had no intention of contributing to a public “debate” at all, and that the Constitution should not protect the involuntary broadcast of personal conversations.27 It is an argument, not a rule, but it shows how the public-debate rationale limits itself.
Losing constitutional shelter does not make the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff must still prove extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress.28 The mental-state element is demanding: the defendant must intend to cause emotional distress or act in conscious disregard of a high probability of it, and an intent to commit a battery or to harm property is not enough.29 A claim built on speech must therefore clear two hurdles, the constitutional limits and the elements, and an answer should say where the claim falls on each.