Concept
Origins and Purpose
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Origins and Purpose
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) states the modern rule: one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is liable for that distress and, if bodily harm results, for the bodily harm as well.1 “Emotional distress” covers the unpleasant mental reactions that another person’s conduct can produce, among them anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, and fury, and distress that is severe enough can support tort damages.2 The rule looks obvious, yet the law reached it slowly. Its two demanding qualifiers, extreme outrageousness and severe distress, are the price courts set for recognizing the tort at all.
For a long time the law refused to protect freedom from emotional disturbance as an interest in its own right. As late as 1934, the First Restatement said that mental and emotional tranquility was not, as a thing in itself, important enough to require others to refrain from conduct intended or likely to disturb it.3 It explained the rule allowing recovery for mere apprehension of bodily harm in assault as a historical anomaly, and the rule allowing recovery for insulting conduct by a common carrier’s employee as a way to secure comfortable as well as safe service for the public.4
Mental suffering nonetheless entered the courtroom by a side door. Courts had long awarded damages for mental trauma and its physical effects as an adjunct to damages for other harms, such as bodily injury, and they recognized harm to purely mental interests in actions for assault, false imprisonment, and, to a lesser extent, battery where the contact is slight but offensive.5 Distress that rides along with another tort is called parasitic, and a requirement of physical symptoms that some courts impose on other distress claims typically does not apply to it.6 A plaintiff with no other tort to point to has no such anchor, which explains why courts approached the stand-alone claim with caution.
The caution had two sources. Courts worried that a general cause of action for intentional infliction would open a Pandora’s box. It could multiply litigation over unmannerly conduct that, while distressing, is so common that anyone with social or commercial relations should expect it, and it could invite fraudulent claims from people who had merely been insulted or aggravated rather than truly and deeply distressed.7 Difficulty of proving and measuring emotional harm was a weaker objection, because courts already value intangible harms such as pain and suffering.8 The real task was to draw a line narrow enough to answer both fears.
Pressure to recognize a freestanding claim came from a cluster of cases that fit none of the existing categories of intentional interference with bodily autonomy. In each, the defendant had made no physical contact, no threat of contact, and no confinement, yet had acted to interfere severely with the plaintiff’s peace of mind.9 The first defendants were innkeepers and common carriers, said to owe a “contractual” obligation not to engage in such conduct. The contractual prerequisite eventually disappeared, and defendants of all sorts became subject to liability.10
Wilkinson v. Downton is among the earliest cases to allow recovery for intentional infliction of mental distress as a distinct tort. A practical joker amused himself by telling the plaintiff that her husband had been smashed up in an accident and lay at a pub in Leytonstone with both legs broken, and that she should come at once in a cab with two pillows to fetch him home. The shock caused serious physical illness with permanent consequences and at one time threatened her reason. The defendant was held liable, although the opinion leaves the cause of action unclear.11
Other fact patterns pointed the same way. In Gadbury v. Bleitz, a body was held without burial while payment of another debt was demanded. The court avoided the difficulties surrounding ownership of a corpse and recognized that the tort was in reality the intentional infliction of mental distress on the survivors by extreme outrage.12 Courts also found actionable conduct in threats and other indignities by bill collectors, insurance adjusters, landlords, school officials, police and those posing as police, and officials of a trade association. Liability attached when the threats went beyond ordinary persuasion or demands the defendant had a right to make and became flagrant abuses of power in the nature of extortion. A defendant is not liable merely for exercising a legal right, even if likely to cause severe distress.13
State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff supplies the reasoning that undermined the old premise. The California Supreme Court observed that a jury is ordinarily better placed to decide whether outrageous conduct causes mental distress than whether that distress in turn causes physical injury. Jurors know from their own experience the character of the disagreeable emotions that conduct can produce, whereas a difficult medical question arises when the issue is whether distress produced physical injury. And conduct designed to bring distress about is better proof that suffering occurred than any physical injury that may or may not follow.14 Later developments in emotional distress law point the same direction. A large number of cases have dropped the requirement of physical symptoms or held it inapplicable when the facts show the reality of the harm,15 and the Restatement Third disavows the requirement, limiting claims to “serious emotional disturbance” whether or not physical manifestations accompany it.16
A leading torts scholar found common threads in these scattered lines of cases: the defendant behaved intentionally, to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and the conduct was so reprehensible, or “outrageous,” as to be an offense against decency. He gathered the seemingly unlike cases under a new heading, the tort now called intentional infliction of emotional distress.17 The features that marked the early cases, the extreme outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct and the severity of the plaintiff’s distress, then became elements of the tort itself.18
Courts that adopt the tort explain why those elements matter. In Harris v. Jones, Maryland recognized the independent tort and chose to adhere closely to the four elements outlined in Womack v. Eldridge. Close adherence, the court reasoned, minimizes two problems inherent in a tort of this character: distinguishing the true claim from the false and the trifling annoyance from the serious wrong.19 The two limits work together on both problems. Only extraordinary misbehavior satisfies the outrageousness requirement, so suits and liability are unlikely to rise radically. Because such misbehavior is more likely than ordinary rudeness to cause severe distress, the requirements of extreme outrageousness and severe distress also tend to reduce the risk of fraudulent claims.20 Severity does more than filter, because it decides whether the plaintiff recovers at all. In Harris the court found the evidence legally insufficient to show a severely disabling emotional response. It explained that severity of distress is not only relevant to the amount of recovery but a necessary element of any recovery, and it never had to decide whether the defendant’s plainly intentional conduct was extreme or outrageous.21
Set Wilkinson beside a clerk who answers a customer’s price question with a brusque insult. Both listeners may be upset, but the joker deliberately manufactured a falsehood meant to shock, the kind of malicious practical joke from which the tort grew. The clerk committed the sort of unmannerly conduct that people are expected to absorb.22 The cases on insults and petty indignities, such as Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, take up that line below.
The tort’s purpose follows from this history. Decisions such as Childers v. Geile describe it as a “gap-filler.” It allows recovery for severe emotional distress caused by truly outrageous behavior where there would otherwise be no remedy, because the victim suffered no injury directly to his person or to intangible personal attributes such as reputation. The tort is grounded in harassing or abusive behavior that causes severe distress. A litigant may plead it in the alternative to negligence but cannot prevail on both claims on the same set of facts.23
The tort’s independence from reputation torts shows in a case that reached the Supreme Court. A jury rejected a public figure’s libel claim over an advertising parody, finding that it could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts or events. It nonetheless ruled for him on the intentional infliction claim and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 each in punitive damages from the petitioners.24 The Court called the question novel: whether the First Amendment lets a public figure recover for emotional harm caused by an ad parody offensive to him and “doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most.”25 That question is taken up under First Amendment Limits below.