Concept
Modification Versus Rescission
Modification of the assigned contract
Modification Versus Rescission
UCC § 9-405(a) makes a good-faith “modification of or substitution for” an assigned contract effective against the assignee, and it adds that the assignee “acquires corresponding rights under the modified or substituted contract.”1 Both phrases presuppose a contract that survives the change, whether on adjusted terms or under a replacement agreement. An agreement that ends the contract fits neither phrase. An account debtor facing the assignee's claim therefore has every reason to argue that ending the deal is only the largest modification of all. The argument fails, and the reason lies in the statute's wording.
In Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. B.C.B.U., a bank claimed as assignee of the rent due under a computer-equipment lease. The lessee, B.C.B.U., answered that it and Crocker had rescinded the lease.2 The lessee raised several arguments. The one aimed at § 9-405 was the cancelation argument, which said that the rescission amounted to a modification of an assigned contract that is effective against an assignee.3 The court rejected it.
The court rested on the statute's wording. The statute does not say the lease can be modified or rescinded; it says the lease can be modified. The sentence that follows speaks of the assignee's rights under the contract after the modification, which plainly contemplates a contract that continues to exist and “would make no sense after a rescission.”4 The result follows directly. When a contract is canceled or rescinded, no rights remain that can pass to the assignee to replace those under the assigned agreement, so cancelation of the lease is not a defense.5
The structure of the rule supports that reading. A modification changes the assigned contract but leaves a contract on which the assignee's rights can take hold, even when the new terms are worse. A rescission leaves the assignee nothing to take. The justification for allowing modification points the same way. Comment 2, which the court quoted, explains that the ability of account debtors and assignors to modify contracts can be important, especially for government contracts and complex arrangements such as construction contracts, where modifications are customary.6 That justification concerns keeping a continuing contract workable. A rescission ends the contract.
The reading has an awkward consequence, and the court admitted it. Cutting the rent to a dollar and rescinding the lease do the same thing to the assignee's recovery, and the court conceded that “the functional difference between a modification of the lease amount to a dollar and the rescission of the contract is nugatory in financial terms,” meaning the difference is negligible in dollars.7 The court offered a possible explanation for the line: as to a modification like that, the legislature may have supposed that a trier of fact would withhold a finding of good faith.8 The court did not rest on that guess. In its words, “regardless of the reason the Legislature chose to differentiate between modification and rescission, it did.”9
Termination paired with a new agreement is a closer call than a bare cancelation. If the same parties end the old lease and sign a new lease for the same equipment at lower rent, a contract remains for the assignee's rights to attach to, and the statute's reference to a “substitution for” the assigned contract fits those facts.10 That reading comes from the statutory text and from the court's insistence that rights must be available to pass to the assignee. The decision itself involved a bare rescission, so it is not a holding on replacement agreements.
On an exam, classify the change before doing anything else. A change that leaves a contract in place, or puts another in its place, goes through the good-faith condition and the timing limits covered earlier. A cancelation or rescission stops at the threshold, because § 9-405 does not treat it as a modification or substitution. A related argument fails too: an agreement to rescind does not amount to paying the assignor in the way that discharges an account debtor under § 9-406.11 The holding is narrow. Rescission is not a modification, so it gives the account debtor no defense under § 9-405.12
Consumer Account Debtors
Subsection (c) makes § 9-405 “subject to law other than this article which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”14 The carve-out applies to the whole section, so it can displace both the good-faith condition and the timing limits. Subsection (c) contains no consumer rule of its own. It sends the court outside Article 9, and where the outside law sets a different rule for a qualifying account debtor, that law controls. Article 9 uses the same device in § 9-404, where a separate consumer protection law that provides otherwise preempts the Article 9 rule.15
Three requirements must be met before the carve-out does any work. First, the account debtor must be an individual, which excludes a corporation, partnership, or other entity however small. Second, the individual must have incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. That test looks to the obligation and not only to the person. An individual can owe a business debt, and the word primarily settles mixed use by asking what the obligation mainly served. A freelance designer who buys a laptop she uses mostly for client work has incurred a business obligation, even if she sometimes works on it at home. Third, outside law must actually establish a different rule on the modification question, because subsection (c) writes none itself.16
The homeowner prevails in that scene only because of the assumed statute. The Code supplies no consumer rule on modification. In a state with no such law, subsections (a) and (b) decide the same facts, and the reduction fails against the finance company because the amount was earned and the homeowner had been notified. A student who sees a consumer and leaps to a pro-consumer answer has skipped the step that matters.
Because the carve-out fails if any element is missing, run it as a short sequence that keeps the two status questions apart from the question about outside law.
Section 9-404 shows the same design from another angle. It preserves the effectiveness of the Federal Trade Commission notice stating that the consumer's defenses and claims are preserved and assertable against an assignee, including a claim that would lead to affirmative recovery.18 Wherever Article 9 sets a commercial default between assignee and account debtor, ask first whether a consumer is involved and what outside law says about that consumer. Subsection (d) adds a limit of a different kind, aimed at one type of receivable.
Health-Care-Insurance Receivables
Subsection (d) is the shortest limit on the modification rule: “This section does not apply to an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable.”20 A health-care-insurance receivable is a type of account, and Article 9 defines it separately in its list of collateral types.21 The exclusion removes the whole section. Neither the good-faith condition nor the timing limits govern a change to the insurer's payment obligation. As the commentary puts it, the modification rule does not apply to modification of the obligation of the health care insurer, and “Other law addresses this issue.”22
This exclusion works differently from the consumer carve-out. Subsection (c) keeps § 9-405 in place and yields only if outside law supplies a different rule, so a court must find that law before it can decide. Subsection (d) operates by classification. Once the collateral is a health-care-insurance receivable, § 9-405 drops out. The court does not ask whether the change was made in good faith, and it does not divide the right to payment into earned and unearned parts.
Comment 2 to § 9-406 draws a similar line. The effect of notification on a person obligated on collateral, other than an account debtor on chattel paper, on accounts other than health-care-insurance receivables, or on payment intangibles, is governed by other law.23 A lender financing a health-care provider therefore cannot carry the notification analysis from the earlier sections over to the insurer's side of the transaction.
Classification decides that scene. The identity of the lender and the size of the change play no part. An exam stem that mentions a financer, an assignment, and a renegotiated payment term invites the full good-faith and timing analysis, so the first move is to ask what kind of right to payment was assigned.
The ordinary account runs through the rules taught earlier in this chapter, with the good-faith condition and the timing limits doing their work.24 The health-care exclusion gives no outcome of its own. It removes the Article 9 answer and sends the question elsewhere, so an answer to a health-care problem that applies the good-faith test has skipped the classification step.