Concept
Collecting From Obligors
Including secured party’s collection rights (§ 9-607)
Collecting From Obligors
A secured party whose collateral is another person's promise to pay has nothing to repossess, so it collects. Section 9-607(a) lets it notify an account debtor or other person obligated on the collateral to render payment or performance to the secured party, take any proceeds to which it is entitled under Section 9-315, and enforce the obligation by exercising the debtor's own rights against the obligated person.1 Each power is permissive: the statute says the secured party may notify, may take, and may enforce.
The grant fits the collateral. A lender holding a car or a stamping press can foreclose, meaning enforce its security interest to turn the collateral into payment, by taking the thing itself. A right to be paid cannot be carried off, because its value is the money a third party owes. Foreclosure on rights to payment therefore normally means collecting the amounts due from the debtor's own debtors, the account debtors, who owe money to the debtor, who in turn owes money to the secured creditor.2
Collection from account debtors raises two questions of unequal difficulty. The easy one asks what rights §§ 9-607 and 9-608 give the secured party and when those rights arise, and a later section takes it up. The hard one asks when an account debtor or others may raise defenses against paying the secured party and so keep it from receiving all or part of what it is owed. That question runs through §§ 9-404 and 9-406 and a body of not-always-consistent case law, and it lies beyond this unit.3
The secured party's collection also runs in a second direction, against the person who owes the secured debt. That obligor can be sued, and the collateral can be reached through the lawsuit and the sheriff's levy that follows it. This unit follows the judicial path: how it works, where a levy lien stands in priority, and what the secured party may do at the sale.
Judgment and Execution
After default, a secured party may skip repossession and go to court. Section 9-601(a)(1) lets it reduce its claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce its claim, security interest, or agricultural lien by any available judicial procedure.4 To reduce a claim to judgment is to have a court fix what the debtor owes in a formal money judgment. To foreclose, in this setting, is to enforce the lien against the collateral through a process a court decrees instead of through the creditor's own seizure. The closing phrase, any available judicial procedure, takes in whatever else the forum offers.
Part 6 of Article 9 does not preclude judicial enforcement, so the secured party may sue the obligor on the debt and may also sue the debtor to foreclose on its security interest or agricultural lien.5 The Code itself does not say how either suit proceeds. Statutes and common law in each state, some of it ancient, specify the steps.6
The route an unsecured creditor follows shows what the judicial path involves. The creditor sues and obtains a judgment for the debt. With a writ of execution in hand, an officer levies on the debtor's property, meaning the officer exercises dominion over it so that it is preserved for satisfaction of the debt. The officer then gives public notice, sells the property at public auction to the highest bidder, and turns over the proceeds needed to satisfy the debt. Any surplus goes to the debtor.7 Against a debtor with an ongoing stream of income, such as wages, garnishment is an attractive alternative to levy.8
The sale usually disappoints. The sheriff gives no warranties of title or quality, and the purchaser's title may be subject to encumbrances on the property, so the price is unlikely to equal fair market value. If the sale does not bring enough to satisfy the debt, the judgment creditor may have another writ issued.9
What the unsecured creditor must earn through execution, the secured party already holds. A judgment alone gives an unsecured creditor no lien. Only when the creditor executes does it become a secured creditor, albeit an involuntary one, with a property interest in whatever particular property the sheriff levies on. A voluntary secured creditor already has that property interest in its collateral by virtue of the Article 9 security interest the debtor granted. Among creditors executing on the same assets, the first to levy usually takes first priority in the proceeds.10 That last rule sets up the relation-back provision in the next subsection.
The difference decides a familiar fact pattern. A trade supplier holds a money judgment against the debtor but has levied on nothing, and the debtor's secured lender repossesses and sells collateral. The supplier takes nothing from that sale, because unsecured creditors have no interest in any particular property and get nothing out of the sale.11
Part 6 favors enforcement outside court, so the judicial route needs a reason. The resale provisions aim to allow realization on collateral with a minimum of judicial proceedings and to encourage higher prices by allowing private as well as public sale.12 Four circumstances nonetheless send a secured party to the courthouse:
- A debtor's objection means self-help would breach the peace, and a court action such as replevin becomes the lawful route; a creditor that takes the collateral over the objection may be liable for conversion.13
- Collateral that has lost value ensures that its sale will not satisfy the debt, so the creditor must sue anyway and does better to sue first than to sue second.14
- Court officers carry out the seizure and sale, which eliminates the creditor's own liability risk for violating the repossession and resale rules of §§ 9-609 and 9-610, because creditors must act reasonably but judicial officials need not.15
- Section 9-601(f) lets the creditor buy at the sheriff's sale, which it generally cannot do at a private sale of repossessed property under § 9-610(c).16
Few creditors take that path. Lawsuits are expensive, they can take years to litigate, and searching for the nonexempt assets of a debtor who is already in trouble is difficult, so most secured creditors seize and sell under § 9-610.17 Even a correct resale often leaves a deficiency for which the debtor is usually liable, and that leads to a deficiency judgment suit.18
Relation-Back of Levy Liens
A secured party that sues reaches its levy last. It must win a judgment, obtain a writ, and wait for an officer to act, and a lien that dated only from the levy would be as young as that final step. Section 9-601(e) removes the handicap. When a secured party has reduced its claim to judgment, the lien of any levy on the collateral under an execution based on that judgment relates back to the earliest of three dates:21
- the date of perfection of the security interest or agricultural lien in the collateral;22
- the date of filing a financing statement covering the collateral; or23
- any date specified in a statute under which the agricultural lien was created.24
To relate back is to be treated as having arisen on the earlier date. The levy lien therefore takes its priority from that date, so the creditor's rank rests on what it did before the lawsuit began, and the sheriff's arrival does not set it.25 Taking the earliest date gives the creditor the best one it can show, and when the perfection and filing dates differ, the earlier controls. The third date matters only for agricultural liens, which arise under a statute that may specify a date of its own. The rule serves a secured party that has reduced its own claim to judgment and levied under that judgment, and a rival creditor levying under its own judgment gets no such date.
Two threats gather in the months between filing and levy. A rival may levy on the same collateral first, and among creditors executing on the same assets the first to levy usually takes first priority.26 The debtor may also file bankruptcy, which exposes a late levy to attack as a preferential transfer. Relation back answers both: it moves the secured party's priority date ahead of the rival's levy, and it lets the filing date, not the levy date, govern the bankruptcy question.
The bankruptcy result follows from the same rule. If the security interest was perfected earlier by a still-effective filing, the time of execution relates back to the time of filing. The debtor may then become bankrupt within 90 days of the execution, and if the filing came more than 90 days before the bankruptcy, the trustee cannot attack the execution as a preferential transfer.27 A lender that filed eight months before the petition and levied 60 days before it is therefore safe, because the filing date governs and lies well outside the 90-day window.
The secured party in that scenario can still enforce, because perfection is not required to enforce a security interest against the debtor.28 What it lacks is an earlier date to borrow, which matters once the problem turns to priority. A stem that lists a filing date, a judgment date, and a levy date tests whether you reach for the wrong one. The statute reaches back past the levy and past the judgment to the earliest of perfection, filing, or the agricultural lien statute's date, and when none of those exists the levy lien has nothing earlier to relate back to.
Purchase at Execution Sales
The judicial route ends at the sale, and § 9-601(f) says what that sale is and who may bid. A sale pursuant to an execution is a foreclosure of the security interest or agricultural lien by judicial procedure within the meaning of § 9-601, and a secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements of Article 9.30 The first clause ties the sale to § 9-601(a)(1): the levy puts the collateral under the court's control, and the officer's sale closes the procedure. The second clause carries the consequence. At the sale the secured party stands among the bidders, and what it buys comes without the Article 9 duties that would burden a secured party disposing of collateral on its own.
The sale belongs to the officer, not the creditor. The creditor obtains the writ, and the sheriff or other officer levies, gives public notice, and sells at auction to the highest bidder, with the details set by state law and not by the Code.31 Such sales are often held on the courthouse steps.32 Because court officers conduct the sale, a secured party that buys holds the collateral without the need to comply with any requirement of Article 9.33
Compare the secured party that repossesses and sells privately. It generally cannot buy at its own sale, because § 9-610(c) forbids what § 9-601(f) permits at a sheriff's sale.34 The two rules turn on who runs the sale. At an execution sale, officers of the court take every action, and the creditor is one bidder at a public auction. In a private disposition the secured party runs the sale itself, so a purchase by the secured party would put the same party on both sides of the transaction.
Price shows the difference in practice. In a private disposition, a low price is not itself sufficient to establish a violation, but it tells a court to scrutinize carefully all aspects of the disposition to ensure that each was commercially reasonable.35 A sale approved in a judicial proceeding, by contrast, is conclusively deemed commercially reasonable under § 9-627(c).36 The rule runs in one direction only. It does not make a judicial sale necessary, and it does not make a nonjudicial sale commercially unreasonable.37
A stem in which a secured party ends up owning the collateral invites two opposite errors: that a secured party may never buy what it is selling, and that any purchase by the secured party is fine. The question that sorts the answer is who ran the sale. If an officer ran a public execution sale after judgment and levy, the purchase is allowed and carries no other Article 9 requirements. If the secured party ran its own private disposition, the general bar of § 9-610(c) governs.