Concept
Court and Creditor Approval
Commercially reasonable disposition
Court and Creditor Approval
After default, a secured party may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of collateral, either in its then condition or after commercially reasonable preparation or processing.1 When the debtor later contests a deficiency, the question is whether that disposition was commercially reasonable. The three safe harbors in § 9-627(b) answer it by pointing to a market or to dealer practice. The route in § 9-627(c) skips that comparison and asks who reviewed the sale. A collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is commercially reasonable if it has been approved in a judicial proceeding, by a bona fide creditors' committee, by a representative of creditors, or by an assignee for the benefit of creditors.2 A sale approved by one of those bodies is per se commercially reasonable.3
Approval matters most when the debtor attacks the sale, because the burden of proving reasonableness then rests on the creditor. One court has held that the secured creditor must show, as part of its case for a deficiency judgment, that the sale was performed in a commercially reasonable manner.4 For business collateral, the secured party need not prove compliance with Article 9 unless the debtor raises the issue in a defense or counterclaim; once the debtor does, the burden of proof is on the secured party.5 Approval answers that burden in advance. The creditor's proof shrinks to one fact, which is who approved the disposition, and a court has no advertising, timing, or buyer-selection questions left to weigh.
Approvals That Deem a Sale Reasonable
The statute names four approvers, and nothing in its text extends the route to anyone else.7 One is a court acting in a judicial proceeding. The other three act for creditors as a group: a bona fide creditors' committee, a representative of creditors, and an assignee for the benefit of creditors, meaning a person to whom a failing debtor has transferred its assets so they can be liquidated and the proceeds paid to its creditors. The common thread, and the likely reason approval carries so much weight, is that none of the four is the secured party reviewing its own sale. The secured party controls the timing, the advertising, and the choice of buyers, and it has a stake in the outcome, so a sign-off from someone else is a different kind of evidence.
The usual way a creditor goes wrong is to offer an approval from someone not on the list.
The general standard treats the creditor's own people much the same way. One court has held that a secured party may not rely solely on the testimony of its credit manager or other employees about the fair value of the collateral and must introduce other credible objective evidence of value.8 A lender whose approval fails to qualify is thrown back on that kind of evidence.
The committee clause has its own qualifier. The text does not define a bona fide creditors' committee, but the words put genuineness in issue. A committee that the secured party assembled from its own affiliates is the plain example of a body that is not bona fide.
Two questions therefore decide an approval problem. First, is the approver one of the four named bodies? Second, if it is a committee, is it genuine? A stem that reports only that someone agreed to the sale has not yet answered either one.
Approval Is Optional
Section 9-627(d) makes two statements about the approval route. Approval under subsection (c) need not be obtained, and lack of approval does not mean that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is not commercially reasonable.10 The first half says a secured party has no duty to go to a court, a committee, a representative, or an assignee before it sells. The second half bars a court from counting the missing approval against the sale.
A creditor who skips approval is therefore held to the ordinary standard. Every aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.11 If it is, the secured party may dispose of the collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.12
The two halves guard against different pressures. A judicial proceeding or a committee review takes time, and delay on routine collateral can cost more than the review adds. If the statute only permitted approval but let a court treat its absence as suspect, every cautious creditor would feel compelled to seek it before every sale, and the optional route would become mandatory by another door. Making the missing approval a neutral fact removes that pressure and keeps approval available for the creditor who wants certainty.
A fact pattern that recites that the lender never asked a court or committee to approve the sale therefore gives the debtor nothing. The sale's own quality decides the case, and two sales with identical approval histories can come out differently.
The first lender may be protected by the dealer-practices harbor, which covers a sale that is otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold.13 That harbor does not ask whether anyone approved the sale. The second lender gets nothing from subsection (d). The thin advertising, the single bid, and the low price draw close scrutiny under the ordinary standard, and nothing in the statute excuses them. Subsection (d) only keeps the absence of approval from being added to the debtor's side of the scale.
Approval is therefore a one-way benefit. When a listed body has approved a disposition, the inquiry ends. When none has, the creditor gets no shortcut and no penalty, and it must show reasonableness through a harbor or through the circumstances of the sale. Two opposite errors follow from misreading the subsection: treating approval as a precondition to a valid sale, and treating its absence as a red flag. Subsection (d) rejects both. How courts weigh a sale that fits no harbor and has no approval is the subject of the next section.