Concept
Reasonable Apprehension
Assault
Reasonable Apprehension
The second clause of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21(1) turns from the defendant's mind to the plaintiff's. Once intent is established, the other must also be “thereby put in such imminent apprehension” of the contact the first clause describes.1 The word thereby joins the two elements, because the apprehension must result from the defendant's act. A defendant who acts with perfect intent still escapes liability if the plaintiff never came to expect a contact. A swing the plaintiff never perceives, or a gesture the plaintiff reasonably reads as harmless, fails at this clause however plainly the defendant meant to threaten.
Assault protects the plaintiff's security against the anticipation of unwanted contact. One opinion put the interest this way: “We have a right to live in society without being put in fear of personal harm. But it must be a reasonable fear of which we complain.”2 What the tort protects is the plaintiff's mental peace, not her physical well-being.3 Because the claim requires no touching and no bodily harm, the plaintiff's own expectation is the whole injury, and a plaintiff who expected no contact has lost nothing the tort exists to protect. The inquiry therefore asks what the plaintiff perceived and whether a reasonable person would have perceived the same thing. Ordinarily a threat that would not satisfy the tort if made to a typical person creates no liability, even when an extra-sensitive plaintiff did regard a battery as imminent.4 The one significant exception covers a defendant who sets out to frighten and succeeds, and it appears under Courage and Sensitivity below.5
The subsections that follow take the clause apart in the order a fact pattern raises its questions. They ask what apprehension means, whether the plaintiff knew of the threat in time, whose person was threatened, whether the danger must come from the defendant, how unusual courage or sensitivity changes the measure, and what the defendant's actual ability to carry out the threat adds. Imminence is a separate requirement and comes after them.
Apprehension, Not Fear
Apprehension means expectation, not fear. Section 21(1)(b) requires that the plaintiff be put in imminent apprehension of the contact the defendant's act threatens,6 and the tort is committed when the plaintiff perceives the threat, even if she is too courageous to be frightened or intimidated.7 Typically the plaintiff does fear the contact, but only anticipation is required, because anticipating a battery without fearing it still substantially disturbs one's mental peace.8 Courts sometimes write of a “well-founded fear of an imminent battery,”9 yet the element the plaintiff must establish is the anticipation.
Section 24 says what the plaintiff must believe: that the act may result in imminent contact unless something prevents it. It names three possible preventers, which are the plaintiff's own self-defensive action, flight, and the intervention of some outside force.10 The word may matters. The plaintiff need not be certain of being hit. It is enough that she takes the act to be capable of producing a contact if nothing further happens.
Because the section itself lists the preventers, a plaintiff who expects to parry the blow, to run, or to be rescued is still apprehensive. A rule that let the ability to avoid the blow erase the apprehension would exclude nearly every plaintiff who saw the attack coming, and those are the only plaintiffs who can be put in apprehension at all. Fear implies doubt about whether the threat can be stopped. Apprehension implies no such doubt, which is why the doctrine uses the second word.
Requiring fear would also cut against the purpose of the tort. Assault protects mental peace and deters conduct that tends to lead to disturbances of the peace.11 The anticipation of an unwanted contact disturbs a confident plaintiff as much as a timid one, so the law asks for anticipation and nothing more. An exam stem reporting that the plaintiff was unafraid, or could easily have defended herself, has therefore not told you the claim fails.
Corbett's liability rests on what Corbett did and meant and on what Press expected. Press's composure and her skill at self-defense do not enter the analysis.
The expectation must also be of the right kind of contact. Leonard and Spinks often slap each other on the shoulder in jest before sparring, so those contacts are not offensive and do not amount to battery. When Spinks moves to slap Leonard, Leonard anticipates a touching but not a harmful or offensive one, and Spinks commits no assault.12
A plaintiff's correct guess about the defendant's purpose does not defeat apprehension. Under § 28, an actor who intends merely to put the other in apprehension of a bodily contact is liable for assault if the other, although realizing that the actor does not intend to inflict the contact, is put in apprehension of it.13 Such a defendant has satisfied the intent element through the second form of intent, so the only live question is what the plaintiff expected. An athlete who pretends to throw a javelin at Mathias merely to frighten him, with no plan to release it, commits an assault in the tort sense if Mathias sees the motion.14
The pedestrian understood the driver's purpose and still expected the car to hit him, and the driver who staged the near-collision produced exactly the expectation the driver was after. The tort asks whether the plaintiff expected a contact. The plaintiff's theory about why the contact might or might not come is no part of that question. The line falls elsewhere. A plaintiff who knows that the pistol pointed at him is a toy has no reason to expect any contact, because nothing in the defendant's act is capable of producing one, and that plaintiff fails the apprehension element.15 What separates the two plaintiffs is whether any expectation of contact survives after the plaintiff has worked out the defendant's purpose.
Awareness of the Threat
Section 22 turns the apprehension element into a rule about timing. An attempt to inflict a harmful or offensive contact, or to cause apprehension of one, does not make the actor liable for assault if the other does not become aware of the attempt before it is terminated.17 The section asks whether the plaintiff's awareness arrived while the attempt was still under way. The defendant's intent cannot close the gap, because intent and apprehension are separate elements. A defendant who aimed perfectly at a target who never perceived the threat has satisfied only the first.
The reason follows from what the tort protects. A plaintiff who never perceived the threat anticipated nothing, so no peace was disturbed while the attempt lasted. A plaintiff who learns afterward that harm narrowly missed her feels alarm about a danger already past, and apprehension looks the other way, toward a contact about to happen. That alarm can be severe, but assault is the wrong tort for it. A remedy for the later distress would have to come from another tort, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, which allows recovery for severe distress whether or not a physical threat was made.18
Wilson's aim, Wilson's malice, and the banner are identical in both versions, and only the moment of Hennie's perception differs. In the first she never expected a contact while the attempt lasted, so she has no assault claim, however shaken she is by the near miss. In the second her apprehension arose before the attempt ended, and she has an assault claim although nothing touched her. The sleeping plaintiff shows the same line. A defendant who kicks someone asleep commits a battery but no assault, because the victim had no apprehension of the contact before it happened.19 Had the banner struck Hennie while she looked away, she would be that plaintiff.
Decided cases draw the line the same way. In State v. Barry, a gun was aimed at the victim with intent to shoot, but he did not learn of it until it was all over, and the court found no assault. In Reynolds v. MacFarlane, a ten dollar bill was snatched from the plaintiff's hand from behind, and there was no assault because nothing showed the plaintiff knew of the grab before the defendant finished it.
Section 23 is the mirror image. If the actor has so acted as to put another in apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact, the actor is liable for assault although he thereafter terminates his attempt or it is frustrated.20 Section 22 asks whether the plaintiff became aware before the attempt ended, and § 23 answers that once she did, nothing that happens afterward undoes the liability. The injury is the anticipation, and the anticipation is complete when the plaintiff expects the contact. A later withdrawal or rescue can prevent a battery, but it cannot restore the peace already lost. If a change of heart erased liability, every attacker whose victim saw the blow coming would claim he was about to relent. The rule also fits § 24, which already treats the plaintiff's apprehension as consistent with the chance that self-defense, flight, or an outside force will prevent the contact.21
Had the customer knocked the gun aside before the clerk ever looked up from the register, § 22 would defeat the claim, because the attempt ended before awareness arrived. The two sections thus ask one question in two directions: did the plaintiff's apprehension arise before the attempt ended? If it did, later events cannot undo the liability, and if it did not, later learning cannot create it. Students go wrong in two ways. Some reason from the defendant's wrongful aim straight to liability without asking when the plaintiff perceived the threat. Others treat a foiled or repentant attacker as having escaped, forgetting that the apprehension, once created, is already the harm.
Contact With the Plaintiff's Person
Section 26 identifies whose body must be in the line of danger: to make the actor liable for an assault, the other must be put in apprehension of a contact with his own person.23 The preceding subsections asked what apprehension means and whether the plaintiff knew of the threat in time. This one asks what the plaintiff was apprehending, and the answer limits the claim to a threatened bodily contact with the plaintiff. Someone who watches another person being threatened may be badly shaken and may expect that person to be hit, yet the expectation concerns the wrong body. Dread of damage to a possession fails for the same reason, since no touching of the plaintiff is anticipated. Section 21(1)(a) sharpens the contrast. The defendant's intent may reach a contact with the person of the other or of a third person,24 so the defendant's aim can extend past the plaintiff's body while the plaintiff's apprehension cannot.
A skating rink supplies a clean illustration. Wilson sets out to drop a banner on Hennie, and Button, her skating partner, sees it fall toward her and fears for her safety. Button has been put in fear that Hennie will suffer a contact, and no contact with Button's own person was ever in prospect, so Button cannot recover for assault. Hennie, who sees the banner coming, has the claim. The line also solves a practical problem. Button has a real stake in Hennie's safety, but so do her manager, her boyfriend, anyone in the audience, and anyone watching on television, and each may suffer genuine distress from fearing for her. If fear for another were enough, the class of plaintiffs would have no boundary.25
What separates a mother who recovers from one who does not when each is terrified for her child? The answer lies in whose body she expected to be touched.
Both mothers feel the same terror for a child, so the intensity of the distress cannot decide the claim. The deciding fact is whether the plaintiff expected a contact with her own body. An exam stem that dwells on how deeply a bystander cares about the victim describes the wrong variable.
The first mother and Button are not necessarily left without a remedy. Assault covers one narrow form of emotional distress, the apprehension of a contact with the plaintiff's own person. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress allows recovery for acts that cause severe distress whether or not a physical threat was made,26 but it carries its own requirements, which a bystander must meet in place of the assault elements.
Students often confuse this rule with transferred intent, and the two fit together only when kept apart. Under the transferred-intent rule, if an act is done with the intention of affecting a third person in the manner § 21(1) describes, but puts another in apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, the actor is liable to that other as fully as though he had intended to affect him.27 Note what the rule still requires: the other must be put in apprehension.
Transferred intent carries a defendant's tortious aim to a plaintiff, but it cannot supply the plaintiff's own apprehension. It also has limits of its own. It applies where a specific act is done with tortious intent and misfires, and the intent must attach to the act that placed the plaintiff in apprehension. A plaintiff cannot prove intent by showing that the defendant was planning some other tort later on someone else.28 In transferred intent the plaintiff is threatened by an act aimed at someone else. Under § 26 the plaintiff is not threatened at all and only fears for another.
Threats From Other Sources
Section 25 provides that to make the actor liable for an assault, the actor need not have put the other in apprehension that the actor will himself inflict a bodily contact.30 The preceding subsection asked whose body must be threatened, and § 26 answered that it must be the plaintiff's own. Section 25 asks where the threatened contact comes from, and it answers that the source does not matter. Some formulations of the tort speak of an “offer to touch the person of another,”31 which suggests that the defendant must be the one touching. Section 25 removes that limit. A plaintiff who expects to be touched by a falling plank, a snake, or a breaking cable has the same anticipation as one who sees a fist, and a defendant who deliberately produced the expectation answers for it.
The reason follows from the interest the tort protects. Assault guards against the anticipation of an unwanted bodily contact,32 and that anticipation feels the same to the plaintiff whatever is expected to deliver the contact. A hiker who hears a rattle at his heel expects a bite, and the expectation disturbs his security as fully as a raised fist would. If liability required the defendant to be the toucher, a defendant who wanted to terrify someone could stage a danger and step back, and the tort would reward the staging. Section 25 asks instead what expectation the defendant set out to produce in the plaintiff's mind.
Because the contact would come from the snake, the defendant cannot have intended to touch the plaintiff, so the claim rests on the second form of intent: an act done intending an imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact.33 The plaintiff must still be put in that apprehension by the act.34 Section 25 relaxes one requirement and leaves the others in place. The defendant's purpose therefore decides the case when the act is a warning.
The words are identical in the two scenes, so an exam stem built around a warning turns on the speaker's aim. A stem that reports only that the plaintiff jumped, or that the warning later proved false, has not yet told you whether intent is present. A sincere shout by a speaker who believes the danger is real lacks the purpose to frighten.
Section 25 also leaves § 26 untouched, so the apprehended contact must still be one with the plaintiff's own person.35
The prankster's staged danger suffices for the worker, and the visitor's fear for another person falls outside the tort. Warnings usually arrive as words, and § 31 provides that words do not make the actor liable unless, together with other acts or circumstances, they put the other in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact with his person.36 The imminence requirement matters as well. A remark that rattlesnakes live in the area describes a risk of future contact and puts no one in apprehension of an immediate bite, because the actor must put the other in apprehension of an imminent contact.37
Courage and Sensitivity
Ordinarily the apprehension on which an assault claim rests must be one a reasonable person would share, as the reference to reasonable apprehension in § 31 reflects.39 Section 27 carves out the one significant exception. If an act is intended to put another in apprehension of an immediate bodily contact and succeeds in doing so, the actor is liable for assault although the act would not have put a person of ordinary courage in such apprehension.40 The baseline protects a defendant from a plaintiff whose fears are peculiar to that plaintiff. The exception withdraws that protection from a defendant who set out to produce the very fear that resulted.
The baseline shows at work in Nicole's case. She is overly squeamish, and as Tyler stares at her from across a classroom she becomes convinced that he will cause her offensive bodily contact at the break. On the facts as given, nothing suggests Tyler knew of her condition, and an ordinary student would see only a stare, so Nicole probably cannot recover for assault.41 Two things are missing from her claim. Her apprehension is not one a person of ordinary courage would share, and Tyler neither acted to frighten her nor knew that fright would follow, so the intent element also fails. The baseline protects the defendant for a practical reason. Imposing liability for conduct the defendant could not reasonably have understood to be tortious would deter conduct that is not ordinarily tortious.42
The same account shows where the baseline stops. A defendant is excused when the plaintiff's apprehension is unusual because the defendant could not have known the conduct would be taken as a threat. Once the defendant knows of the plaintiff's sensitivity, that reason disappears. The defendant knows what effect the threat will have, and so has the intent to put the plaintiff in apprehension even if an ordinary person would feel none.43 Section 27 writes that conclusion into two conditions: the act must be intended to put the other in apprehension of an immediate bodily contact, and it must succeed in doing so.44 The first condition is the intent element, made concrete here by the defendant's knowledge of this particular plaintiff, and the second is the apprehension element.
Nicole and the teller are equally fragile, so the plaintiff's susceptibility cannot explain the different outcomes. The difference lies on the defendant's side, since Tyler had neither aim nor knowledge and the colleague had both. If Tyler had known of Nicole's squeamishness and stared in order to exploit it, he would be liable under § 27 once she was in fact put in apprehension of an immediate contact.45 The source on which this discussion draws reports that the American Law Institute was debating how the Third Restatement should treat the sensitive plaintiff,46 but § 27 states the rule applied here.
Sensitivity can matter at a second point, after liability is settled, and the two uses should be kept apart. Section 27 asks whether a tort occurred when the act would not have affected an ordinary person. A different question arises when the act would have put an ordinary person in apprehension and the plaintiff, being unusually sensitive, suffers far more. Suppose that Press, the shot-putter threatened by Corbett, is a sensitive type who is so upset by the threat that she develops a phobia about competition and goes into therapy, and she sues Corbett for those consequences.47 The threat would have put an ordinary person in apprehension, so Corbett has committed an assault. A defendant who has committed a tort takes the plaintiff as he finds her and answers for the damage she actually suffers, even when it exceeds what an average plaintiff would have felt.
That damages rule presupposes a tort. Corbett's threat qualifies because the tort exists first and the plaintiff's susceptibility then enlarges only the damages. Section 27 supplies the one route to liability where the ordinary yardstick finds no tort, and that route runs through the defendant's intent and success. Fragility alone leaves a claim where Nicole's stands.
The second step does the screening. A stem that describes a plaintiff as unusually fragile but gives the defendant ordinary conduct and no awareness of the fragility ends there, as Nicole's did. A stem that tells you the defendant knew of the plaintiff's history and chose a gesture to exploit it passes to the third step, where the only remaining question is whether the plaintiff actually apprehended an immediate contact.
Apparent Ability to Harm
Section 33 answers a question the earlier subsections left open: must the defendant actually be able to carry out the threat? The section says no. To make the actor liable for assault, it is not necessary that he have, or believe that he has, the ability to inflict the contact his act apparently threatens.49 The operative word is apparently. Apprehension forms from what the plaintiff can see and hear, so the inquiry follows how the threat looked from the plaintiff's position, and the defendant's undisclosed capacity never enters. The traditional formulation reflects the same view, since it requires an offer to touch under circumstances creating a well-founded fear of imminent battery, “coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented.”50 A defendant who knows the gun is empty and points it anyway, hoping to watch the plaintiff dive for cover, has satisfied the elements if the plaintiff reasonably expected to be shot.
In Allen v. Hannaford, the court explained why. It is not unreasonable for a person to fear personal injury when a pistol is pointed at him in a threatening manner, because, “for aught he knows, it may be loaded, and may occasion his immediate death. The business of the world could not be carried on with comfort, if such things could be done with impunity.”51 That reasoning answers the objection that an unloaded gun threatens no one. A person looking at a pistol cannot inspect the chamber, so the expectation of being shot arises whether or not the weapon holds a bullet, and the anticipation of contact, which is the injury the tort compensates, is just as complete.
Proof points the same way. The holder of a weapon can establish whether it was loaded far more easily than the plaintiff can refute it, and if actual ability were an element, every defendant could answer a claim with testimony that the gun was empty. Imitation weapons would then offer a safe way to terrorize people, the very conduct the tort exists to deter.
The same reasoning covers a toy. When Landy brandishes a realistic-looking toy pistol at Oda, who takes it for a real one, Landy has the apparent ability to shoot even though no battery could ever be completed with it, and Oda's apprehension is reasonable. If Oda knows the pistol is a toy, the result reverses, because Oda does not apprehend a touching and Landy is not liable.52 Landy's intent to frighten is identical in both versions, and the element that fails in the second is apprehension. A plaintiff who knows the threat is empty has no expectation of contact for the tort to protect.
The toy-pistol plaintiff is one instance of a wider limit. When the defendant is confined, restrained, or otherwise physically unable to carry out the threat immediately, and the plaintiff knows it, the plaintiff cannot reasonably apprehend a contact and there is no assault. When the plaintiff does reasonably apprehend a contact, an assault exists even though the defendant, unknown to the plaintiff, could not have delivered it.53 Section 33 and this limit express one principle seen from two sides, because both ask what a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would perceive. The limit also sits comfortably beside the rule that a plaintiff who realizes the defendant means only to frighten can still be in apprehension.54 A plaintiff who guesses at the defendant's purpose may still expect a contact, since the defendant's restraint might fail, while a plaintiff who can see that the defendant physically cannot reach has no expectation left to disturb.
A genuine dispute about reach appears in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, where the question was whether Sapp, standing behind a desk, could have touched Mrs. Hill. There was testimony that, notwithstanding the width of the counter and Sapp's height, he could have reached six to eighteen inches beyond the desk in an effort to place his hand on her. The court held that the evidence as a whole presented a question for the jury and found no error in the trial judge's rulings on it.55 The contrast with the pistol case is instructive. A pistol pointed at the plaintiff's face leaves no doubt about apparent ability, whatever the weapon holds, while the counter made the plaintiff's expectation of being touched turn on disputed facts about reach.
A criminal statute may define assault more narrowly, and the later section on civil versus criminal assault takes up that contrast. If such a statute demands actual present ability, an unloaded gun may fall short of it while the tort claim stands, because the tort looks only to apparent ability.56 On an exam, an unloaded gun or a toy tempts students to reason from the defendant's inability straight to the conclusion that no assault occurred. A known toy or a visible restraint tempts the opposite shortcut, which runs from the defendant's wish to scare straight to liability. Each shortcut skips the question the rule asks, namely what the plaintiff reasonably perceived. The apparent ability must also look capable of producing contact without significant delay, a requirement the imminence section develops.