Concept
Commercially Reasonable Disposition
Including secured party’s right to take possession and dispose of collateral (§§ 9-608 through 9-624)
Commercially Reasonable Disposition
A secured party may sell collateral after default, but it must sell within a limit set by Section 9-610(b). Section 9-610(a) supplies the power: after default, the secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral, either in its present condition or after commercially reasonable preparation or processing.1 Default is the debtor's failure to perform, and it takes many forms, including missed payments, destruction or disposal of the collateral, lapsed insurance, and a bankruptcy filing.2 Section 9-610(b) then conditions the power: every aspect of a disposition, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.3 The same subsection restores flexibility inside that limit. If commercially reasonable, the secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.4
The Code protects the debtor with a standard instead of a prescribed procedure, and the reason lies in who controls the sale. The secured party chooses the buyer, the date, and the place, and the cash proceeds pay its reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing, and disposing before they reach the debt.5 The debtor is then liable for any deficiency, unless otherwise agreed, and the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus.6 A higher price means a lower deficiency, so the secured party's own choices help set the amount the debtor still owes.7
Experience with fixed procedures also pushed the drafters toward a standard. Public sales of personal and real property had a dismal history, so Article 9 expressly authorized private sales, an innovation that seems commonplace today but was important in its day.8 Creditors know that a sale may need to be done quickly, usually in wholesale markets, and often in markets that are plainly inefficient, such as the courthouse steps.9 Two policies drive the resale rules: to allow realization on the collateral with a minimum of resort to judicial proceedings, and to encourage higher yields on disposition by allowing private as well as public sale.10
Disposition is also the path the secured party must take in some situations. It is required in certain consumer-goods situations, and when the debtor does not consent to, or objects to, the secured party's proposal to accept the goods in satisfaction of the debt.11 In those cases, and whenever the secured party chooses to sell, the commercial-reasonableness standard governs the sale.
The standard has teeth because a sale that fails it costs the secured party its deficiency. A sale of collateral that is not commercially reasonable can reduce or eliminate the obligor's liability for any deficiency.12 Even a sale conducted correctly often leaves a deficiency, and the debtor's challenge to the sale usually arrives in the resulting deficiency suit.13 The subsections that follow take the standard in turn: what “every aspect” covers, the choice between public and private sales, how price figures in the inquiry, the safe harbors that ease the secured party's proof, and how far the parties may reshape the standard by agreement.
Every Aspect of the Sale
Section 9-610(b) tests a sale feature by feature. Method, manner, time, place, and other terms must each be commercially reasonable, so a secured party can fail on one feature even if it handled the others well.14 A sale meets the test when it is conducted in good faith and in accordance with commonly accepted commercial practice, and because commercial practice differs from one kind of property to another, the measure moves with the collateral.15
Price explains why these tests matter. A higher sale price produces a lower deficiency, and the tests of method, manner, time, place, and terms are really proxies for insufficient price; their importance lies almost exclusively in how well they protect the debtor against an unfairly low price.16 A later subsection takes up how courts treat price directly. Here the task is to see what courts examine in the sale itself.
The cases focus mainly on six features of a sale. Among them are the timing of the disposition, the way it is advertised, its location, and the access that prospective buyers have to it.17 Courts also consider the condition of the collateral and any efforts made to enhance it, the number of bids received, and the method used in soliciting bids, and they treat the ultimate question as one of fact.18 A student can work through any disposition by taking these features in order and asking what sellers of this collateral ordinarily do.
Timing draws attack from both directions, so haste and delay are equally exposed. A creditor who repossesses an automobile in the winter dares not wait for spring in hope of a better market. A creditor who sells a business's inventory where similar sales normally follow two or three weeks of advertising and notice is in trouble if it advertises a public sale for five days later. The creditor can fall outside commercial reasonableness by being too quick or too slow.19 Delay also carries a direct cost, because the reasonable expenses of holding the collateral come off the proceeds before the debt receives anything.20 When delay is justified, the secured party should record the reasons so that it can prove them later at a deficiency trial.21
Publicity connects the sale to its buyers. The creditor must properly advertise, or take other proper measures, to find the best market and the best buyers.22 Advertising a drilling rig in the county newspaper will not do where everyone else would advertise in trade journals, and a creditor unsure where the market lies should consult the debtor, if they are on speaking terms, or ask an expert.23 Publicity can also pull against speed: if the best advertising medium is published only biweekly or monthly, the need to advertise may conflict with the need to sell promptly.24
Place and access ask whether the likeliest buyers can reach the sale. If collateral is repossessed in Nashville and the most appropriate market is in Chicago, the creditor should think about selling in Chicago if that is possible.25 Geography can matter differently at different times of year: the automobile market may be better in the south in winter and in the north in summer, and the price of farm equipment fluctuates seasonally.26 Access by prospective buyers is the fourth recurring concern in the cases, and a sale that prospective buyers cannot readily reach is unlikely to draw the best price.27
The condition of the collateral raises a choice that the statute leaves open. The secured party may sell collateral in its present condition or following commercially reasonable preparation or processing.28 The reasonable expenses of preparing for disposition and processing come out of the proceeds ahead of the debt, so preparation is not free to the debtor.29 Courts weigh the condition of the collateral and any efforts to enhance it when they evaluate the sale, so neither selling as is nor preparing is wrong in itself; the choice must be commercially reasonable.30
Public or Private Disposition
The second sentence of Section 9-610(b) hands the secured party a menu of choices and attaches one condition to all of them: if commercially reasonable, it may dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.32 The condition governs every item, so a method is not safe merely because the statute lists it. The first pair on the menu, public or private, carries the most consequences, and it returns below in the rules on who may buy.
A public disposition is one in which members of the public have a meaningful opportunity for competitive bidding after reasonable advertising.33 For a sale to count as public, the public must be invited and told the time and place of the sale, and the sale must then be held at the time and place stated in the advertisements.34 The bidders need not be everyone. A sale open only to dealers is probably public if enough dealers in the locale attend to produce a significant number of bidders, and an auto auction at which only registered retailers may bid qualifies when a large number of retailers attend.35 A disposition that lacks that opportunity for competitive bidding is private.36
Article 9 does not require either method. The choice between a public and a private disposition must itself be commercially reasonable, and in many circumstances a private disposition will bring a better price for the collateral.37 The rules were built that way: one of their twin policies is to encourage higher yields on disposition by allowing private as well as public sale, and the drafters adopted it against the dismal history of public sales.38 A public sale in an inefficient market, such as the courthouse steps, shows the risk that policy addresses.39 None of this condemns public sales, because those that are properly held, usually auctions, are generally commercially reasonable.40
The same test reaches the other choices on the menu. A secured party may sell by one contract or several, and as a unit or in parcels, and each choice, like the choice of method, must be commercially reasonable for the collateral at hand.41
The public-or-private label matters most when the secured party wants to buy. In any sale under Section 9-610, the secured party may purchase the collateral at any public sale. At a private sale its right to buy is severely restricted: it may purchase only if the collateral is of a kind customarily sold on a recognized market or is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.42 The restriction fits the structure of a private sale, in which no bidding contest tests the price.
Price and Judicial Scrutiny
Section 9-627(a) controls how much a debtor can make of price. The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a disposition at a different time or by a different method is not of itself sufficient to preclude the secured party from establishing that the disposition was commercially reasonable.44 The rule leaves a better price relevant as evidence and denies it the power to decide the question alone. The court's attention stays on what the secured party did.
The reasons begin with a gap in perspective. Debtors tend to overestimate the value of their property and to assume that a crowd of willing, motivated buyers will pay what the debtor believes to be full retail value. Creditors know that sales may need to be done quickly, usually in wholesale markets, and often in markets that are plainly inefficient, such as the courthouse steps.45 Without Section 9-627(a), hindsight would doom nearly every sale, since some other time or method that would have paid more can almost always be imagined, and no secured party could know in advance which choice was safe.
Price nonetheless drives the litigation, and the rule has to be read with that in view. Reasoning backward from a low price to a conclusion that the sale was not commercially reasonable is incorrect. On the other hand, a low price, lower than the court thinks right, is probably the single most important fact in most of these cases: a high price will likely save the creditor no matter what it has done, while a low price may put the most scrupulous creditor in trouble.46 Because the feature-by-feature tests are proxies for an unfairly low price, a low price works as a flag.47 It does not prove a defect, but it is usually what sends a court looking for one.
A debtor who puts compliance in issue shifts the work to the secured party, which bears the burden of proving that it complied with the Article 9 enforcement rules.48 Because commercial reasonableness is ultimately a question of fact, the secured party proves it with evidence on the matters courts weigh: whether it tried to obtain the best price possible, whether the sale was private or public, the condition of the collateral and any efforts to improve it, the advertising, the number of bids, and the method used to solicit them.49 If the sale falls short, the obligor's liability for the deficiency may be eliminated or reduced.50 Under the rebuttable-presumption rule, the court presumes that a complying sale would have brought the amount of the debt plus the recoverable costs of enforcement, which leaves no deficiency unless the secured party rebuts the presumption.51
Safe Harbors for Reasonableness
Section 9-610(b) leaves a secured party open to attack on any feature of a sale, and a creditor facing that uncertainty looks for ways to minimize its risk.53 Section 9-627(b) offers three safe harbors. A disposition is commercially reasonable if it is made in the usual manner on any recognized market, at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition, or otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold.54 The Code also protects a disposition that has been approved by a court, a creditors' committee, an assignee for the benefit of creditors, or a representative of creditors.55 The harbors are neither required nor exclusive. A secured party need not fit one, and a sale that fits none is tested under the general standard, but a sale that follows one should be protected.56
The first two harbors help less than their wording suggests, because a recognized market is a quite limited concept. It applies only where there are standardized price quotations for property that is essentially fungible, such as quotations on stock exchanges.57 Special auctions and other markets where used cars are sold do not qualify.58 The same limit narrows the second harbor: gold bullion, shares of publicly traded stocks, and commodities in ordinary commercial units may fit, but a Bluebook price for a used automobile or the catalog price of a baseball card does not.59 In each case the question is whether a market publishes a quoted price for interchangeable units, and a book value is only an estimate for a typical item.
The third harbor can reach used and repossessed goods that fit neither of the first two. It protects a disposition made in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold.60 The statute speaks of dealers, not secured creditors, and commentators doubt that the drafters meant to hold creditors to the standards of retail dealers, who have expertise and resources that creditors lack. They read the provision to require only that the sale conform to the usual practices involved in selling repossessed property, although the language leaves the point unclear.61
Seeking approval is optional. A failure to obtain the approval described in the approval harbor does not mean the disposition is commercially unreasonable.62 That follows from the design of the resale rules, which allow realization on collateral with a minimum of resort to judicial proceedings, so the absence of a court's or committee's approval cannot count as a defect.63
Fitting a harbor protects the sale, and missing every harbor leaves the sale where Section 9-610(b) put it, subject to a full examination of its features. A debtor who complains of a low price ordinarily pushes the court to examine every feature, and a sale within a harbor answers that complaint without the examination.
Variation by Agreement
A lender drafting its security agreement will ask how much of the commercial-reasonableness requirement a contract can reshape, and two provisions of Part 6 answer in different directions. The debtor or obligor may not waive the secured party's obligation to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.65 The parties may nonetheless agree on standards that measure whether the secured party has met that obligation, as long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.66 The two rules together draw a working line: an agreement may say how or when a duty is performed, and it may not remove the duty.
The bar on waiver comes from a deeply rooted attitude that debtors need protection from their creditors when it comes to drafting default rules. Creditors therefore cannot require debtors in advance to waive the rules that govern how creditors must behave when seizing and selling property.67
Standards earn their place because they leave the duty standing while giving it content. Section 9-603(a) authorizes the parties to agree on “the standards measuring the fulfillment of the duties of a secured party . . . if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.” Where the Code asks for a reasonable action, the security agreement can specify in advance what counts as reasonable. A debtor cannot waive its right to notice of the sale, for example, but the agreement may supply reasonable details about how and when the notice is given.68 The standards seen most often in practice concern the ways a creditor must give notice, the time that must pass between notice and sale, and sometimes even a statement of what counts as a commercially reasonable resale, and none of these ordinarily creates a problem.69
The line between a prohibited waiver and a permitted standard is not clear, and the statute gives no guidance on when a merely unreasonable standard becomes manifestly unreasonable.70 The word “manifestly” suggests that a standard a court would have drafted differently still passes, but a clause that leaves the debtor nothing against which to measure the sale looks like a waiver under another name.
One subject is closed even to agreed standards. Section 9-603(b) bars the parties from establishing any standards concerning what amounts to a breach of the peace in repossession, and because such breaches may create public safety issues, the bar is unsurprising.71 A clause declaring that entry into a closed garage is peaceful therefore has no effect, although a clause fixing the notice period for a sale would be enforced.
Waiver and Agreed Standards
The duties Part 6 places on a secured party sit in separate sections, but one rule protects them together. The duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner appears in Section 9-610(b), and the duty to send a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition appears in Section 9-611(b).73 Section 9-602 lists the debtor's post-default rights that the security agreement cannot waive or vary except as Section 9-624 permits.74 The list reaches the provisions on disposition of the collateral, including the requirement of notice, and the provisions on acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of the debt.75 It also reaches the duty to take possession without judicial process only without breach of the peace.76
Notification gives the protected duties a concrete shape. For consumer goods, the notice must go to the debtor and to secondary obligors, who also undertook liability on the debt, basically as sureties or guarantors. For other goods, such as equipment, it must also go to anyone who has told the secured party that it has a claim in the goods and to other secured parties who filed a financing statement, or had their interest noted on a vehicle's certificate of title, at least ten days before the notice is sent.77 The later section on notification develops these requirements.
The bar on waiver has a timing limit. Certain debtor rights may be waived by an agreement entered into and authenticated after default.78 Section 9-624 lists them: the right to notification of disposition, the right to require disposition of consumer goods, and, except in consumer transactions, the right to redeem. The waiver must be made in an authenticated record.79 The right to require disposition shows the pattern, since it is protected against advance waiver under Section 9-602 yet waivable after default under Section 9-624(b).80 The duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner is not on the Section 9-624 list, so it stays beyond waiver even after default.81
The timing limit follows the worry behind the rule. The concern is that creditors will require debtors, in advance and on the creditors' own forms, to give up the rules that govern seizure and sale.82 A waiver in a separate authenticated record signed after default is a different instrument from a clause in a form signed at closing.