Concept
Defining Intent
Threshold: act, volition, and intent
Defining Intent
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines intent in one sentence: the actor “desires to cause consequences of his act,” or “believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”1 The Third Restatement uses the same two-part definition.2 The two halves describe different minds. The actor who desires a consequence acts in order to bring it about. The actor who believes a consequence substantially certain may bear the victim no ill will, yet knows the consequence will follow.3 This chapter calls the first state of mind purpose and the second knowledge. Because the definition joins them with “or,” proof of either establishes intent.
Both halves aim at consequences, not movements. The voluntary-act requirement asked whether the actor’s own will produced a movement; intent asks what the actor wanted or knew that movement would accomplish. Battery therefore requires more than a deliberate act. It requires a deliberate act done for the purpose of causing a harmful or offensive contact, or one the actor knows to a substantial certainty will cause such a contact.4
Certainty is where the law draws the line between intentional torts and their neighbors. If the result is intended or virtually certain to occur, the tort is intentional; below that, the actor is negligent or reckless.5 The subsections below separate act from consequence, then take up purpose, knowledge, and the point at which a known risk falls short of intent.
Act Versus Consequence
Every intent problem begins by separating two things the defendant did: the defendant moved, and the movement produced a result. Restatement commentary draws the line with a gun. It is improper to describe the act as “the shooting,” because that phrase conflates the act with its consequence; the act is the pulling of the trigger.6 When a fist lands, likewise, the act is only the movement of the actor’s hand, not the contact it immediately establishes.7
Once the movement is presumed voluntary, the question whether a contact was intentional or negligent turns not on whether the actor meant to move a hand, but on whether the actor meant to make contact by moving it.8 In accidental and intentional shootings alike, the actor intended to pull the trigger. Battery liability attaches only when the actor pulled it in order to shoot another person, or knowing that the shot would hit one; that second alternative is the substantial-certainty half of the definition.9 An actor whose bullet strikes a person “present in the desert without the actor’s knowledge” commits no intentional tort.10 The trigger pull is identical in the empty desert, the hidden hiker, and the aimed shot, so the movement cannot separate them. The actor’s relation to the consequence does.
A deliberate act cannot be the test, because it would sweep in many cases where the actor intended no harmful or offensive contact.11 A driver who looks away from the road and has an accident, and a joker who throws a snowball at a tree when a pedestrian unexpectedly steps into its path, each did a voluntary act. Neither acted with purpose or substantial certainty that a harmful or offensive contact would result. Neither committed battery, though each may have been negligent for failing to exercise due care.12
The collision is carelessness. Chu neither desired the contact nor believed it substantially certain, so any claim lies in negligence. The shove is different: a Chu who pushes Munoz to get her out of the way is substantially certain that Munoz will find the contact offensive, and she meets the intent requirement.13 Both movements were equally voluntary. What differs is Chu’s relation to the contact.
For battery, the consequence is a harmful or offensive contact. Offensiveness is measured objectively, by whether a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances would find the contact offensive, and that raises a question for the next part of the chapter: must the actor intend the offensiveness as well as the contact?14 Either way, even under the single-intent standard there is no liability unless the contact actually turns out harmful or offensive, whether or not the defendant intended it to be.15 What counts as a contact is itself a question: casebook problems ask whether taking hold of a man’s coat, spitting in his face, or forcibly removing his hat will do.16
An exam stem that says a defendant “deliberately” pushed a door or threw a ball describes a movement, and describing the movement settles only the act requirement. The open question is whether the defendant desired the contact or believed it substantially certain. The everyday sense of “intentional” answers the first question; the tort sense answers the second.
Purpose or Desire
An actor intends a consequence, under the first half of the definition, when the actor desires to cause it.18 Tort law usually states this as the desire to cause certain immediate consequences. One who hurls a rock against a glass window intends that it break, and one who points a loaded gun at another and pulls the trigger intends that the bullet strike and injure.19
Purpose does not depend on the odds. Smith heaves a stone at her enemy Jones, though she thinks Jones is probably beyond her range. She is not substantially certain of hitting him, but she acts with the desire to do so, and that satisfies the intent requirement; if the stone strikes Jones, Smith has committed battery.20 Purpose describes what the actor is trying to do. The chance of success matters only as evidence of what the actor wanted.
Only the first thrower acted in order to bring the contact about, so only the first has the intent a battery requires. Any claim against the second lies in negligence.
Defendants seldom admit a bad purpose, and after the fact a defendant may claim the best of intentions. State of mind is therefore usually proved by circumstantial evidence: the defendant’s conduct, in light of the surroundings and what the defendant presumably knew and perceived, supports an inference that the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of the acts.21 Criminal law reasons the same way. When a defendant who shot the victim five times in vital areas testifies that he meant only to scare, the jury may disbelieve him if he was an expert marksman who stood close and took careful aim.22 Criminal law also limits the inference. In Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), jurors were told that the “law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,” and the Supreme Court overturned the conviction because the instruction violated the requirement that the state prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. A cautious instruction describing a permissive inference would have been acceptable.23
The definition is disjunctive, and a rule built on “either” and “or” rewards a reader who attends to those words: either state of mind alone is enough.24
Dana acted for the purpose of causing the contact, and that alone suffices. The instruction rewrites “or” as “and,” and Leo’s lawyer should object.
Desire must also attach to something the defendant did. The Restatement speaks of desiring the consequences “of his act.”25 A rival who hopes a colleague will tumble into a trench dug by a road crew, and who stands by delighted when the colleague does, desired the contact. But the rival did nothing to bring it about, so the rival has committed no battery. A wish that is not joined to the actor’s own movement is not a tort.
Substantial Certainty
The second route reaches an actor who wants nothing from the contact. An actor intends a consequence when the actor believes it substantially certain to result from the act, whether or not the actor desires it.27 Intent is thus broader than desire; it extends to consequences the actor believes are substantially certain to follow.28 A person who fires a bullet into a neighbor’s home may fervently pray that no one is hit, but if the person knows that firing into a house is substantially certain to cause harm, the person is deemed to have intended it.29
The case that anchors this route is Garratt v. Dailey. Brian moved a chair, and the plaintiff fell. Brian said he was trying to help by putting the chair under her as she was about to fall but was too small to move it into place, and the trial judge accepted that version at the first trial. The plaintiff’s sister testified differently: the plaintiff, an arthritic woman, had begun the slow process of sitting when Brian quickly removed the chair and sat on it himself, knowing with substantial certainty that she would try to sit where it had been.30
The test turns on Brian’s knowledge. A battery would be established if, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit where it had been.31 The absence of any intent to injure, to play a prank, or to embarrass would not absolve him if he had that knowledge; without it, there would be nothing wrongful about moving the chair, and so no liability.32 On remand the trial judge accepted the sister’s testimony and awarded $11,000, and the second appeal upheld the judgment.33 The two trials involved the same movement. They differed in what they found Brian knew.
The test looks to what the actor actually believed. Belief is rarely admitted, so the factfinder infers it from the circumstances,34 but the inference stops at certainty: knowledge and appreciation of a risk short of substantial certainty is not intent.35
The first dockworker believed the contact substantially certain and has the intent for battery. The second knew of a serious risk. His conduct may be negligent or reckless, but his belief fell short of certainty, so he did not intend the contact.
The actor need not know who will be harmed. A smelter that knows its operation emits pollutants may not know who Green is or where his farm lies, but it knows the pollutants will come to earth on someone’s property, and so it has intent to cause the intrusion in the substantial-certainty sense.36 A sprinter who hurls his shoes into a packed grandstand stands in the same position for battery: he cannot know which spectator will be struck, but he knows someone will be. No transfer of intent is needed to reach the victim, because his own knowledge covers whoever is hit; transferred intent is a separate basis the Restatement lists beside the actor’s own intent to cause contact.37
Good feeling toward the plaintiff changes nothing. When Chu sees Jones walking below and deliberately throws a bucket of water on her from a second-story window, it is no defense that Chu was only emptying the scrub bucket and meant no offense; she intends the contacts she is substantially certain will occur.38 In Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., an employee tried to set the plaintiff’s broken arm over her protests. He meant only to help, but he knew from her protests that she found the contact unwelcome, and so he met the intent requirement for battery.39 Brian’s lack of any wish to injure the plaintiff was equally beside the point.40
Risk Is Not Intent
The definition of intent mentions neither risk nor foreseeability, and the omission matters because actors often know more than they want.42 An actor who acts with the belief or consciousness that the act creates an appreciable risk of harm may be negligent, and if the risk is great, reckless or wanton, but the actor has not committed an intentional wrong.43 The difference is one of degree, and the jury weighs the facts. Courts draw the line where a known danger stops being a foreseeable risk that a reasonable person would avoid and becomes, in the actor’s mind, a substantial certainty.44
Recklessness sits between negligence and intent. The reckless actor is conscious of the risk and proceeds in spite of that awareness, while the merely negligent actor shows inadvertence, inattention, thoughtlessness, or incompetence and may perceive no imminent danger. Recklessness differs from an intentional tort in what the actor is aware of. The intentional tort requires awareness that injury is certain or substantially certain, which supports the inference that the actor meant to bring it about; the reckless actor did not actually intend to injure anyone but knew or had reason to know the risk was quite substantial.45 Risk-based fault has work of its own. A possessor of land is generally liable to a trespasser only for willful and wanton misconduct, and some statutes require at least recklessness before liability attaches.46
The same line governs trespass to land. Trespass is an intentional tort: the actor must act with the purpose to cause the intrusion or with substantial certainty that it will occur, while a nuisance can arise without any intent to affect another’s property.47
The golfer knew an entry was possible, but he neither sought it nor expected it with substantial certainty. His awareness of the risk may make him negligent. It does not make him liable for an intentional trespass.
Because belief is inferred from circumstances, similar collisions can fall on either side of the line. A cyclist who rides straight at a pedestrian standing in plain view on a wide, empty sidewalk may protest that the collision was not meant. A factfinder may infer from the visible pedestrian and the ample room to pass that the cyclist believed contact substantially certain.48 A cyclist who clips a pedestrian who stepped out from behind a parked van is in the position of the second dockworker. In any fact pattern, look for what the actor saw and believed; the seriousness of the danger does not decide the question.