Concept
Bodily Harm Rules
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Bodily Harm Rules
Severe distress can make a person physically ill, and the Restatement offers the injured plaintiff two routes to recover for the illness. The first is the last clause of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1). After making the defendant liable for severe emotional distress caused by extreme and outrageous conduct, the section adds that “if bodily harm to the other results from it,” the defendant is liable “for such bodily harm.”1 Illness, heart trouble, or a miscarriage that follows the distress thus becomes part of the recoverable loss. In most jurisdictions the plaintiff does not need bodily harm to reach a jury, because the claim is complete once its own elements are met and the bodily harm is an extra item attached to it.
Section 312 is the second route. It makes an actor liable for illness or other bodily harm of which emotional distress is a legal cause, if the actor intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to distress that the actor should recognize as likely to result in illness or other bodily harm.2 The actor need not have intended the bodily harm.3 The intent that counts is intent to distress, and the illness is a consequence the actor should have seen coming.
The two rules ask different questions before physical harm becomes compensable. Section 46(1) requires extreme and outrageous conduct and severe distress, and the bodily harm follows as an add-on. Section 312 says nothing about outrageousness; it asks whether the actor inflicted the distress intentionally and unreasonably, and whether the actor should have recognized illness as a likely result. The first subsection below takes up § 46, and the second turns to § 312.
Bodily Harm Under Section 46
The last clause of § 46(1) carries liability past the distress itself. A defendant who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress answers for that distress, “and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”4 The word “it” points back to the distress, so the clause attaches to a claim that is already complete. The plaintiff must still prove outrageous conduct, the required mental state, causation, and severe distress; a plaintiff with a physical injury but no severe distress produced by the conduct gives the clause nothing to attach to. The bodily harm in view is the physical aftermath of mental suffering: a physical illness, a heart condition, a miscarriage, and the like.5 The clause raises two questions that are easy to confuse. Must the plaintiff suffer bodily harm to recover at all? And when bodily harm does follow, how far does the defendant's liability reach?
Most courts answer the first question no. If the emotional anguish is great, and especially if it is prolonged, most courts and the Restatement Third allow the action whether or not the suffering has any physical manifestation and whether or not bodily harm results.6 A large number of cases have dropped the requirement of physical symptoms or hold that it does not apply when the facts tend to show the reality of the plaintiff's harm, and the Restatement Third disavows it, limiting claims to “serious emotional disturbance” with or without physical manifestations.7 A majority of the courts that have addressed the question allow recovery for intentional infliction despite the absence of physical injury,8 and one court held flatly that no proof of physical injury is required for an IIED claim.9
Two reasons support the majority view. The first concerns who is better placed to judge. Jurors know from their own experience the extent and character of the disagreeable emotions that outrageous conduct can produce, but whether distress in turn produced a physical injury is a difficult medical question.10 The second concerns the evidence: the defendant's conduct, designed to bring on mental suffering, is greater proof that the suffering occurred than any physical injury that may or may not have resulted.11 A dissenting opinion adds that in intentional-tort cases the presumption that severe distress will occur is great, so the chance of a disingenuous claim is small, and doubts about the injury are better left to the factfinder than resolved by demanding evidence of bodily injury.12
A few jurisdictions still keep the physical-injury gate.13 Rhode Island is one. To avoid summary judgment in a case against Narragansett, the plaintiffs had to allege and demonstrate not only extreme and outrageous conduct but also resulting physical symptomatology, and their failure to do so ended the claim.14 A decision in M.H. & J.L.H. v. Caritas Family Services likewise stated that infliction of distress, whether intentional or negligent, generally requires a physical injury as evidence of severe distress.15 Where the gate applies, physical manifestation is a condition of the distress claim itself and not an add-on, and a plaintiff whose anguish was real but left no medical trace recovers nothing. The worry behind such a gate is the disingenuous claim. The requirement is most familiar from negligence: many courts demand physical manifestation for negligent conduct, and it might be eliminated once the conduct is proved intentional.16 A bodily-harm answer should therefore state the majority rule and flag the minority.
When bodily harm does follow, the next question is how much of it the defendant must answer for. Wilkinson v. Downton is the paradigm. A practical joker told the plaintiff that her husband had been smashed up in an accident and lay in a pub with both legs broken, and that she should come at once in a cab with two pillows to fetch him home. The shock caused serious physical illness with permanent consequences, and the court held the joker liable, although the opinion leaves unclear which cause of action it applied.17
The limits come from a corollary rule. Where the defendant intended to inflict only severe emotional distress, the defendant is not liable for greater harm in the form of illness or other bodily harm unless the conduct created a foreseeable risk of that aggravated harm. Where the defendant intended to cause bodily harm by means of inflicting distress, the defendant is liable for that harm, perhaps even independent of this tort.18
Each half has its own logic. The foreseeability limit ties the defendant's exposure to what the defendant aimed at or risked: someone who set out to frighten or humiliate has the culpability of that choice, but an unusual illness that nothing in the conduct made likely is neither something the defendant intended nor a risk the defendant ran. The second half runs the other way. Courts tend to expand the scope of liability when a tort is intentional or reckless. A defendant who intentionally causes physical harm is liable for it even if it was unlikely to occur, and the Restatement Third says that an actor who intentionally or recklessly causes physical harm is liable for “a broader range of harms” than if acting negligently.19 A defendant who used distress as the instrument of bodily harm intended physical harm, so the broader scope applies. Knowledge of the plaintiff's condition connects the two halves, because a defendant who knows of a frailty has made the aggravated harm foreseeable. A plaintiff's pre-existing susceptibility does not necessarily bar recovery either, if the conduct intensified the pre-existing condition of psychological stress.20
An exam stem about physical consequences usually asks one of two questions, and the first job is to tell which. If the plaintiff is badly shaken but shows no illness, the issue is whether the jurisdiction demands physical manifestation, and the Restatement and most courts do not. If the plaintiff has an illness, the issue is scope: did the defendant intend bodily harm, or at least create a foreseeable risk of it? Bodily harm never substitutes for the underlying elements, because it rides on a distress claim that must otherwise succeed. Section 312 offers a separate route for illness, with its own conditions, in the next subsection.
Section 312 Illness Claims
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 312 gives the plaintiff a second route to recover for physical consequences, one that does not pass through § 46. It makes an actor liable for illness or other bodily harm when the actor intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to emotional distress that the actor should recognize as likely to result in illness or other bodily harm, so long as the distress is a legal cause of the harm.22 The bodily-harm clause of § 46(1) attaches to a claim that already has outrageous conduct and severe distress. Section 312 stands on its own conditions. It asks whether the defendant set out to distress the plaintiff, whether doing so was unreasonable, and whether illness was a recognizable danger. Because it protects the plaintiff's body, the claim exists only when illness or bodily harm actually follows.
The rule applies although the actor has no intention of inflicting such harm.23 Its mental state attaches to the distress, and the illness is a result the defendant need not have wanted; it is enough that the defendant should have recognized it as likely. An intended disturbance can carry liability for an unintended illness because of what the intending actor knows. One who sets out to distress another necessarily knows the distress that is to be inflicted, the person who will receive it, and the circumstances in which it will land, and that knowledge gives the actor far greater ability to foresee its consequences than a careless actor who never grasped that anyone would be distressed.24 The defendant chose the target and the method, and the choice puts the physical consequence within the defendant's view.
The Restatement's comments, as quoted in Bartow v. Smith, mark the border with § 46 in their first sentence: the rule “does not give protection to mental and emotional tranquillity.”25 The comment calls the conduct negligent, “not because it is intended to subject the other to a mental or emotional disturbance but because it is likely to result in physical harm through the intended disturbance,” and the disturbance matters only insofar as it involves a risk of bodily harm and affects the damages recoverable if that harm is sustained.26 Two consequences follow. A plaintiff who was badly shaken but never became ill has no claim under this rule, whereas a plaintiff under § 46 who proves severe distress recovers for it in most jurisdictions without any bodily harm. And the text of § 312 asks only whether the actor inflicted the distress intentionally and unreasonably and should have recognized illness as likely; it nowhere requires extreme and outrageous conduct.
The word “unreasonably” keeps the rule from reaching distress that cannot be avoided. The comment observes that many situations make it reasonable, indeed inevitable, to subject another to distress that is recognizably likely to have serious physical consequences, and its example is that it may be necessary to inform even an ill woman of the death of a dearly loved relative.27 A person who must deliver that news can foresee its effect on a fragile listener as clearly as a prankster can, so the likelihood of illness cannot separate the two. Justification does that work, and the rule places its burden on the defendant who inflicted distress for no purpose that warranted it.
Place the superintendent beside the person who must report a death. Each recognizes that a heart patient may collapse, and each knows what the words will do, yet only the one with no reason to cause the distress acts unreasonably. A stem that gives the defendant knowledge of the plaintiff's condition has therefore supplied only the foreseeability element. The next question is whether the distress served a purpose that made it reasonable, even inevitable, to cause.
Section 313 covers the unintentional counterpart. It imposes liability for resulting illness on an actor who unintentionally causes distress, if the actor should have realized that the conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress and that the distress, if caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.28 Subsection (2) withholds that route when the illness comes from distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the actor's negligence has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff.29 The contrast to hold onto is the mental state. Section 312 requires that the actor intentionally subject the plaintiff to distress and should have recognized illness as likely; § 313 substitutes an unreasonable risk of causing the distress in the first place. A later section sets the intentional and negligent routes side by side. Section 312, for its part, applies “irrespective of whether the act is directed against the other or a third person,” a point taken up with the third-party claims below.30