Concept
Participation in Confinement
False imprisonment
Participation in Confinement
False imprisonment liability does not stop with the person who turns the key. One who instigates or participates in the unlawful confinement of another is subject to liability to the other for false imprisonment.1 The earlier sections asked how a confinement comes about and whether the plaintiff was held. This section asks who else answers for it, and the answer turns on what each defendant contributed and what each defendant knew.
The test asks whether the defendant was an active and knowing participant in procuring or instigating the confinement, including its wrongful aspect.2 To instigate is to set the confinement in motion by directing or urging someone else to carry it out. To participate is to take a hand in holding the plaintiff, whether at the start or partway through. Two kinds of defendant fall outside the test. One merely gives information to others who independently decide whether and how to confine the plaintiff. The other requests a proper arrest that someone else performs improperly.3
The word unlawful in § 45A adds a second limit: participation creates liability only when the confinement itself lacks justification. Where an officer holds a valid warrant or probable cause, no false arrest claim lies at all, and conviction of the crime for which the plaintiff was arrested is a complete defense.4 In that case there is no unlawful confinement for anyone to instigate or join. The privileges that can supply such justification are taken up at the end of this chapter.
Three defendants mark out the line: one who joins a restraint already under way, one who only reports facts, and a private citizen who helps an officer make an arrest. The first is liable, the second is not, and the third depends on what the citizen knew.
Participation can begin after the restraint does. In Buckel v. Rodrigues, a security guard questioned a grocery clerk about suspected theft, stood between her and the only door of the room, and told her he would decide whether she went to jail that evening. She was allowed only one telephone call.5 The owner did not start that restraint. The owner acquiesced in it and continued the interrogation the guard had begun, over a three-hour period.6 That is participation. The clerk stayed held during those hours partly through the owner's own conduct, and it makes no difference that the guard, not the owner, stood at the door.
The informant stands at the other pole. A person who gives the police information, even information that proves incorrect, has not instigated or participated in the confinement that follows when the officer chooses to arrest.7 The Indiana Supreme Court drew the line this way in Holcomb v. Walter's Dimmick Petroleum, Inc.: "Liability will not be imposed when the defendant does nothing more than detail his version of the facts to a policeman and ask for his assistance, leaving it to the officer to determine what is the appropriate response, at least where his representation of the facts does not prevent the intelligent exercise of the officer's discretion."8 Missouri applied the same idea in Highfill v. Hale. There a deputy's decision to arrest neighbors for stalking rested at least partly on the deputy's own investigation, so the complainant who had set the matter before the deputy was not liable.9
The line follows the decision. An officer who weighs the facts and chooses to arrest has made the choice, while the informant has only supplied facts for it. The qualifying clause in the Holcomb passage marks where that protection ends: when a complainant's account prevents the intelligent exercise of the officer's discretion, the decision is no longer the officer's alone, and the informant's shelter goes with it.
The private citizen who physically helps an officer stands differently, because that citizen takes a hand in the restraint itself. Such a citizen who aids in a false arrest can be liable for false imprisonment. When the officer requests the assistance, however, the citizen is not liable unless the citizen knows the arrest is unlawful.10 The knowledge requirement is the test's word knowing at work. Awareness that the arrest is unlawful is what turns a helper answering an officer's call into a knowing participant in the confinement's wrongful aspect.
A fact pattern in which a bystander lends a hand to an arrest raises one question before any other: did the bystander know the arrest was unlawful?
The Buckel owner and a helper who knows the arrest is unlawful both answer for a restraint they joined. The helper who does not know, and the informant who never touched the restraint, do not.
Steps two and three do most of the sorting. They separate the defendant who shared in the restraint from the defendant who only set facts before someone else, and a plaintiff on the informant side has no false imprisonment claim against that defendant.