Concept
Causation and Indirect Contact
Battery
Causation and Indirect Contact
Battery does not require that the defendant touch the plaintiff. The Restatement asks only that a harmful contact with the plaintiff’s person, or an offensive one, result “directly or indirectly” from the defendant’s act.1 A defendant who throws a snowball or a rock, or fires a bullet, at the plaintiff may therefore be liable.2 The intent sections asked what the defendant was trying to bring about. This section asks how the defendant’s act travels to the plaintiff’s body, and what breaks the chain.
Contact Through the Ground, an Object, or a Force
The pulled chair in Garratt v. Dailey shows how far indirection can go. The plaintiff was injured when she fell to the ground, and the open question was whether Brian had moved the chair while she was in the act of sitting down. Had she proved that, the court said, his act would have been for the purpose of causing her bodily contact with the ground, and she would be entitled to judgment for the resulting damages.3 The defendant’s conduct was moving a chair; the contact that injured the plaintiff was with the ground. Literally speaking, it was the plaintiff who, by attempting to sit down, set in motion the force that caused her injury. But the harmful contact with the ground was the one the defendant intended or expected, and that was enough, because battery protects the plaintiff’s bodily well-being and dignity from intentional invasion, not merely from particular methods of invading them.4
The same reasoning reaches thrown objects and released forces. Battery remedies an intentional and unpermitted contact with the plaintiff’s person by the defendant’s affirmative conduct, “or by an agency D has set in motion.”5 A rock thrown and a bullet fired are agencies of that kind, and so is a trap the defendant arranged in advance. The defendant need not be present when the plaintiff meets it.
A fire-drill case shows how such chains look when the facts are disputed. Wallace testified that Rosen, telling her to get moving because “this is a fire drill,” pushed her and she slipped and fell down the stairs. Rosen denied pushing her but admitted touching her back. The trial court refused Wallace’s requested instruction on civil battery, and the jury found for IPS and Rosen on the negligence count.6 If the jury believed Wallace, her injury came from the fall down the stairs, and the act behind it was Rosen’s push. The route through the stairs would not change that analysis.
The Defendant’s Own Act Must Cause the Contact
The word “indirectly” lengthens the path between the defendant and the plaintiff’s body, but the defendant must still stand on that path. To make the actor liable, the harmful bodily contact must be caused by an act done by the person whose liability is in question.7 Suppose an onlooker watches a stranger, nose in a phone, walk toward an open utility trench, hopes the stranger will fall in, and smiles when the stranger does. The onlooker wished for a harmful contact but did nothing to bring it about. The contact came from the excavation and the stranger’s own steps, so there is no battery.
Change the facts so that the defendant acts, and liability appears. Romeo, hoping Thibault will slip and fall, puts a bar of soap on the shower floor where Thibault may step. Romeo could hardly be substantially certain that Thibault would fall, since he did not know that Thibault would use that shower or that Thibault would slip on the soap. Intent, however, is satisfied either by an act done with substantial certainty that the contact will result or by an act done with the purpose of causing it, and Romeo placed the soap for that purpose.8
The opposite mistake is to treat any act that leads to a contact as enough. Act and intent are separate elements, and an act that causes a contact is not a battery unless the actor had purpose or substantial certainty that a harmful or offensive contact would result. A driver who looks away from the road and gets into an accident acts voluntarily, yet she did not intend to hit the plaintiff.9 A joker who throws a snowball at a tree is in the same position when a pedestrian unexpectedly steps into its path.10 Either may have acted negligently, if he or she failed to exercise due care, but neither acted with the state of mind an intentional tort requires.11 Intent supplies the aim, the act supplies the link to the plaintiff’s body, and the resulting contact completes the chain.
On an exam, the defendant’s act usually connects to the contact without difficulty: the fist lands, the rock strikes, the chair is gone. One sentence tracing the contact to the act will dispose of this element, and the words belong on intent and on whether the contact was harmful or offensive. Spend them here only when the facts raise one of the traps above: an absent defendant, a thrown or released force, or an onlooker who did nothing.
When What Reaches the Plaintiff Is Smoke or Light
A different difficulty arises when what reaches the plaintiff is so slight that a court doubts it is a contact at all, and results vary by jurisdiction. In Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., the court held that smoke can constitute contact where the defendant purposely blew it in the face of an antismoking advocate, reasoning that tobacco smoke is particulate matter capable of making contact. It declined to adopt liability where exhaled smoke is merely substantially certain to reach a nonsmoker. In McCracken v. Sloan, another court found no battery where the defendant smoked in his own office during a meeting, treating the smell as an innocuous contact customary in everyday life. Light presents the same puzzle. A person who flashes a mirror into a driver’s eyes to annoy intended to put light in those eyes, but a court would first have to treat light rays as a contact, and it might decline. A high-powered laser would doubtless qualify, and a Virginia court, in Adams v. Commonwealth, found a battery where a laser produced some physical consequence or corporeal hurt. If the driver then crashes into a wall, the crash is a separate contact that the person with the mirror neither desired nor knew was substantially certain, so it cannot supply the intent.14 On an exam, ask whether what reached the plaintiff is physical matter that touched the body, say that courts divide on smoke and light, and argue the point.