Concept
Agreements That Do Not Subordinate
Subordination (§ 9-339)
Agreements That Do Not Subordinate
Article 9 “does not preclude subordination by agreement by a person entitled to priority,” and the last five words carry the weight: the power to give up a ranking belongs to the claimant that the priority rules have already placed ahead.1 That claimant must make the agreement itself, because its rights cannot be adversely affected by an agreement to which it is not a party.2
Debtors and lenders who want a different order of priority sometimes reach for other documents. Two recur: a clause in the debtor’s security agreement that purports to waive the Article 9 priority rules, and a negative pledge, the debtor’s promise not to encumber or transfer the collateral. Each looks like an attempt to control priority, and each is signed by the debtor and a single creditor. Neither is signed by the claimant whose rank it would change, so neither subordinates anything.
One principle explains both results: only the holder of a ranking can surrender it. A debtor can bind itself and the creditor it deals with, but a ranking among creditors also concerns every other claimant to the same collateral, and those claimants have agreed to nothing. If a contract between a debtor and one lender could push the others back, no lender could rely on the position the priority rules gave it.
Waivers in the Security Agreement
Article 9 starts from freedom of contract, and that starting point is why a priority waiver looks plausible. Except as the Code otherwise provides, a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the debtor and the secured party,3 and it is effective against purchasers of the collateral as well.4 The parties may add “optional” provisions to those the Code requires, and a lender that wants first rank sometimes asks for one more: a clause declaring that its security interest has priority over every other claim, whatever the priority rules would otherwise say. The clause reads like the rest of the agreement, yet it does what the rest does not. It decides the position of creditors who never sat at the table.
The opening words of § 9-201(a) defeat the clause. “Except as otherwise provided” points to any overriding provision in Article 9 or another Article of the UCC. Section 9-317 subordinates unperfected security interests to lien creditors and certain buyers, and several provisions in Part 3, such as § 9-322, subordinate some security interests to other security interests and to interests of purchasers.5 The priority rules are overriding provisions of exactly this kind, and, as Comment 2 to § 9-201 indicates, a term waiving them is ineffective unless the affected third persons assent to it.6 Placing the term in a record called a security agreement does not extend it to outsiders.
The rule has a different reason on each side of the line. Between the two signers, enforcing the term costs no one outside the bargain: each agreed to it, and each could price it into the deal. Against a third person the logic reverses. Priority is a place in a line, and moving one lender forward moves every lender it passes back. The debtor gains new financing and the favored lender gains first rank, yet neither pays for the change; the cost falls on a creditor that advanced funds in reliance on its own position. The debtor holds rights in its collateral, but the places in line among its creditors belong to those creditors, so the debtor has no rank to hand over.
The clause and a § 9-339 agreement differ in one respect: who signed. In a § 9-339 agreement, the person entitled to priority has itself chosen to rank behind another claimant.7 In the bakery example, that person is Granite, and two parties with nothing to give are rearranging its place. Had Granite assented to the clause, or signed its own subordination agreement with Summit, Summit would rank first. Granite’s own consent would have turned the arrangement into subordination by the person entitled to priority.8
When an exam stem places a priority clause in a security agreement and asks who ranks first, the tempting answer treats the clause as controlling because Article 9 favors freedom of contract. The better first question is whose agreement the clause represents. If the signers are the debtor and the junior lender, the entitled creditor has agreed to nothing, and the default ranking stands.
Negative Pledge Covenants: Attachment Survives the Promise
A negative pledge is the debtor’s promise to one creditor that it will not give others an interest in particular property, or will not transfer its rights in that property at all. Article 9 gives the promise almost no force against anyone but the debtor. An agreement between the debtor and a secured party that prohibits the debtor from transferring its rights in the collateral, or makes the transfer a default, does not prevent the transfer from taking effect, and creating another security interest is one kind of transfer.10 Section 9-401(b) and its official comment, which label this situation the negative pledge covenant, say the same.11
Ridge’s remedy runs against the shop. A security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties who signed it, so the grant is a default that Ridge may act on.12 Two reasons support denying the promise any reach over Cobalt. A private promise should not control the property rights of a stranger to it. And the first lender to extract the promise could otherwise freeze the collateral for every other lender, however much value remained after its own debt was covered. Article 9 starts from the opposite premise: the debtor should be free to create a security interest in its assets even when a contract, or the rules governing that type of asset, say the debtor cannot transfer its rights in them.13
The same rule governs a transfer the debtor does not choose. Suppose a debtor gives a secured party a security interest in inventory worth $200,000 to secure a $100,000 debt, a financing statement is duly filed, and the security agreement prohibits any transfer of the debtor’s interest in the inventory. A judgment creditor then levies on units of that inventory. The levy takes effect despite the prohibition and reaches the debtor’s equity, here $100,000, but only the equity, because the judgment creditor’s interest is subordinate to the secured party’s prior perfected security interest.14 The prohibition could not stop the levy, and the priority rules decided how much the judgment creditor could take.
Negative Pledge Clauses: The Promise Does Not Move the Ranking
A covenant that cannot stop a transfer cannot reorder the creditors either. In the lathe example, Ridge ranks first only if the priority rules put it first, and the covenant contributes nothing to that result. The levy example shows the same thing: the secured party’s protection against the judgment creditor came from its earlier perfected interest and not from the prohibition.16 The covenant gives its holder a contract remedy against the debtor and moves no one in the line.
Calling an arrangement a negative pledge also settles nothing about how Article 9 treats it. The definition of “security interest” in § 1-201(b)(35) is broad, and because it applies to any transaction that “regardless of its form” creates a security interest, parties will find it difficult or impossible to create a transaction with the economic characteristics of a security interest that the law treats as something else.17 The test is substance, not label. The Part 3 rules the sources describe rank security interests against one another and against lien creditors and buyers; a debtor’s promise about its own conduct is a different kind of thing, enforceable between the debtor and the covenantee as a contract term.
A change in ranking therefore needs the agreement of the creditor entitled to priority.18
The company’s promise produced a default and left the line of creditors where it was. Delta’s signature moved the line, because Delta held the better position and chose to give it up, which is the agreement § 9-339 leaves effective.19 A debtor’s covenant governs the debtor’s conduct; a creditor’s agreement governs the creditor’s rank.