Concept
Intent to Confine
False imprisonment
Intent to Confine
False imprisonment is an intentional tort, so every confinement case begins with the question of what the defendant meant to do. Section 35(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts answers it: the actor must act intending to confine the other, or a third person, within boundaries the actor fixes.1 A plaintiff who was held in place, knew it, and resented it still loses without that mental state. The intent must be aimed at the confinement itself, and meaning to do something else that happens to trap someone does not qualify.
The tort aims at confinement because it protects freedom of movement against defendants who choose to invade it. A defendant who traps someone through inattention made no such choice and answers, if at all, in negligence. Section 35(2) marks the boundary: an act not done with the intent described in § 35(1)(a) creates no liability for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, even though the act carried an unreasonable risk of confining someone and would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.2 However foreseeable the trapping was, carelessness does not become false imprisonment.
Three subsections follow. The first defines the two mental states that count as intent to confine. The second shows how that intent can pass to a person the defendant never meant to confine. The third explains why the defendant's reason for confining, kind or cruel, plays no part in liability.
Purpose or Knowledge
Intent to confine is shown in one of two ways: the actor acts with the purpose of confining, or the actor acts knowing to a substantial certainty that confinement will result. The word carries the same restricted meaning here that it has in battery and assault. Carelessness does not suffice, and a person may act deliberately without acting intentionally.3 Substantial certainty is the same line that separates intentional torts from negligent or reckless ones: when a result is intended or virtually certain to occur, the tort is intentional.4
Most disputes arise in the gap between a deliberate act and an intent to confine. Peterson, a zookeeper, closes the tiger cage and goes to bed, not realizing that Stanley is still inside feeding the tigers. Peterson meant to close the door, but he did not close it to trap Stanley and had no idea that Stanley would be trapped. He committed no false imprisonment, and Stanley's remedy, if any, lies in negligence.5 In this tort, intent attaches to the confinement, not to the act that produces it.
A bus driver named Lewis shows the same boundary on facts that invite a sympathetic result. She deliberately locks the bus before leaving, and Gretel, a sleeping child, is still on board. Lewis had no purpose to confine Gretel and no knowledge that confinement was substantially certain, so Gretel's false imprisonment claim fails.6 Lewis may well have been negligent, because she did not walk to the back of the bus and check for sleeping children, and negligence is where Gretel's claim would proceed.7 That a careful driver would have checked, and would have found Gretel, proves negligence. It does not supply the knowledge that intent requires.
Purpose is the plainer route, and it is proved through what the defendant did and said. In a nursing-home case, a patient tried to escape five or six times, and each time he was caught and brought back against his will. He was locked and taped in a restraint chair for more than five hours and put back in it on later occasions. The court found ample evidence to sustain the jury's verdict of false imprisonment, which it defined as the direct restraint of one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification.8 No one stumbles into conduct like that. Staff who chase down a patient each time he leaves and strap him into a chair are acting to keep him where they want him.
Words can prove purpose just as well. An IRAC exam guide teaches its method through worked examples, because students learn writing better from examples than from abstractions, and one of its problems is set in a haunted house.9 Kristy walks into a small room with one door and no doorknob. Noah slams the door and shouts, "You can't get away this time, Kristy," and when she yells, "Let me out!" he refuses.10 The slam, the shout, and the refusal leave no room to say that the door closed by accident, so Noah acted with the purpose of confining Kristy. Whether Kristy's decision to enter the attraction amounts to consent is a different question, which belongs with the defenses later in this chapter.
Knowledge qualifies as intent because a person who knows that confinement will follow has, in effect, chosen it, whatever the person would have preferred. Defendants seldom say that confinement was their goal, so the law treats going ahead with an act the actor knows will confine as equivalent to wanting the result.
The mental state in question is the defendant's own, and the plaintiff must prove it. A defendant's mental disability is not a defense to an intentional tort. It matters only because it may make it harder for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant actually formed the intent.11
The limit in § 35(2) follows from the structure of the tort. Intentional liability answers a defendant's choice to restrain another person. If a careless trapping could trigger it, anyone who closed a door or latched a gate would answer as an intentional wrongdoer for risks never perceived, and the line between intentional and negligent fault would disappear. Negligence law already covers carelessness, and it is where Gretel's claim would proceed if the night in the bus injured her. When a careless confinement is brief and harmless, § 35(2) leaves the plaintiff without a claim.12
The third step decides most disputes, because the argument is usually over whether the actor's awareness reached substantial certainty. The facts that settle it concern perception: what the actor could see from where the actor stood, what the actor was told, and whether anyone warned the actor that the plaintiff was inside.
Transferred Intent
Section 43 provides that when an act done with the intention of affecting a third person imposes a confinement upon someone else, the actor is liable to that other person as fully as though the act had been intended to affect him.14 This is transferred intent: the defendant's culpable state of mind moves from the person the defendant had in view to the person actually held. The text of § 35(1)(a) already reaches an actor who intends to confine a third person.15 Section 43 speaks more broadly, because it asks only whether the actor meant to affect the third person, and that wording leaves room for an intended wrong other than confinement.16
The reason for the rule lies in what the intent element is meant to find. A defendant who sets out to restrain someone has chosen to invade a person's freedom, and that choice is the culpability that justifies liability. The person who actually ends up locked in has lost the same freedom the intended target would have lost, and has done nothing to deserve the loss. If intent were measured victim by victim, bad aim would turn an intentional wrong into a mere accident, and the person actually restrained would stand where the victim of a careless trapping stands, with no false imprisonment claim for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement.17 Transfer closes that gap by treating the defendant's wrongful aim as the intent for whoever the act actually confines.
Transfer supplies the missing intent and nothing else. Rolfe must still show that her act directly or indirectly resulted in his confinement, and that he knew of the confinement or was harmed by it.18 The example also assumes that nothing justified holding Smith, because privilege is a separate question taken up near the end of this chapter. A shop owner who turns the key at closing time with no thought that anyone remains inside presents the opposite result. That owner intended no confinement, and no other wrong, against anyone, so nothing exists to transfer to a customer who is trapped. Transfer relocates an intent the defendant actually had, and it cannot manufacture one that was never there.
The doctrine runs in two directions. The first is from one victim to another, which is the shop owner's case. The second is from one tort to another. Battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels descend from the old action of trespass, and intent to commit any one of them is traditionally treated as sufficient for a resulting injury of another. The formulation of false imprisonment that most states follow builds this in: the actor either intends to confine the plaintiff or has an intent that is "sufficient under §11 (transferred intent)."19 In Brown v. Martinez, a landowner fired a warning shot to scare intruders away from his watermelon patch and hit a person he did not know was there, and his intent to frighten (assault) carried over to the contact that actually occurred (battery). The same logic produces false imprisonment as the resulting tort.
The limit to the trespass family keeps intent from stretching across wrongs of different kinds. When either the tort intended or the harm that resulted falls outside the old trespass action, the doctrine does not apply, as in McGee v. Vanover, where a defendant who beat one person was not held liable on this theory to a bystander who claimed mental distress. The trespass-family torts share a structure, a direct application of force, so an actor who intends one has shown the kind of wrongful purpose the others punish. A distress claim rests on a different kind of fault.
Motive Is Irrelevant
Section 44 provides that when an act causing another's confinement is done with the intention of causing the confinement, the actor is liable although the act is not inspired by personal hostility or desire to offend.21 The earlier subsections fixed what the actor must aim at (the confinement itself) and whom that aim may reach (anyone the act actually confines). Section 44 says what the requirement leaves out, which is the reason the actor wanted the confinement.
Intent and motive answer different questions. Intent is the desire to bring about a particular immediate consequence, here the plaintiff's confinement. Motive is the reason for wanting it: revenge, protest, punishment, self-defense, even a wish to help.22 A prima facie case needs only the defendant's conduct, the invasion of a legally protected interest, and intent, so motive is no element of it.23 A kind motive, standing alone, does not excuse an intended confinement, and an ugly one does not stand in for an intent that is missing.
The reason follows from what the tort protects. False imprisonment guards freedom of movement, and that freedom is lost to the same degree whether the person who turned the key acted from spite or from kindness. If a benevolent purpose were a defense, every confiner could replace the plaintiff's judgment about where the plaintiff ought to be with the confiner's own, and that substitution is the invasion the tort exists to prevent. A motive defense would also turn each trial into an inquiry about the defendant's inner reasons, when the confinement itself is what the claim is about.
The protective-motive case is Eilers v. Coy. The defendants admitted that they intended to confine the plaintiff for at least a week, and they maintained that their purpose was to help the plaintiff. The court, applying Minnesota law, held that good motives are no defense to false imprisonment and that malice toward the person confined is not an element of the tort.24 A playful motive fares no better. In Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., coworkers staged a mock arrest of a new employee to celebrate the end of a probationary period, and the Tenth Circuit did not treat the prank label as a defense. The two decisions differ only in the flavor of the motive. Each defendant meant the confinement itself, and the identical result shows that the quality of the reason never entered the analysis.
The opposite error treats hostility as if it could stand in for intent.
Without the intent that § 35(1)(a) describes, the actor is not liable in false imprisonment for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, however ill-tempered the actor was.25 The anger in the example is simply a motive, and motive cannot replace the missing state of mind.
Motive does its work in two places, and neither is the prima facie case. The first is damages. Malice can aggravate an award and its absence can mitigate one, which is how malice may support punitive damages.26 The second is privilege, where a recognized defense may make the defendant's purpose relevant. Once the plaintiff proves an intentional confinement, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove legal justification.27 Detention of a suspected shoplifter shows how this works. Courts have strained to deny liability to good-faith merchants, often by finding that the plaintiff consented to stay or by creating a special privilege to detain on the premises, and most states have since enacted statutes giving the shopkeeper a limited privilege to detain for a reasonable time to investigate.28 Good faith alone was not enough, so relief came through consent or a defined privilege. Arrest is the other familiar example. Many circumstances privilege an arrest on a warrant or on reasonable suspicion of a crime, and where no privilege applies, the arrest is actionable false imprisonment, though it is often called false arrest.29 The privileges themselves are taken up near the end of this chapter.