Concept
Act and Confinement
False imprisonment
Act and Confinement
Intent to confine carries a false imprisonment claim only part of the way. Section 35(1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also requires that the actor's act directly or indirectly result in a confinement of the other,1 and § 36(1) requires that the confinement within the boundaries the actor fixed be complete.2 A defendant who meant to hold someone in place and never did has met the first requirement and failed the second. This section therefore moves from the defendant's mind to the defendant's conduct and its result.
The completeness requirement follows from the interest the tort protects. False imprisonment guards freedom of movement, so the law looks for a restraint that takes that freedom away within a bounded area. A person who is slowed, inconvenienced, or sent the long way around still has somewhere to go,3 and treating every such hindrance as imprisonment would turn ordinary obstruction into an intentional tort. A locked storeroom and a blocked doorway lie on opposite sides of that line, and the four subsections below locate it.
The first subsection asks whether the defendant's act caused the confinement, a question § 37 answers by making it immaterial whether the act did so directly or indirectly.4 The other three examine the confinement itself: what makes it complete within a bounded area, how an available exit affects completeness,5 and why intentionally preventing a plaintiff from going in one direction, even one the plaintiff has a right or privilege to take, does not alone create liability.6 Any of these questions can defeat a claim in which intent and awareness are both established, because § 35(1) imposes liability only when all of its requirements are met.7
Act and Legal Cause
Once intent to confine is shown, the question becomes whether the defendant's conduct produced the confinement. Section 35(1)(b) requires that the actor's act directly or indirectly result in a confinement of the other.8 Section 37 adds that when an act is done with intent to confine and is the legal cause of the confinement, it is immaterial whether the act causes the confinement directly or indirectly.9 Legal cause is the law's name for a connection between conduct and result strong enough to make the actor answerable for the result: the confinement must trace to what the defendant did, not to some unrelated event. The first provision demands the connection, and the second allows it to run through intermediate steps.
The direct cases are the familiar ones. A nursing-home resident tried to escape five or six times and was caught and brought back against his will each time, and on one occasion he was locked and taped in a restraint chair for more than five hours. The court found ample evidence to sustain the jury's finding of false imprisonment.10
The law treats indirect causation the same way because of what the tort protects. If liability required the defendant to lay hands on the plaintiff, a defendant could escape by letting a lock, a barrier, or an agent do the holding, and the plaintiff would be held just as tightly. Section 37 closes that gap by tracing the confinement to the person who set it in motion. It does not reach actors who lack the intent to confine: an act not done with that intent does not make the actor liable for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, even if the act ran an unreasonable risk of imposing it.11
Several routes count as indirect. A defendant who locks a door and walks away leaves the lock to do the confining. Taking property that the plaintiff will not abandon compels the plaintiff to come along, and coercion through seizure of personal property can constitute false imprisonment.12 Enlisting another person to bar the way is a third route, which the section on participation in confinement develops.
The classic illustration is Griffin v. Clark. In the version used in teaching problems, Clark takes Griffin's bag, and she skips her train and rides in his car to retrieve it. Clark might argue that no one forced her to skip the train, but coercion through seizure of personal property can constitute false imprisonment.13 His taking of the bag was the act, and her ride in the car was its result.
The case also shows how far an intentional confiner answers for what follows. An accident injured Griffin during the ride. Nothing suggests that Clark drove negligently, so a negligence claim would fail, and she must recover on a false imprisonment theory instead. Intentional tortfeasors are generally liable for the consequences of their deliberately tortious conduct, even unexpected ones. Some limit probably exists, but an accident is a reasonably predictable consequence of forcing someone to ride in a car, so the risk of the forced journey falls on Clark, who created it, and not on Griffin, who never accepted it.14
The causal link fails when the plaintiff's own choice, and nothing the defendant did, keeps the plaintiff in place. Moral or social pressure is not enough. A plaintiff who stays to clear his name, or to avoid attracting attention or public humiliation, may have some tort claim, but it is not false imprisonment.15 Hardy v. LaBelle's Distributing Co. applies that line to an employee who stayed to answer a theft accusation. The contrast with Griffin lies in the source of the compulsion. Clark's seizure of the bag made leaving costly, because leaving meant giving up her belongings. Concern for one's reputation imposes no comparable cost on leaving, so the plaintiff's presence is the plaintiff's own doing. The sections on means of confinement take up the kinds of pressure that do count, such as barriers, force, and threats.
Complete Confinement
Section 36(1) conditions liability on a confinement that is complete within the boundaries the actor fixed.17 The preceding subsection asked whether the defendant's act produced a restraint; this one asks how thorough the restraint must be. A boundary that leaves the plaintiff free to go elsewhere confines no one. A boundary that closes every direction does, whatever it is made of and however much ground it encloses.
A plaintiff forced to take the long way around to reach a destination has been delayed, not imprisoned, but a plaintiff given no way out of where he is, even no way out of a large space, has been confined. Keeping an individual in a closed room, physically barring his only way out, and detaining him in a retail store by threat of force may each qualify.18 The requirement also keeps the tort narrow: without it, every blocked sidewalk, refused entry, and traffic delay would become an intentional tort.
The bounded area may be a room, an automobile, a building, or perhaps something larger. It is enough that the plaintiff is prevented from leaving the area, but within it the confinement must be total, leaving no reasonable or safe avenue of escape known to the plaintiff.19 Walls are not required. In a standard teaching problem, Tough and Thug make Milquetoast stay where he sits, on open ground with a sixty-mile view, for seven minutes. He is confined within a bounded area, the spot where he sits, and one can be confined in the open as well as in a room and suffer the same indignity from the loss of freedom of movement.20
Size is where completeness begins to shade into exclusion. One court found the country of Taiwan too spacious to constitute a bounded area in Shen v. Leo A. Daly Co.. The Seventh Circuit suggested in Albright v. Oliver that 'we suppose Illinois could be a prison' to the plaintiff, and the Alaska Supreme Court said in Helstrom v. North Slope Borough that preventing a plaintiff from leaving Barrow, Alaska, could constitute false imprisonment.21 Most cases involve far more limited spaces: the four walls of a house, an office, a prison, or a car or other vehicle.22
No mileage figure separates these results. Inside a very large area the plaintiff keeps nearly all of the freedom of movement the tort protects, so a restraint on leaving a nation resembles a ban on entering one place. A smaller place, such as a town, is one a person can be shut into. Where one becomes the other is left to the circumstances of each case.23
The bounded area may also move. The Restatement passage quoted in Griffin v. Clark says that an actor who by force, threats, or asserted legal authority compels another to accompany him from place to place has confined that person as effectively as if he had locked her in a room, and that a place of confinement in constant motion, such as a forced sea voyage, does not prevent liability.24 The captor's control is the boundary, and it travels with the plaintiff. Tough and Thug confine Milquetoast just as surely when they force him to go where they order him to, as does a carjacker. His apprehension of being knifed if he refuses also supports an assault claim, since assault is the victim's apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact caused by the defendant's action or threat, coupled with the defendant's intent to cause that apprehension or the contact itself.25 The two torts coexist on the same facts.
Duration is not an element. Confinement for any appreciable time, however short, is sufficient.26 Seven minutes is not a long confinement, yet it supports the claim; the brevity may reduce damages but does not avoid liability for the tort.27 The section on duration and damages returns to the point.
The second step carries most of the weight; the third matters only when the area is very large. Two opposite mistakes are common: treating a small area or a long episode as necessary, and treating any obstacle as confinement. The next two subsections refine the same question, whether the plaintiff truly had nowhere to go.
Reasonable Means of Escape
Section 36(2) qualifies the completeness requirement with a rule about exits: the confinement is complete although there is a reasonable means of escape, unless the other knows of it.29 The default favors the plaintiff, so an exit somewhere on the premises does not defeat the claim by itself. The exception applies only when two things are true: the exit is a reasonable means of escape, and the plaintiff knows of it. Knowledge and reasonableness ask different questions, and most fact patterns turn on which one is missing.
The exception exists because a person who can leave by an ordinary, safe, known route still has the freedom the tort protects. If a closed door produced liability even when another door stood open down the hall, every obstruction would become a lawsuit. The default exists for a different reason. A defendant who set out to restrain the plaintiff chose the restraint, and the law does not let that defendant shift its costs to the plaintiff by pointing to a way out that is hidden or expensive to use. Each half of the rule polices one of those failures: the exit the plaintiff cannot use because it is unknown, and the exit the plaintiff should not have to use because of what it would cost.
The knowledge half is clearest in Talcott v. National Exhibition Co.. The plaintiff got into an enclosure where tickets were being sold but could not get into the stands, and the defendant closed the entrance gates behind him to prevent injuries from the crush. Another exit existed, but because no one told him of it, he stayed in the enclosure for more than an hour. The court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff: the defendant might have been justified in closing the gates, but it was then under a duty to inform him of the other exit.30 An exit the plaintiff has never heard of gives him no more freedom than a wall.
Decisions that deny recovery rest on an alternative the plaintiff could use. Bird v. Jones and Davis & Allcott Co. v. Boozer are examples: the plaintiffs had somewhere else to go, which is the fact Talcott lacked. A store owner who blocks one exit shows the same contrast. If Munoz blocks an exit while Maxwell is inside but the side door is open and Maxwell knows it, he is not confined, only frustrated. If his only other way out is a hatch into the sewer system, he has no reasonable means of escape.31
The reasonableness half of the rule defines which exits a plaintiff must take. The Restatement passage quoted in Griffin v. Clark puts it this way: because the actor intended to imprison the other, the other need not run any risk of harm to his person or his chattels, or subject himself to substantial liability, and need not take even a perfectly safe avenue of escape if the circumstances make it offensive to a reasonable sense of decency or personal dignity.32 A standard summary agrees in substance: no reasonable means of escape exists when the plaintiff cannot leave without risking harm to person or property, or when the escape would offend a personal sense of decency or dignity.33 The common thread is the allocation of risk. The defendant chose the restraint, so the danger and indignity of getting out fall on the defendant, not on the plaintiff who did nothing to invite them.
A treehouse problem makes the point concrete. Amil tells Logan to put the ladder back up, Logan refuses and tells him to 'just jump,' and Amil jumps and breaks his ankle on landing.34 A jump that risks injury to the person is not a reasonable means of escape, so Logan's invitation does not describe a reasonable way out.
Two mistakes recur. One treats any physically possible exit as fatal to the claim and skips the question whether the plaintiff knew of it. The other treats the plaintiff's awareness of an exit as the end of the inquiry and skips the question whether anyone could be expected to use it.
Blocked Directions
Section 36(3) completes the picture by saying what does not count: the actor does not become liable for false imprisonment by intentionally preventing another from going in a particular direction in which the other has a right or privilege to go.36 The earlier subsections asked whether the plaintiff was shut in with no direction left to go. This one concerns the plaintiff who is turned back from one place or route and stays free to go everywhere else. A workable shorthand is that the tort answers being held in, not being kept out.
The rule follows from the harm the tort redresses. The essence of false imprisonment is the mental harm of knowing that one is not free to move about at will.37 A person refused entry to a place keeps that freedom, because every direction but one remains open. The restriction is real but partial, and it lacks the captivity that sets this tort apart from the ordinary frustration of being told no. Merely blocking a plaintiff's path in one direction is therefore not enough, and neither is excluding the plaintiff from a place such as a bar or restaurant.38
The Munoz problem shows the rule on a small scale. If Munoz blocks the door of her store and refuses to let Maxwell in, she has restricted his freedom of movement to some degree but has not confined him, because he can go anywhere else. Blocking a plaintiff's way in the street likewise supports no recovery as long as the plaintiff can go some other way.39
Courts have applied the same reasoning to exclusion from a race track and from a dance, in Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club and Cullen v. Dickenson. An exclusion may be unjustified, but wrongfulness cannot supply a missing confinement: the plaintiff must still show that the defendant held her within boundaries.
Bird v. Jones is the classic English case on the point. The defendant's agents blocked the public footpath of Hammersmith Bridge and refused to let the plaintiff pass. He had a right to use that footpath, yet he was not imprisoned, because he could go back the way he had come or cross by the carriageway. A right to travel a particular way may make an obstruction wrongful in some other respect, but false imprisonment asks whether the plaintiff was held, and a plaintiff free to retrace his steps was not.
Withheld property follows the same line. In a problem loosely based on Warrem v. Parrish, station owners tell Clevinger they will keep his car. He cannot drive home, but nothing stops him from leaving on foot or going anywhere else, so he is not confined; if he has a claim, it lies in another tort. Property can, however, serve as leverage to keep a plaintiff in place. A store customer who goes to the security office after guards confiscate her purse has not truly consented to the detention, because she acted under duress,40 and Clark's saying that he would leave with Griffin's things unless she came along would be coercion of the same kind.41 The difference lies in the function of the property: in the purse case it is held to make the plaintiff stay, while in the car case it is merely kept.
On an exam, a stem that describes a refusal of entry, a traveler turned back from a road, or a withheld car calls for one question before any other: in which directions was the plaintiff still free to go? If any remain, the claim fails as false imprisonment however unjustified the defendant's conduct, and any remedy lies in some other tort or doctrine. When none remains, the facts have become the complete confinement that § 36(1) requires, and § 36(2) then asks whether the plaintiff knew of a reasonable means of escape.42