Concept
The Good-Faith Modification Rule
Modification of the assigned contract
Modification of Assigned Contracts
The Good-Faith Modification Rule
An assignment transfers the right to payment and leaves the contract behind. The assignor and the account debtor remain the only parties to the underlying agreement, and commercial deals do not hold still: delivery dates slip, quantities shrink, prices are renegotiated, one product replaces another. Each change can shrink the right that the assignee took as collateral, and the assignee was not at the table when it was made.
UCC § 9-405(a) settles that conflict in favor of the contracting parties and then fences the choice in. A modification of or substitution for an assigned contract is effective against an assignee if made in good faith. The assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide that the modification or substitution is a breach of contract by the assignor. And the whole subsection is subject to subsections (b) through (d).1 Three parties recur below: the assignor, the seller or contractor who owns the right to payment and transfers it; the assignee, typically a financer or secured party who takes the right; and the account debtor, the buyer or customer who owes the payment.2
Freedom to modify matters because changes are customary in some settings, especially government contracts and complex arrangements such as construction contracts.3 An assignee that could veto each adjustment would hold up routine business decisions, while parties that could rewrite the deal without limit could shrink the very right the assignee relies on. Section 9-405(a) therefore protects assignees in three ways: it limits effective modifications to those made in good faith, it gives the assignee corresponding rights under the modified contract, and it recognizes that the modification may breach the assignor’s agreement with the assignee.4
Subsections (b) through (d) then cut the rule back. The timing limit in subsection (b) lets a good-faith modification bind the assignee to the extent that the right to payment has not been fully earned or that notification of the assignment has not been given to the account debtor.5 Further limits turn on the kind of account debtor and the kind of receivable, and later sections of this chapter take each limit in turn.6 Consumer account debtors show what to expect from such carve-outs. In the neighboring defenses provision, a separate consumer protection law that provides otherwise preempts the Article 9 rule, and § 9-404(d) preserves the effectiveness of the Federal Trade Commission notice under which a consumer’s defenses and claims remain assertable against an assignee, including a claim that would lead to affirmative recovery.7
The Good-Faith Requirement
The first sentence of § 9-405(a) supplies the test for whether a changed contract binds an assignee: the change is effective against the assignee if made in good faith.8 A modification alters terms of the existing agreement, such as price, quantity, or delivery date. A substitution replaces the assigned contract with a different one. Because the assignor and the account debtor are the only parties to that contract, the Code starts from the premise that they may change it, and it asks one question about how they did so.
Good faith carries most of the assignee’s protection because the other limits leave so much room. The timing limit lets a great many good-faith changes bind the assignee, since any right not yet fully earned by performance remains open to modification.9 Good faith is a qualification that leaves much room for modifications effective against assignees, and many assignees must rely on it for protection. In this setting it means “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”10
The definition has two halves, and each tests something different. Honesty in fact looks at what the parties actually knew and intended, so a change adopted to drain the assignee’s collateral fails it however plausible the paperwork looks. Reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing look outward, at whether the change is the kind of adjustment that parties in that line of business make for ordinary commercial reasons. The Code needs both because the contracting parties can shrink the assignee’s collateral without its participation. Honesty alone would excuse a sincere but commercially senseless giveaway, and commercial reasonableness alone would excuse a collusive reduction that happened to resemble a normal price adjustment. Requiring both separates a genuine adjustment from a sham.
The falling market gives the parties an ordinary commercial reason, so the cut satisfies both halves of the definition. The assignee’s own reliance can complicate that picture.
The bank would argue that it advanced funds against the full contract price, that Mayflower knew it, and that a cut leaving the advance exposed falls short of fair dealing even though a falling market supplies a reason.11 Mayflower’s knowledge bears most directly on honesty in fact, since a customer unaware of the bank’s reliance has little to be dishonest about. Whether the cut also meets reasonable commercial standards turns on facts that a trier of fact would weigh.
The far end of the spectrum appears in Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. B.C.B.U. The lessee there argued that it is anomalous to treat a cut of the lease amount to a dollar differently from a rescission, since the two differ little in financial terms. The court conceded the financial point but replied that such a cut could greatly affect a trier of fact’s assessment of good faith, because the section allows a good-faith modification and not just any modification the parties choose.12 Apply that reasoning to a cut to a nominal sum, made with knowledge of the assignment and with no change in the goods or the market to explain it. Such a cut fails both halves of the definition and does not bind the assignee. The court’s holding on rescission itself is taken up at the end of this section.
The current test is shorter than the one it replaced. In BAII Banking Corp. v. UPG, Inc. the court quoted former § 9-318(2), which made a modification effective against an assignee when it was made in good faith, in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, and without material adverse effect on the assignee’s rights under the contract or on the assignor’s ability to perform it.13 The reasonable-commercial-standards requirement survives inside the current definition of good faith. The separate bar on material adverse effect does not appear in the current text, so harm to the assignee does not by itself defeat a modification, though it may bear on whether the parties dealt honestly and fairly. That fits the economics of the problem: nearly every price reduction hurts the assignee, and a rule voiding every harmful change would leave the modification rule with little to do.
The protection also belongs only to an assignee. BAII asserted several bases for its claims against Falco, including rights as an assignee of Will. The court agreed that the former provision addresses cases in which the obligor and the assignor agree to changes that adversely affect an assignee’s rights, and then concluded that BAII was not an assignee of Will.14 A party that financed a seller but never took an assignment of the contract therefore gets nothing from § 9-405(a), however heavily it relied on the deal. The analysis starts by confirming an actual assignment and only then asks whether the modification was made in good faith.
Corresponding Rights Under the New Contract
The second sentence of § 9-405(a) completes the first: when a modification or substitution is effective against the assignee, the assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modified or substituted contract.16 The first sentence says what the assignee must accept, and the second says what it receives. The assignee’s collateral is a right to payment, and a contract creates that right, so when a change binds the assignee, the payment right changes with it. The assignee’s interest attaches to the right as the new deal defines it, and the assignee follows the performance into the new arrangement.17
The sentence does two jobs. It first keeps the assignment from collapsing when a contract is replaced. A substitution puts a new agreement in the place of the assigned one, and if the assignee’s interest stayed with the superseded agreement, the assignee would hold a claim under a contract that no longer exists. The first sentence would then bind the assignee to the change while leaving it nothing to enforce. It also sizes the assignee’s claim, and the word corresponding does that work: the assignee’s rights match what the new contract provides and extend no further. An assignee bound by a good-faith price reduction collects the reduced price, because the account debtor now owes only that amount and the assignee cannot hold a right larger than the one that exists.
The bank’s protection against an unwelcome cut lies in the good-faith test of the first sentence. A cut that passes the test leaves the bank with the lower figure, and a cut that fails it never binds the bank at all. The assignment may also declare the change a breach by Plank, the subject of the next subsection.
The same sentence covers a replacement contract as readily as an amendment, because it speaks of the modified or substituted contract. An amendment changes terms within the same agreement, while a substitution replaces the agreement itself. Either way a live contract obligates the account debtor to pay the assignor, and the assignee’s interest attaches to that obligation.
This premise, that a contract survives for the assignee to follow, explains why the court in Wells Fargo refused to treat rescission as a modification. It read the corresponding-rights sentence as speaking of the assignee’s rights after the change and so as “obviously contemplating the continued existence of the contract.”18 When a contract is canceled or rescinded, no rights remain that could pass to the assignee in place of those under the assigned agreement.19 A replacement contract leaves a payment obligation for the assignee’s interest to attach to, and a rescission leaves none, which is the difference the last subsection develops.
Breach Clause Against the Assignor
The third sentence of § 9-405(a) turns from the account debtor to the assignor: the assignment may provide that a modification or substitution is a breach of contract by the assignor.21 A contract assignment creates two relationships. One runs between the account debtor and the assignee, and the first two sentences of the subsection govern it by asking whether a good-faith change binds the assignee and what rights the assignee holds afterward. The other runs between the assignor and the assignee, and their own agreement governs it. The third sentence operates only on that second relationship, so an assignee may write into its agreement a promise that the assignor will not modify the assigned contract, or will do so only with the assignee’s consent.
The word may matters. Section 9-405(a) does not itself make any modification a breach. It recognizes that the assignor and the assignee can attach that consequence by agreement, and it leaves the effectiveness of the modification against the assignee to the good-faith test.22 An assignment that is silent on the point therefore gives the assignee no breach claim from the statute alone.
The Code keeps the two relationships apart because of who knows what. If violating a clause in the assignment could undo the modification, the account debtor would be exposed to a term in a private agreement that it never signed and often cannot see. A customer renegotiating a price in good faith would have to demand its supplier’s financing papers before every adjustment, or risk that the change would be disregarded. The first sentence of the subsection spares the account debtor that burden. The assignee stands differently: it chose its assignor, could examine the assignor’s business before taking the assignment, and can bargain over covenants and default remedies at the outset. The cost of an unwelcome modification therefore falls on the party that had the chance to bargain, and the assignee’s remedy is contractual and runs against the assignor.
An exam stem usually tests this sentence with one question: the assignor and the account debtor made a good-faith change, so what can the assignee do about it? The answer depends on two inquiries that do not control each other.
The first two sentences of subsection (a) settled the bank’s rights against Mayflower: the cut was made in good faith, so it binds the bank, and the bank’s rights correspond to the lower price. The breach clause adds a claim against Plank and nothing more, because it cannot reach back and restore the original price against Mayflower. The inquiries also run the other way, since a change that was not made in good faith fails against the assignee whatever the assignment says. The two questions can come out in all four combinations, and the usual error is to let one answer decide the other. A student either treats a violated no-modification term as making the change ineffective, or treats an effective change as proof that the assignor did nothing wrong.
With no clause to invoke, a good-faith change leaves Harbor nothing to sue on under § 9-405(a). Whatever recourse Harbor has depends on the other terms it negotiated.
The same logic appears when courts decide which terms of the underlying contract bind an assignee. One court held an assignee to an arbitration clause in an agreement between the account debtor and the assignor, reasoning that an assignee that did not want to arbitrate collection disputes could have contracted with the assignor to prevent it from entering into any agreement containing arbitration clauses.23 That decision concerns terms of the underlying contract and not later modifications, so the parallel is one of reasoning only. The lesson transfers all the same: an assignee’s protection against a term it dislikes is a covenant bargained for with the assignor.
Rescission Is Not Modification
The effectiveness rule in § 9-405(a) reaches a “modification of or substitution for” an assigned contract, and those words mark where the rule stops.25 A modification changes the terms of a contract that goes on living, and a substitution puts a different contract in its place. Rescission, which is also called cancellation, does neither: it undoes the agreement and releases the parties from further performance. Whether an account debtor and an assignor can invoke the good-faith modification rule when they take that more drastic step was the question in Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. B.C.B.U., and the court answered that they cannot.26
The assignee there was a bank claiming rent due under a computer-equipment lease, and the lessee defended on the ground that the parties to the lease had rescinded it.27 The lessee read § 9-405 to cover a rescission as well as a modification and so to make the rescission effective against the bank. The court held that cancelation of a contract cannot be said to be a “modification of” or “substitution for” the contract assigned, so cancelation of the lease was no defense for the lessee.28 The decision rests on two features of the statutory text, and each does separate work.
The first feature is vocabulary. Subsection (a) names two kinds of change, modification and substitution, and the court observed that the statute does not say the lease can be modified or rescinded; it says the lease can be modified.29 Reading rescission into a list that omits it would add a third category that the legislature did not include. The second feature is the sentence that follows the good-faith rule, which gives the assignee corresponding rights under the modified or substituted contract. The court read that sentence as “obviously contemplating the continued existence of the contract,” a premise that fails after a rescission because no rights remain that could pass to the assignee in place of those under the assigned agreement.30
The two features fit together because of how the statute protects the assignee. When a good-faith change binds the assignee, its interest moves from the old payment right to the corresponding right under the changed contract, so the protection works only when a changed contract exists to receive the interest. A price cut, a reduced quantity, and a replacement agreement each leave a payment obligation standing for the assignee’s interest to attach to, and a rescission leaves nothing. Treating rescission as a modification would also let the assignor and the account debtor remove the assignee’s collateral entirely, in one agreement, without the good-faith scrutiny that applies to every other change.
The lessee in Wells Fargo objected that this line produces an anomaly, since a party who cuts the lease amount to a dollar is treated differently from a party who rescinds, although the assignee ends up in the same financial position either way.31 The court granted the financial point, calling the functional difference between the two “nugatory in financial terms.” It then gave two answers. The first is that a cut to a dollar is less dangerous to the assignee than it looks, because the section allows only a good-faith modification, and a cut that drains the contract of value could greatly affect a trier of fact’s assessment of good faith.32 That answer connects to the nominal-sum cut discussed earlier: a drastic reduction made with knowledge of the assignment and no commercial explanation fails the honesty and fair-dealing test, so the statute already equips the assignee to resist the very result the lessee fears.
The second answer accepts whatever gap remains and assigns it to the legislature: “regardless of the reason the Legislature chose to differentiate between modification and rescission, it did.”33 The two answers do different jobs. The first narrows the anomaly by showing that the good-faith filter stands between an assignee and a collusive modification, and the second holds that a court may not erase a line the text draws, even if the difference across it is hard to defend in economic terms.
An exam stem in which the assignor and the account debtor “terminate” or “cancel” the contract after the assignment invites the lessee’s argument that termination is only a modification carried to its limit. The answer applies the text: rescission is neither a modification nor a substitution, the corresponding-rights sentence presupposes a surviving contract, and the rescission therefore does not defeat the assignee. The mirror-image error is to read the case as shielding the assignee from every change, when a good-faith amendment that leaves the contract in place still binds the assignee, who takes corresponding rights under the amended contract. A neighboring rule points the same way: an agreement to rescind does not amount to paying the assignor, as § 9-406 describes payment, so that route does not rescue the account debtor either.34