Concept
Taking Possession of Collateral
Including secured party’s right to take possession and dispose of collateral (§§ 9-608 through 9-624)
Possession and Disposition of Collateral
Taking Possession of Collateral
After default, Article 9 gives the secured party two powers and two ways to exercise each. Under Section 9-609(a), it may take possession of the collateral or, without removing equipment, render the equipment unusable and dispose of it on the debtor's premises. Under subsection (b), it may do either one pursuant to judicial process or, without judicial process, so long as it proceeds without breach of the peace.1
The second route is the secured creditor's chief advantage over an unsecured one. An unsecured creditor must obtain a judgment, find property of the debtor, and obtain a lien on it through the execution process, while a secured party whose security interest has attached can exercise its Article 9 remedies without those steps.2 The advantage carries a condition. Self-help must be peaceful, and a creditor who repossesses over the debtor's objection may be liable for conversion, so a debtor's objection sends the creditor to court.3
The right to repossess depends on attachment and default alone. Perfection and first priority are not required to enforce a security interest, and a failure to file a financing statement affects the secured party's priority against other creditors, not its rights against the debtor.4
Possession is a means to one of two ends. After taking the goods, the secured party may dispose of them or propose to accept them in satisfaction of the debt. The debtor consents to a proposal either by agreeing to its terms in a record authenticated after default or by failing to object within 20 days after the secured party sends it, but silence is not consent to accepting collateral in partial satisfaction.5 When the debtor does not consent, or objects, disposition is required.6 Later sections of this chapter take up each ending. This unit covers how the secured party gets the goods in the first place.
Judicial Process
Section 9-609(b)(1) permits a secured party to take possession “pursuant to judicial process,” which puts the compulsion in the hands of a court rather than the creditor.7 Article 9 supplies the right to possession; the procedure for enforcing it comes from other law. Many states use replevin, a common-law action now largely codified, and others use its statutory successor, claim and delivery.8 In either action the secured party's claim rests on its right to possession under § 9-609.9 Louisiana goes further and leaves the secured party no choice, because it forbids self-help repossession on the theory that self-help is too conducive to violence.10
A replevin writ transfers possession and nothing more. The sheriff delivers the goods to the secured party instead of selling them, and the secured party's own disposition, if it chooses to sell, remains subject to the requirement that every aspect of the sale be commercially reasonable.14 The modern form of the action, unlike the common-law form, lets the plaintiff recover either the property or its value.15
Because many replevin statutes let the secured party obtain an order for possession without notice to the debtor, they raise constitutional concerns, and some have been struck down as violations of the debtor's right to due process. Most recent cases uphold them, at least as long as the debtor is entitled to a prompt hearing after the seizure.16 The law reached that position over time. Before the 1970s the action was simple: the secured party filed, and the sheriff seized the collateral and turned it over without notice to the debtor or any chance to be heard. A series of Supreme Court decisions, from Fuentes v. Shevin to North Georgia Finishing Corp. v. Di-Chem, Inc., restricted that practice, and later cases appeared to allow seizure when the creditor alleged that the property would become unavailable or be wasted without an immediate writ, a judge issued the writ, and the debtor had a right to a prompt hearing afterward.17 Because the statutes differ and may have been amended to meet the constitutional objections, the particular state statute must be examined.18
A debtor who will not yield without a fight is the usual reason to go to court. The debtor's objection ends peaceful self-help, and the creditor who cannot repossess peacefully must bring a replevin action.19 In a judicial proceeding, officers of the court take the actions, so the creditor eliminates its own exposure for violating the repossession and resale rules of Sections 9-609 and 9-610.20 A creditor that is selling an entire business may also go to court because it thinks a court order will make the sale more orderly.21
The protection is not free. Judicial repossession costs more than self-help: in addition to attorneys' fees, it normally involves the cost of posting a bond and the sheriff's fees, and Section 9-615(a) and (d) make the debtor liable for them.22 The reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing, plus reasonable attorney's fees to the extent the agreement provides for them and law does not prohibit them, come out of the cash proceeds of a disposition.23 Because a debtor in default rarely has the money both to make good the deficiency and to pay the fees of collecting it, the court route pays for itself mainly against a debtor who will resist surrender and can afford the cost.24
Judicial process to obtain possession differs from suing on the debt. A creditor with nothing more than a claim has two rights: to have a court enter a judgment that the debtor owes it money, and to invoke state power to seize the debtor's nonexempt property to satisfy that judgment if the debtor does not pay.25 A secured party may follow the same path. After judgment the clerk issues a writ of execution, the sheriff levies on the debtor's property and sells it, and Section 9-601(f) lets the creditor buy at that sheriff's sale, something it usually cannot do at a private sale of property it has repossessed under Section 9-610(c).26 Replevin ends with the goods in the secured party's hands. Execution ends with a sheriff's sale.
The first lender's seizure does not depend on the debtor's cooperation, because a sheriff acts under a court order and the lender's own conduct is never in question. The second lender relies on self-help, so its conduct is tested under the breach-of-the-peace limit, and removal over the express objection of the debtor is probably a breach even if no one is hurt.27 The next subsection explains where that line falls.
Self-Help Repossession
Section 9-609(b)(2) allows a secured party to take possession without judicial process only if it proceeds without breach of the peace.29 The UCC does not define the phrase, so its content comes from the cases. In general, the creditor may recover the collateral unless the debtor objects or protests, and a debtor who voluntarily relinquishes the property upon default leaves nothing to breach.30 Courts define a breach of the peace as a disturbance of public order by an act of violence, by any act likely to produce violence, or by an act that, by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community.31
The test asks about the potential for violence, not about injury. A repossessor who sees the likelihood, or even the possibility, of violence should stop, and continuing almost certainly breaches the peace whether or not violence follows.32 The rule makes sense because its goal is to avoid violence. Requiring the debtor to confront or threaten the repossessor physically would be counterproductive, since repossessors should not be encouraged to make shows of overawing force and debtors should not have to brandish weapons to protect their rights.33
A protest made while the repossession is under way is the most common way the potential for violence becomes real. Even when the creditor is properly at the location, as on a public street, the debtor's opposition, however slight and even if merely oral, normally makes any entry or seizure a breach. Some cases hold otherwise, but the rule that opposition counts is the sounder one for the reason just given.34 Removal over the express objection of the debtor is improper even without physical violence, and the same is probably true of an objection by a third person.35 Timing matters. The debtor must object at the time of the repossession, and an objection made after the collateral is in the repossessors' hands does not create a breach.36
The second agent persisted over a protest made while the repossession was under way, so the lender repossessed wrongfully. The debtor may recover damages under Section 9-625(b) or sue for conversion, in which punitive damages may be awarded.37 The first bank's missing perfection is irrelevant to its right to take the car. That right rests on attachment and default, and perfection matters only in a contest with purchasers, other creditors, and lien holders.38
Where the goods sit sets the likelihood of confrontation. At one end of the range, courts permit repossession of cars from private driveways, because simple trespass does not by itself spoil an otherwise valid repossession.39 At the other end, entering the debtor's home, garage, or other building without consent in order to remove the collateral is a technical breaking and entering, and the removal is improper.40 Without consent, entry into a debtor's house is not permitted whether the debtor is home or not.41 In between, a car in an attached garage with the door open is a closer case, because the repossessor must enter the debtor's abode. A closed door makes a breach more likely, and a locked door whose lock the agent breaks is almost certainly a breach.42 Remote land whose owner is likely to shoot at intruders raises the risk even outside any building.43
A self-help repossessor cannot borrow the state's authority. Comment 3 to Section 9-609 notes that a number of cases had found police assistance to be a failure to comply with the older provisions, and it states that the revised section does not authorize a secured party who repossesses without judicial process to use the assistance of a law enforcement officer.44 Ordinary trickery is treated more leniently. A secured party that induces the debtor to drive to its office under the pretext of working things out, and then blocks the car, does not make the repossession improper.45
The secured party answers for the agents it hires. The duty to repossess without breaching the peace is nondelegable. In one case, a finance company's contractor ran over the debtor and killed him during the contractor's getaway, and the finance company was held liable.46
The debtor's consent at the time of the repossession makes the taking lawful, and a debtor in default has a duty to give up possession under Section 9-609. No formalities are required: even an oral consent is enough if it is contemporaneous, though it must be voluntary, at least to the extent that it is not given in response to an improper threat.47 Consent given in advance, in the security agreement, fares worse, because courts for the most part ignore clauses that purport to authorize a repossession resulting in a breach of the peace.48 Article 9 reinforces that result. Section 9-603(a) lets the parties agree on standards that measure the secured party's duties if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable,49 but Sections 9-602(6) and 9-603(b) take the duty to refrain from breaching the peace out of that freedom.
Assembly and Rendering Unusable
Section 9-609 adds two refinements for collateral that is hard to move or hard to find. Subsection (a)(2) lets the secured party, without removing equipment, render it unusable and dispose of it on the debtor's premises. Subsection (c) lets the secured party require the debtor, if so agreed and in any event after default, to assemble the collateral and make it available at a place the secured party designates that is reasonably convenient to both parties.52 Neither refinement is a separate remedy. Rendering equipment unusable is one of the two post-default powers in subsection (a), so it travels with the two routes in subsection (b): judicial process, or self-help without breach of the peace.53 Assembly is a demand on the debtor, not a seizure.
Equipment that is costly to move can be disabled where it stands. The Code permits the secured party to render equipment unusable without removing it and to dispose of it on the debtor's premises, because removal is often impractical.54 With large earth-moving equipment, for example, the secured party might remove an essential part so that the machine cannot be operated, and then sell the machine where it sits.55 The expenses of retaking and holding are charged against the proceeds, so every dollar spent hauling a machine is a dollar that the debt and any surplus do not receive.56
Two limits come with the power. The first concerns access. Because subsection (b) governs both powers, disabling in place is lawful only through judicial process or without breach of the peace, so a secured party that can reach the machine only by cutting a lock over the debtor's protest stands where one that breaks into a garage stands.57 The second concerns the sale. Any action by the secured party in rendering equipment unusable must be commercially reasonable,58 and every aspect of a disposition, including its method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.59 Selling in place is therefore a permitted choice of place, and the sale is still tested on every other term.
The result changes if the agent reached the press only by cutting the plant's lock over the debtor's protest, because the access itself breaches the peace and the seizure is wrongful. It changes in a different way if the lender sells the disabled press on terms no reasonable seller would accept, because selling on the premises does not excuse a failure of commercial reasonableness.
The assembly power answers a different problem: scattered collateral. A debtor may keep mobile equipment in several places and even in several states, and sending agents to each one is slow and costly.60 A security agreement may require the debtor to assemble the collateral on default, and may even require it before default, presumably so the secured party can examine the goods.61 The statute does not depend on such a clause once the debtor has defaulted, because the power exists “if so agreed, and in any event after default.”62 The secured party chooses the place, but the place must be reasonably convenient to both parties, which keeps the power from becoming a means of imposing a distant or burdensome site. A debtor who ignores the demand leaves the secured party with the ordinary options of retaking the goods lawfully or asking a court for help in requiring the debtor to gather them.63
The parties may agree in advance on standards for how these powers are exercised, within limits. Where the Code requires a reasonable action, the security agreement can specify what counts as reasonable, so long as the standard is not manifestly unreasonable.64 Breach of the peace is the exception, and Section 9-602(6) keeps that duty beyond the reach of any agreement.
Junior Secured Parties' Possession
Article 9's post-default powers belong to the secured party as such, and they do not turn on its rank. Section 9-610(a), for example, permits a secured party after default to sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral, and it says nothing about priority.66 The right to take possession works the same way: a secured party whose interest has attached may repossess after default whether or not it perfected and whether or not it stands first in line.67
Enforcement and priority answer different questions. Attachment and default establish a claim against the collateral that is ripe for enforcement, while perfection and priority sort out competing claimants. An unperfected interest is most likely not valid against purchasers from the debtor, other creditors with security interests in the same collateral, and holders of judicial or statutory liens, yet a failure to perfect does not protect the debtor from repossession or any other Article 9 remedy.68 A fact pattern that stresses that the repossessing creditor is second in line, or never filed, is usually offering a distraction on the question whether it may take the goods.
Repossession even improves an unperfected party's position. A secured party with an unperfected interest in collateral in the debtor's possession obtains a perfected security interest if it repossesses after default, and it then holds the rights and duties of a pledgee or secured party in possession.69
A junior or unperfected party that holds the goods cannot keep them against a creditor that outranks it. When a senior secured party demands the collateral, the party in possession must surrender it, and refusing can make the junior party liable to the senior party for conversion.70 The senior party's priority gives it the superior right to the collateral's value, and a junior that keeps or sells the goods for its own account against the demand takes what the ranking allocated to someone else.
A junior may also sell without any demand from a senior, but its sale passes only what its position allows. Its power to dispose is intact, and every aspect of the sale must be commercially reasonable.71 A disposition discharges the security interest under which it is made and any subordinate security interest or lien, and the statute does not list senior interests among those discharged.72 Senior liens therefore do not get paid from the proceeds but remain on the collateral, which the buyer takes subject to them.73 After the expenses of retaking, holding, and selling, the cash goes to the obligation secured by the junior's own interest.74
Notice rules give a filed senior party a chance to learn of the sale. When the collateral is equipment rather than consumer goods, notice of the disposition must go not only to the debtor and secondary obligors but also to anyone who has told the secured party it claims an interest in the goods and to other secured parties who filed a financing statement, or had their interest noted on a certificate of title, at least ten days before the notice is sent.75 A senior party that filed in time will therefore receive notice of the junior's sale.
The senior party need not accept the junior's sale. It can demand the goods and conduct its own, and a sale under the senior's interest discharges the subordinate interests, the junior's included. That discharge is why only subordinate secured parties are entitled to be paid from the proceeds of such a sale.76 Later sections take up the buyer's title and the order in which proceeds are applied.