Concept
Applying the Threshold
Threshold: act, volition, and intent
Applying the Threshold
Every intentional-tort fact pattern puts the same four questions in the same order, and the order does real work. The Restatement says there cannot be an act without volition, so the first question is whether the defendant's own will produced the movement the plaintiff complains of.1 It defines intent as a desire to cause the consequences of the act, or a belief that those consequences are substantially certain to result, so the third question is which of those states of mind the defendant held.2 The second question sits between them: which consequence is intent measured against?
- Did the defendant's own will produce the movement?
- Which consequence of that movement does the tort at issue protect against?
- Did the defendant desire that consequence, or believe it substantially certain to result?
- Do the defendant's motive, mistake, or capacity change the answer to the third question?
Each step supplies the object of the next. A state of mind can be attributed only to a person whose will produced the movement, and intent needs a consequence to be intent about. Motive, mistake, and capacity matter only as attempts to undercut a finding of desire or belief, so they have nothing to work on until that finding is in view.
The first question usually takes a sentence. An adult who drives, throws, shoves, or steps onto a lawn is directing the movement, and an answer that says so and moves on is correct. The question deserves more attention only when the facts describe a convulsion, a movement during sleep, or a defendant whose body someone else used as an instrument, because in those cases the actor is another person or no one.3 Pressure from outside circumstances does not change this. Even pressure that reasonable people cannot be expected to resist leaves a movement an act when the actor's mind and will directed it, and the pressure goes to excuse. Only a purely reflexive reaction, in which mind and will have no share, falls outside the category of acts.4
The second question names the consequence. For battery it is contact with the person. Keep that consequence separate from physical harm, which the Restatement uses to mean physical impairment of the human body, of land, or of chattels.5 A contact need not impair anyone, so asking whether the defendant intended the contact differs from asking whether he intended an injury. The severity of the injury says nothing about whether the defendant desired or expected the contact.
The third question puts the definition to the defendant's own state of mind. Offensiveness is measured objectively, by whether the contact would offend a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances, but that objective test does not settle intent. Suppose Romeo hugs the new girl in school. Even if the hug is offensive under the reasonable-person test, Romeo must have intended an offensive contact, not merely caused one, and a Romeo who genuinely believed she would welcome his attention has a real argument that he did not.6 The inquiry stays fixed on what the defendant desired or believed when he acted, and not on how the contact looked to a bystander afterward.
The deliberate toss answers only the first question. The student's belief about the contact answers the third, and the softness of the slippers is relevant only as it bears on what the student expected.
The flashed mirror shows that a purpose aimed at one consequence does not supply intent for a different one. Regan, standing on a bridge over an interstate, shines a mirror into the eyes of oncoming drivers, and Cordelia, temporarily blinded, swerves out of control and hits the bridge.7 Regan moved the mirror voluntarily and wanted the flash. The consequence in question is the crash, and a brief blinding makes a crash possible without making it substantially certain. The crash was a risk her conduct created, not a result she sought or knew would follow, and the definition of intent asks about desire and substantial certainty.8
The fourth question comes last because each of its three explanations operates on a conclusion already reached about the third. A defendant who says he meant well is describing motive, which explains why he acted and does not address whether he desired the consequence or believed it substantially certain. A defendant who says he was mistaken, or whose mental condition clouded his judgment, matters only if that mistake or condition shows he neither desired the consequence nor believed it substantially certain. Otherwise the finding of intent stands.
An exam answer states the rule once and then applies it step by step, tying each fact to the element it supports. On the mirror facts it runs as follows. A battery requires a voluntary act and intent, meaning that the defendant desired the consequence or believed it substantially certain to result. Regan's movement of the mirror was voluntary. She wanted the drivers to be flashed, but the consequence at issue is the crash, which she neither desired nor had reason to believe substantially certain. Intent as to the crash therefore fails. The conclusion arrives only after the facts have been run through the questions in order, and motive, mistake, and capacity get discussion only when the stem raises them.