Concept
Deadlines for Filing
Termination statement (§ 9-513)
Deadlines for Filing
A consumer-goods secured party who owes a termination statement must also deliver it on time, and § 9-513(b) sets the clock. The secured party must cause the secured party of record to file the termination statement.1 The duty is to file, not merely to hand the debtor a copy, and it arises without any demand from the debtor.2 A duty with no deadline cannot be enforced, because a secured party could always say the filing is coming. Subsection (b) supplies the day on which silence becomes noncompliance.
The length of the period depends on whether the debtor asks. When the consumer debtor sends an authenticated demand, the secured party must file within twenty days of receiving it. When no demand arrives, the secured party has one month after there is no obligation secured by the collateral and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value.3 The one-month period is therefore the default, and it starts running on its own once the debtor is paid up and the secured party is free of commitments. A demand cuts the secured party's time to twenty days.
Neither period is met by sending the debtor a copy. Each requires the filing itself.
The one-month period runs from a moment the secured party must be able to identify: the point at which nothing is owed on the collateral and nothing is promised. That moment has two components, and both must be present before the period begins. The subsections below take them in turn, first what the debtor still owes and then what the secured party still promises.
No Secured Obligation Remains
The first component of the payoff trigger asks what the debtor still owes that this collateral secures. The duty under § 9-513(a)(1) applies when the financing statement covers consumer goods5 and there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value.6 Both conditions must hold, so a zero balance on the purchase loan satisfies only half of the trigger. This subsection takes the debtor's side of the ledger, and the next takes the secured party's.
Two phrases in the first condition do the work. The word obligation reaches any debt, so a paid-off purchase loan does not end the inquiry if the security agreement makes the same goods stand behind a second debt on which something is still owed. The phrase secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement ties the inquiry to the goods. A debt the debtor owes the same lender on an unsecured basis, or on a loan secured only by other property, cannot hold this financing statement in place. A fact pattern that reports the first loan paid in full has therefore not finished the analysis, because the question remains whether anything still owed is secured by this collateral.
The logic of waiting for a clean slate is simple. While the goods still stand behind a debt, the filing accurately reports the secured party's claim, and terminating it would clear the record while money is owed. Only when nothing is owed does the filing overstate the secured party's position, and that is the moment the statute requires the secured party to correct it.
The same condition appears outside the consumer setting, and a decision there shows how a remaining debt defeats the duty. In AEG Liquidation Trust v. Toobro N.Y. LLC, a factor was still owed more than $8 million under its factoring agreement when termination statements were filed against its financing statements without its authorization.7 The court explained that such a termination statement is effective only if the secured party authorized it, or if the secured party had failed to file or send a termination statement that § 9-513(a) or (c) required, the debtor authorized the filing, and the statement said so. Neither condition was met.8 Section 9-513(a) did not apply because it governs consumer goods, and § 9-513(c) gave the debtor no help either. The remaining debt is what keeps the payoff trigger from being met, so no duty to terminate was in force, the filings were ineffective, and the financing statements stayed effective.
Because AEG involved commercial collateral, it decides nothing about consumer goods, and it is useful here only for how the shared condition operates. The consumer-goods duty differs in that it arises without any demand from the debtor,9 while the provision for other collateral works through a demand, as later sections show. The case also previews a limit on the debtor's own remedy. A termination statement filed without the secured party's authorization is effective only where the secured party failed to file or send one that the statute required, the debtor authorized the filing, and the statement says so.10 Where a secured obligation remains, no such duty existed, and the debtor's filing does nothing. The discussion of debtor self-help returns to that limit.
No Commitment to Advance
The second component of the payoff trigger is one that a zero balance cannot satisfy: the secured party must also have no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value.12 The previous subsection looked at the debtor's side of the ledger. This one looks at the secured party's side and asks what the secured party has still promised. The two conditions are cumulative, so the consumer-goods duty has not arisen until both are met, even if the debtor owes nothing today.13 Because the clause ends in a catch-all, otherwise give value, it reaches any promise the secured party has made and has yet to perform.
The reason for this half lies in what a filing does for a lender who is still lending. Filing is the ordinary way to perfect a security interest in personal property, and it is far more convenient than possession.14 A lender bound to advance more money is still relying on that filing. If the duty to terminate arose the moment the balance hit zero, the lender would lose the filing it still needs and would have to file afresh before its next advance, and a fresh filing is only as old as the day it is made. Tying the duty to the end of both the debt and the commitment protects a continuing financing relationship. It also frees a debtor whose relationship has truly ended to clear the record.
A revolving credit arrangement is the familiar setting. The lender agrees that the consumer may borrow, repay, and borrow again up to a limit, with the goods purchased standing behind whatever is outstanding. When the consumer pays the balance to zero, the account is quiet but not closed, because the lender must still honor the next purchase. An unreleased future-advances arrangement works the same way: the security agreement may say that the collateral secures money to be lent later, and the lender may still be bound to lend it. In each case the statute asks about the commitment itself, and the size of the balance does not answer that question. A future-advances clause signals that a commitment may exist, and the facts decide whether the secured party is actually still bound.
A stem that reports a zero balance on a consumer's secured account invites the conclusion that the secured party must now file. The next question is whether the secured party is still bound to lend.
A secured party cannot always tell from its file whether the arrangement is really over, so the commitment is best ended in so many words. Closing the account and canceling the limit in writing, or an agreement that a future-advances clause no longer binds, settles the point and leaves the second condition plainly satisfied. Once a zero balance and the end of the commitment coincide, both components are met and the one-month period begins to run, or the twenty-day period if the debtor sends an authenticated demand.15