Concept
Waiver and Non-Variation
Right to redeem collateral
Waiver and Non-Variation
A lender who drafts the loan papers can try to write redemption out of the deal, and the Code anticipates the attempt. Section 9-623(a) gives the right to redeem to the debtor, any secondary obligor, and any other secured party or lienholder, and the price of exercising it is fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral.1 Two further provisions settle whether an agreement can shrink that right. Section 9-602(11) lists redemption among the debtor rights that agreement cannot waive or vary, and § 9-624(c) makes one exception for an agreement entered into and authenticated after default, which does not extend to a consumer-goods transaction.2
Everything turns on when the agreement was made. An agreement made before default cannot waive or vary the right, whatever it says. An agreement made after default can waive it, but not in a consumer-goods transaction. A stem that describes a clause, release, or side deal purporting to give up redemption therefore calls for two checks in order: did the agreement come before or after default, and, if after, was the transaction a consumer-goods transaction?3
No Waiver Before Default
A debtor cannot waive redemption in advance. Section 9-602(11) puts the right beyond the reach of any agreement except one that § 9-624(c) allows, and § 9-624(c) allows only an agreement entered into and authenticated after default.4 A clause signed at closing therefore fails wherever it appears, in the security agreement or any other document signed before default.5 The Code bars varying the right as well as waiving it, so a term that merely trims redemption, by shortening the time to redeem for example, meets the same objection as a term that erases it.
The Code's suspicion of advance waivers is old. The comment to the pre-1999 Article 9 observed that “[i]n the area of rights after default our legal system has traditionally looked with suspicion on agreements designed to cut down the debtor’s rights and free the secured party of their duties,” that the default situation “offers great scope for overreaching,” and that “no mortgage clause has ever been allowed to clog the equity of redemption.”6 No comparable comment accompanies the 1999 Code, but the same policy underlies its non-waiver provisions.7 To clog the equity of redemption is to attach to a loan a term that keeps the borrower from recovering the collateral by paying what is owed, and § 9-624(c) applies that principle to any such term agreed before default.8
Redemption protects the debtor's equity in the collateral. A New York Court of Appeals decision on a surety's rights makes the connection. The court stressed that at no time before or after default may the creditor take the collateral for the debt and thereby forfeit the debtor's surplus value or equity in it, and it treated the borrower's right of redemption as one that cannot be waived in advance.9
The same decision shows where the rule stops. The court traced the difficulty in the case solely to confusion between two interests: the borrower's nonwaivable right of redemption and the surety's waivable right to rely on the collateral securing the debt.10 A surety reaches the collateral only by paying the debt and being subrogated to the creditor's position, and only while the creditor still holds it. A surety may therefore consent to anything the debtor has power to agree to, which is everything except waiving the equity of redemption in advance, and a surety who consents is not discharged when the creditor does what the surety allowed.11 Advance consent to the creditor's releasing or substituting collateral falls on the waivable side of that line. The difference lies in whose protection the clause gives up. A surety who consents surrenders only the surety's own protection and leaves the debtor's surplus untouched, while a debtor who waives redemption in advance surrenders the right that guards the debtor's own equity.
The ineffective clause removes the lender's waiver defense and nothing else. Reyes still had to tender fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral, within the cutoffs covered earlier in this chapter.12 Had Reyes sent only the three missed installments on a debt the lender had accelerated, the lender could have refused the check because the tender fell short, and the clause would have played no part. The rule preserves the right on the terms the statute gives it.
Exam answers go wrong in two directions here. One enforces a waiver because the debtor signed it and overlooks that the signature came before default. The other voids every advance agreement that touches the collateral and overlooks the surety's power to consent. Two questions prevent both errors: when was the agreement made, and whose right does it give up?
Waiver After Default
A debtor can waive redemption after default, but only if two conditions are met. The agreement must be entered into and authenticated after default, and the transaction must not be a consumer-goods transaction.14 If either condition fails, the waiver fails.
Timing comes first because it separates a term set in advance of default from an agreement made with the default already in hand. The same words in the same document are ineffective if signed at closing and potentially effective if signed afterward, and no kind of transaction cures an agreement made before default.
The statute asks for more than a conversation after default. The agreement must be entered into and also authenticated after default. The 2022 amendments substitute sign for authenticate, as the commentary to § 9-620 notes,15 so the working question is whether the debtor signed an agreement after default. The substitution changes the verb and leaves the timing requirement where it was, because both the making and the signing must follow default.
Calloway's clause would fail had the lender put it in the loan papers at closing. Timing is also only the first variable, because a post-default signature still fails in a consumer-goods transaction.16 In that setting no agreement waives the right to redeem, whenever it is made, and a loan on a family's own car is the paradigm.
The two scenes share a post-default signature and a complete, timely tender. They differ only in the kind of transaction, and that difference decides who keeps the collateral. Apply the checks in order:
- Was the agreement made before default? If so, it is ineffective, and the analysis ends there.
- Was it entered into and signed after default? If so, ask whether the transaction is a consumer-goods transaction. If it is, the waiver is ineffective.
- If the agreement follows default and the transaction is not a consumer-goods transaction, the waiver is effective, and the lender may refuse even a complete tender.