Concept
Intent Required
Assault
Intent Required
An assault claim needs a defendant who meant something, and a plaintiff’s fear does not prove that the defendant did. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21(1)(a), the actor must act intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact.1 Section 32(1) states the requirement from the other direction: the actor must have intended to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the other or to have put the other in apprehension of such contact.2 Whether the plaintiff actually came to expect a contact is a separate element, taken up in the next section. This element asks only what the defendant was trying to accomplish.
Most tort courses open with intentional torts to the person, and the prototype is the punch in the nose; the cases you will actually study are the unusual ones that test the limits of the definitions.3 Assault shows those limits at work, because a plaintiff on the receiving end feels the same fear whether the defendant was an aggressor or a bungler, and only the defendant’s state of mind separates the two. The separation matters. Liability for an intentional tort is premised on the intent to bring about the consequences,4 and intentional torts carry broader scope-of-liability rules than negligence: one who intentionally causes physical harm answers for all the consequences of that harm, even if unintended, unlikely, or unforeseeable.5
The element has five working parts: the two aims that qualify, the mental state the law requires for either aim, the carelessness that falls short, the doctrine that carries intent to a plaintiff the defendant did not target, and the reasons for acting that do not count.
Two Forms of Intent
The intent element is met by either of two aims, and both Restatement provisions say so with the word “or.” The defendant may have aimed at the plaintiff’s body, intending a harmful or offensive contact, or at the plaintiff’s mind, intending an imminent apprehension of such a contact.6 Proof of either aim satisfies the element.
The first aim makes an attempted battery an assault whenever the plaintiff sees it coming. Haines hurls a javelin at Mathias, intending to injure him. Haines acts with the intent assault requires whether or not Mathias ever sees the javelin, but intent is only one element. If Mathias sees it, he is placed in apprehension of a blow, and Haines has committed the tort of assault. If it comes from behind and Mathias never knows, Haines may be guilty of criminal assault, but he has not committed the civil tort, because Mathias was not placed in apprehension of a blow.7 The same logic explains why a defendant who kicks a sleeping plaintiff commits battery but not assault.8
The law counts intent to touch because the plaintiff’s injury is the anticipation of the blow, and that anticipation is the same whether the defendant wanted to land the blow or only to threaten it. If the tort demanded intent to frighten, an attacker who was seen coming could escape by testifying that he meant to hit.
The second aim reaches a defendant who never wants to touch anyone. As a practical joke, Zachary comes up behind Amanda in a dark alley and says, in a menacing voice, “Your money or your life.” This is not an attempted battery, because Zachary did not intend to hit Amanda. But Amanda is terrified, and Zachary acted with a purpose to scare her, so he is liable for assault.9 A defendant who intended only an assault has intended enough; the tort does not also require an intent to commit battery.10
A frightened plaintiff does not establish either aim. If a driver loses control of her car and careens over the curb toward a pedestrian, the pedestrian will doubtless fear being run down. But the driver did not act with a purpose to frighten him or with substantial certainty that she would, so she may be liable in negligence, and she has not assaulted him.11
Because both aims lead to the same liability, the choice between them rarely changes the outcome. The common error is to treat one aim as the only aim. Demanding a wish to frighten excuses the attacker who was seen, and demanding a wish to touch excuses the prankster. The question to ask is whether the defendant was aiming at a contact or at an apprehension of one. If the answer is neither, the claim fails at this element.
Purpose or Substantial Certainty
Section 21(1)(a) requires that the actor intend a contact or an apprehension, but it does not say what intending means. The general definition of intent in the law of intentional torts fills the gap: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A uses “intent” to denote that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.13 What the actor must intend is the consequence: for battery, a touching,14 and for assault, a contact or an apprehension of one.15
Garratt v. Dailey applies the same test in words that cover both objects of the intent clause. The act must be done “for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.”16 That formulation offers two routes to intent. Under purpose, the contact or apprehension is what the defendant is trying to bring about. Under knowledge, the defendant may want something else entirely, but if he knows the contact or apprehension is substantially certain to follow, the law treats him as having intended it.
Garratt shows both routes. The defendant, Brian, conceded that he moved a chair, so the only live question was his state of mind. The court reasoned that if he moved it while the plaintiff was in the act of sitting down, he acted for the purpose of causing her to strike the ground, and she would be entitled to judgment.17 It then turned to knowledge: the absence of any intent to injure, prank, or embarrass her would not absolve him if he in fact knew the contact was substantially certain, and without that knowledge there would be nothing wrongful in moving the chair and no liability.18 Garratt itself involved a contact, but the formulation it applies names apprehension too, so the same two routes govern assault.
The knowledge route reaches a defendant who hopes the result will not occur. A person who fires a bullet into a neighbor’s home may fervently pray that it hits no one, but if the person knows there is a substantial certainty that firing into a house may result in harm, the person is deemed to have intended that consequence.19
The same route supplies intent to cause apprehension. Owens throws a shot put across the infield while Jackson stands in the landing area. Owens cannot avoid liability for assault by explaining that he was only warming up for the decathlon. If Jackson was looking at him, Owens must have known that Jackson would reasonably fear being hit, so his act is intentional under the Restatement definition even though he did not throw for the purpose of frightening Jackson.20
What the knowledge route does not reach is the defendant who knew only of a risk. Mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk short of substantial certainty does not constitute intent. Courts have historically drawn the line at the point where a known danger ceases to be a foreseeable risk that a reasonable person would avoid and becomes, in the actor’s mind, a substantial certainty, and where that point falls on particular facts is for the jury.21
Owens and the groundskeeper both acted deliberately, and that settles nothing. Owens had a watching victim in plain view, so apprehension was close to certain; the groundskeeper had only a chance that someone was there. The tort asks about the consequence, not about whether the defendant chose to act.
The fourth step decides close cases. The standard looks into the defendant’s own mind, but the fact-finder reads that mind from the surrounding circumstances. Owens could not credibly claim ignorance with Jackson staring at him. A defendant who truly did not know that apprehension was coming falls outside the element, even if a more careful person would have foreseen it.
Negligence Is Not Enough
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21(2) closes the element from the other side. An action not done with the intention stated in § 21(1)(a) does not make the actor liable for the apprehension it causes, even if the act involves an unreasonable risk of causing that apprehension and would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.24 The subsection speaks to the facts that most invite a claim: a plaintiff frightened by someone else’s carelessness. A defendant whose carelessness frightens someone has not assaulted that person, however sharp the fear.
The line falls where the actor’s own mind puts it. Conduct that merely creates a foreseeable risk of harm, which may or may not be realized, is negligent or reckless depending on the size of the risk, but it is not an intentional tort.25 A person who acts aware that the act carries an appreciable risk of harm may be negligent, and if the risk is great the conduct may be reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong. The distinction between intent and negligence is a matter of degree, for the jury to weigh on the facts.26
Two examples show the line. Suppose a driver loses control of her car on Main Street and careens over the curb toward a pedestrian. The pedestrian will doubtless fear being run down, but the driver did not act with a purpose to frighten him or with substantial certainty that she would, so she may be liable in negligence and has not assaulted him.27 In the second, Wilson knocks a clamp off a scaffold above Button, who sees it falling and fears being hit. Button has been placed in fear of a harmful or offensive contact, but Wilson did not act intentionally in the restricted tort sense. He did not knock the clamp down for the purpose of hitting or frightening Button, and he was not substantially certain at the time that it would do so.28
Nothing in the plaintiff’s experience differs between the two versions, which is why an exam stem that reports the plaintiff’s fright has not yet told you whether an assault occurred. Piling on carelessness does not close the gap either. A driver who knows that cornering fast on a crowded street is dangerous, but does not know anyone is about to step out, has created a risk of frightening someone. A risk, however large, makes conduct negligent or reckless without ever turning it into an intentional tort.29
Transferred Intent
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 32(2) covers the case in which the person who ends up frightened is not the person the defendant had in mind. If an act is done with the intention of affecting a third person in the manner § 32(1) describes, but puts another in apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, the actor is liable to that other person as fully as though he had intended to affect her.31 The intent element so far has assumed that the defendant’s target and the plaintiff are the same person, and real incidents seldom cooperate. A swing meant for one person frightens two, and a shot fired to scare lands where no one expected it.
Transferred intent is a legal fiction, since the defendant had no actual intent toward this plaintiff. Courts adopt it to reach a sensible result: the tortfeasor’s act is just as culpable when her aim is bad as when it is good, and it would be unconscionable to exonerate her because she hit the wrong person.32 The doctrine reaches even a plaintiff whose presence the defendant never suspected. If A shoots at B and wounds or misses him, A’s intent to injure B transfers to C, who is injured at the same time or instead, although A was completely unaware of C’s existence.33
Intent can travel in three ways, depending on what changed between the defendant’s aim and the result:
- Intent aimed at one person supports liability to another person who is put in apprehension, under § 32(2), or who is touched, under § 20(2).34
- Intent to commit one tort supports liability for the other. Chu tries to hit Smith with a hammer and misses, leaving Smith in fear but untouched; her intent to commit a battery suffices for assault. If she instead tries to frighten Lopez by shooting near her and the bullet hits Lopez, she is liable for battery although she intended only an assault.35 Section 20(1) states the second result: an act done to put another in apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, which in fact causes an offensive bodily contact to that person, makes the actor liable although the contact was not what he intended.36
- Both the victim and the tort can change at once. A fires in B’s direction only to frighten him, and the bullet unexpectedly strikes C; A’s intent to commit only an assault on B can support liability to C for battery.37
Transfer is confined to the five torts that descend from the old trespass action: battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels. It works only so long as the harm is direct and immediate.38 Intent may move among those five, so a defendant who intends one and brings about another answers for the one that results.39 A harm outside the five is not reached. A bystander who merely watches an attack on someone else is not assaulted, because assault requires apprehension of a contact with the plaintiff’s own person.40 For decisions that put the doctrine to work, see Hall v. McBryde, Brown v. Martinez, and Corn v. Sheppard; for decisions that test where it stops, see Clark v. Gay and McGee v. Vanover.
Transfer also requires that the act that produced the result was itself done with tortious intent. Return to Wilson, whose careless clamp frightened Button, and suppose Wilson was also planning to commit a tort on someone else later that day. Button cannot borrow that plan. Transferred intent applies where a specific act is done with tortious intent and misfires, and knocking the clamp down was not done with intent to hit or frighten anyone. Button must focus on the act that placed him in apprehension, and that act, though perhaps negligent, was not done for the purpose or with substantial certainty of causing apprehension.41
A mistake by the defendant does not excuse him either. Where the actor acts for the antisocial purpose of causing a harmful or offensive touching, the law places the risk of mistake on him, as in Ranson v. Kitner, where the defendant who shot the plaintiff’s dog, believing it was a wolf, was held liable.42
The third step screens out claims that try to stretch an intent aimed at a bodily invasion to cover a different kind of harm. The second catches the careless defendant whose plan against someone else happens to lie nearby.
Motive Is Irrelevant
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 34 removes a requirement students often expect to find: to make the actor liable for assault under § 21, it is not necessary that the actor be inspired by personal hostility or desire to offend.44 The rule rests on a distinction that is easy to blur. Intent, as this unit has used the word, is the aim of the act, the contact or apprehension the actor wants or knows is substantially certain. Motive is the reason the actor wants it, whether spite, amusement, or a wish to help. The prima facie case asks about the first and ignores the second.
The plaintiff’s injury is the disturbance of security, the anticipation of an unwanted contact, and it is the same whether the person who raised the fist was furious or amused. A plaintiff confronted in a dark alley by a menacing voice cannot tell whether it belongs to a robber or a friend. If liability required ill will, every prankster could defeat the claim by testifying to harmless purposes, and the tort would excuse deliberate frightening, which is the very conduct it exists to deter.
Zachary’s alley prank shows the rule at work. He must have acted with a purpose to scare Amanda or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that his acts would scare her, and nothing more is required. He is liable even though he meant it as a joke, because malice or ill will is not an element.45 The same holds for good intentions: an assault that grows out of a practical joke, or even out of an attempt to be helpful, such as medical treatment, is still an assault.46 Owens’s warm-up throw in the earlier example is likewise a reason for acting, and it could not rescue him once he knew the apprehension was substantially certain.
The rule also runs the other way, because hostility supplies nothing when the aim is missing.
Side by side, Zachary and the driver show why motive is the wrong thing to examine. Zachary had a friendly motive and the required intent, and he is liable. The driver had an unfriendly motive and no intent, and the driver is not. An exam stem that dwells on the defendant’s feelings, affectionate or hostile, is describing motive. Ask what the defendant was aiming at: a contact, an apprehension of one, or neither.