Concept
Commercially Reasonable Collection
Including secured party’s collection rights (§ 9-607)
Commercially Reasonable Collection
A secured party that collects on collateral owes the debtor a standard of conduct, but only when two conditions are both met. Section 9-607(c) provides that a secured party “shall proceed in a commercially reasonable manner” if it undertakes to collect from or enforce an obligation of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral, and is also entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.1 Without both, no duty arises.
The duty counterbalances the collection powers taught above. Notifying account debtors, taking proceeds, and enforcing the debtor's rights each put the lender in charge of how hard, how fast, and on what terms the debtor's customers are pressed to pay. When the lender can send an uncollected shortfall back to the debtor, those choices decide how large a deficiency the debtor owes or how small a surplus the debtor receives, and the debtor made none of them.2 The standard gives the debtor a measure against which to test what the lender did.
The two conditions divide the work. The first asks what the secured party did, and the next subsection takes it up. The second asks who absorbs the loss if collection falls short. Buyers of receivables sit at the edge of both conditions, and the final subsection describes how courts decide whether a particular collection was reasonable.
Undertaking to Collect
The first condition turns on a verb. The secured party must “undertake” to collect from or enforce an obligation of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral, so the duty follows what the secured party does and ignores what it merely holds.3 The recourse condition, taken up next, is joined to this one by “and,” and the duty needs both.4
A secured party holds three collection powers, each a way to collect or enforce. It may notify an account debtor or other obligor to pay or perform for its benefit. It may take proceeds to which it is entitled under § 9-315. And it may enforce the obligations of an account debtor or other obligor and exercise the debtor's rights against that person and against any property securing the obligation.5 The phrase “other person obligated on collateral” reaches well beyond account debtors, who owe on accounts, chattel paper, and general intangibles. It also covers persons who owe the debtor on collateral such as instruments, documents of title, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, and investment securities.6 Enforcement can even run through property. A secured party holding a mortgage as collateral may exercise the debtor's right to foreclose without judicial process where applicable law allows it, and it may need to record the security agreement and a sworn affidavit of default in the real estate records to do so.7
Holding those powers is different from using them. Article 9 does not require a secured party to use its collection mechanism; it may instead conduct a disposition or a retention of the collateral.8 In a non-notification financing the debtor keeps collecting from its own account debtors, and the agreement may permit the secured party to notify them and collect directly.9 Until the secured party does so, it has undertaken nothing, and the duty is not yet in play.
The duty waits for the undertaking because the undertaking takes the matter out of the debtor's hands. A lender that steps in decides whether to press a slow customer, accept a discount for quick payment, or sue, and the debtor must live with the result: a poor collection enlarges the deficiency or shrinks the surplus.10 Control exercised over another's receivables calls for a standard, and control never exercised needs none.
The statute lists no acts that amount to an undertaking, so its own verbs set the scope. To collect is to ask those who owe the debtor to pay the secured party. To enforce is to sue one of them, or to exercise the debtor's rights against an obligor or the property securing its obligation.11 A notification directing payment to the secured party is the usual first step, and demands, suits, and settlements of disputed accounts commonly follow it.12 Because the text sets no threshold, treat any real effort to make an account debtor pay the lender as an undertaking.
The other side of the line is the lender that never contacts anyone. Collection is one route among several, so a secured party that disposes of the accounts or retains them has not undertaken to collect from an account debtor, and the rules for those remedies measure its conduct instead.13
Exam stems probe this line in two ways. In one, the facts say only that the debtor defaulted and the lender holds the accounts, and the pull is to find a breach of the collection duty in the lender's inaction; nothing has triggered the duty. In the other, the stem says the lender moved the accounts by sale, and the pull is to call the sale an enforcement of the account debtors' obligations. A sale puts the accounts in a buyer's hands and pursues no account debtor.
Recourse and Charge Back
The second condition turns from what the secured party did to who bears the cost if it did poorly. Section 9-607(c)(2) requires that the secured party be entitled to “charge back uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.”16
A charge-back is the right to hand an uncollected item back to the debtor and make the debtor answer for it, as when a financer returns an unpaid account to the business that assigned it.17 Recourse is the wider right to fall back on the debtor, or on a secondary obligor such as a guarantor, when collection brings in less than what is owed. Full recourse reaches the whole shortfall; limited recourse reaches only part of it. Because the statute covers both, any right to look back for a collection shortfall satisfies the condition, whatever the parties call it.
Recourse triggers the duty because of the arithmetic of a secured loan. When the collateral is a right to payment, the lender collects, deducts its reasonable expenses of realization, and applies the rest to the debt. If the collections exceed the obligation, the secured party must account to the debtor for the surplus, and if they fall short, the debtor is liable for the deficiency unless the parties agreed otherwise.18 Every dollar the lender fails to collect therefore lands on the debtor, as a larger deficiency or a smaller surplus. A lender that can pass its losses along has little financial reason to press a slow customer or refuse a cheap settlement, and the debtor pays for its haste without having made the choice. The duty answers that mismatch by giving the debtor a standard to hold the lender to.
Where no shortfall can travel back to anyone else, the same reasoning runs in reverse. A secured party without recourse spends its own money and carries its own loss, because the buyer in an outright sale has “bargained for both the risk and the benefit.”19
When the parties leave recourse unstated, the form of the deal supplies the answer. In a standard illustration, a bank finances a dealer's chattel paper. If the dealer signs a note promising to repay a $50,000 loan, together with a security agreement, the deal is a secured loan, and if the paper brings in less than the amount due, the bank may seek a deficiency judgment against the dealer. If the dealer instead “sells” the paper to the bank for a fixed $45,000, the bank probably has no right to a deficiency but keeps any surplus above that sum.20 Recourse is present in the loan and absent in the sale, so § 9-607(c)(2) is met in the first and unmet in the second. Section 9-608(b) writes the second result into the Code: when the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, the debtor is not entitled to any surplus, and the obligor is not liable for any deficiency, unless the agreement provides otherwise.21 In this setting a “sale” presumably means a nonrecourse transfer, so the label gives way to substance. The question is whether the secured party can look back to the debtor or a secondary obligor.22
A stem that describes careless collection invites the quick conclusion that the lender breached § 9-607(c), but the stem must first supply both conditions. Notifying, demanding, suing, or settling meets the first. The second is met only if the facts show a loan on which the debtor owes a deficiency, a right to hand uncollected items back, or a guarantor who answers for the shortfall. A fixed-price purchase with no right to return unpaid accounts takes the problem outside the duty altogether.
Buyers of Receivables
Section 9-601(g) lifts most of Part 6 from one class of financers. Except as § 9-607(c) provides, Part 6 imposes no duties on a secured party that is a consignor or a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.25 The phrasing treats such a buyer as a secured party, because Article 9 reaches sales of accounts and chattel paper, and the exemption then relieves the buyer of the duties that ordinarily come with that status.26 A buyer of receivables therefore stands in a better position than a lender holding the same receivables as collateral. One duty survives, and the rest of this subsection explains why the others fall away and why that one stays.
The reason lies in who owns the receivables. After an outright sale of these assets, the secured party, not the debtor, owns them, so the seller is entitled to no surplus and the buyer can recover no deficiency unless the agreement provides for one.27 The seller has no residual stake in how the buyer collects. The buyer has “bargained for both the risk and the benefit,” so a poor collection lowers only its own return.28
The result reverses once the buyer keeps recourse. Section 9-601(g) preserves the § 9-607(c) duty even for a buyer, so a buyer that undertakes to collect and is entitled to charge back uncollected items, or to full or limited recourse against the seller or a secondary obligor, must collect reasonably.29 The debtor and obligor cannot waive the duty by agreement.30 The loss-bearing logic of the Harlan scene now points the other way. A buyer who can hand back unpaid items does not bear the shortfall in the end, because it returns to the seller, who keeps a stake in how carefully the buyer collects. And because the statute reaches limited recourse as well as full, even a partial right to look back to the seller brings the duty with it.
A bank that “buys” a dealer's chattel paper but keeps a right of recourse against the dealer shows the exception at work. It owes the dealer none of Part 6's other duties, yet it must collect reasonably, because the dollars it fails to collect fall back on the dealer.31 The bank and Harlan differ in a single fact, the right to hand back unpaid paper, and that fact moves the answer from no duty to a duty.
The name a financing agreement gives itself does not settle which side of the line a deal falls on. A “sale” in this setting presumably means a nonrecourse transfer,32 so a transaction called a purchase that lets the financer return unpaid accounts to the seller leaves the seller bearing the shortfall just as a loan would, and the duty applies. The label does control the settlement of any shortfall. In a secured loan the debtor is entitled to any surplus and is liable for any deficiency, while in a sale of these assets neither follows unless the agreement provides for it.33 The mechanics of surplus and deficiency belong to a later subsection.
A stem about a financer that “purchases” receivables and then collects carelessly invites two opposite errors. One treats the financer as a lender bound by all of Part 6. The other treats the word purchase as ending the analysis. The statute's answer lies between them: Part 6 imposes no duties on the buyer except those in § 9-607(c), and § 9-607(c) reaches the buyer only if it undertook to collect and holds a right of recourse. The recourse right in the agreement decides the question, and the word purchase decides nothing.
Measuring Reasonableness
Section 9-607(c) names the standard without defining it. The Code's general yardstick appears in § 9-627(a), which covers collection, enforcement, disposition, and acceptance together and provides that proof of a greater recovery at a different time or by a different method does not of itself prevent the secured party from establishing that it acted in a commercially reasonable manner.37 Deficiency-judgment cases produce most of the law under this part of Article 9, and the decisions below are sale cases, so they serve as analogies for collection, which § 9-627(a) measures by the same words.38
Courts treat the question as fact-intensive: “no magic set of procedures will immunize a sale from scrutiny.”39 Collateral differs, markets differ, and customers differ. An undisputed invoice owed by a solvent customer may justify steady pressure to collect in full, while an invoice the customer disputes may be worth less than its face amount. A formula fixed in advance would misjudge one of them, whereas a standard applied to the whole process lets a court ask what a careful lender would have done with this account on these facts. A discount below face value does not by itself make a collection unreasonable, any more than proof of a greater recovery elsewhere would. The question is whether the circumstances explain it.
The rule that a greater recovery elsewhere does not of itself defeat reasonableness exists because hindsight is cheap. A debtor can nearly always show afterward that waiting a month or calling another buyer might have brought in more, and a standard that turned on that showing would hold the secured party to perfection. A second principle limits the first. Comment 2 to § 9-627 explains that a low price, though not itself sufficient to establish a violation, “suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable.”40 The debtor usually cannot see inside the secured party's process, so the result is the fact the debtor can point to. One commentator concludes that the price received ends up as the talisman.41
Coxall v. Clover Commercial Corp. shows a low price doing that work. The lender sold a Lexus that the Coxalls had bought about four months earlier for $8,100, and it received $1,500, or 18.5 percent of the purchase price. With the price as the only evidence of commercial reasonableness, the court had little else to weigh.42 The lender offered no evidence that it contacted any prospective buyer other than the original seller, no evidence of the car's fair market value on the date of sale, and nothing else that would justify the price, so the court held that it failed to carry its burden of showing a commercially reasonable sale.43 The low price opened the inquiry, and the lender's silence about everything else ended it.
That outcome follows from the allocation of proof. A secured party seeking a deficiency bears the burden of proving that the sale was commercially reasonable,44 and the same burden attaches whenever the debtor or obligor puts the secured party's compliance with Article 9's enforcement rules in issue.45 The allocation makes sense because the secured party holds the evidence of whom it contacted and what it did with the collateral, while the debtor can hardly prove that a call was never made.
City National Bank v. Unique Structures, Inc. shows the burden at work on a different failure. CNB, the lender, had to prove that its sales of mobile homes were commercially reasonable, yet the record held no evidence of when CNB took control of the homes or of their condition when it did, and no evidence that CNB made any effort to protect them afterward. Without that evidence, the district court could not evaluate whether CNB preserved the collateral, disposed of the homes in a timely manner, or should have cleaned and repaired them before sale, and it did not clearly err in finding that CNB failed to prove that any of the sales was commercially reasonable.46 In Coxall, an unusually low price raised the alarm, and in City National, a record silent about the handling of the collateral left the court unable to evaluate the sales at all. In both, the party with the burden lost for want of proof.
The two settlements differ in what the file shows. The first records a real dispute and the cost of suing; the second records nothing.
The duty cannot be bargained away in advance. Section 9-607(c) is among the rights that the debtor and obligor cannot waive, and Article 9 restricts the parties' ability to alter some of its enforcement provisions.47 The parties do keep some room. Section 9-603(a) lets them agree on the standards that measure how the secured party performs its duties, so long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.48 A clause that fixes how long a lender will press a disputed account, and what notice it will give the debtor before compromising it, fills in the duty and stands unless manifestly unreasonable. A clause declaring that the lender owes no duty of reasonable care in collecting removes the duty and has no effect.
Failure to meet the standard costs the secured party its deficiency. Outside consumer transactions, a rebuttable presumption rule operates against a noncompliant secured party, while in consumer transactions courts may apply their own rules, including an absolute bar on any deficiency.49 If the debtor shows that compliance would have produced a surplus, the debtor may recover damages for failure to obtain it even though the deficiency is eliminated.50 The later readings on surplus, deficiency, and liability for violations develop these consequences, and for now the point is that the burden of proof and the deficiency remedy together make a thin record the secured party's problem.
A stem describing a collection at a deep discount tempts two quick answers. One treats the size of the discount as a breach, which overlooks that a greater recovery elsewhere does not of itself defeat reasonableness. The other treats any settlement as safe because the lender had recourse, which overlooks the burden of proof and the scrutiny a low result invites.