Concept
Ordinary Building Materials
Fixture status and Article 9 coverage
Ordinary Building Materials
A supplier delivers a truckload of lumber to a construction site on credit and takes a signed security agreement covering it. Within weeks the carpenters have built the lumber into the frame of a house. Does the supplier still hold a security interest in it? Section 9-334(a) says no, and it says so in terms of existence, not priority: "A security interest does not exist under this article in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land."1 The sentence before it brings fixtures, and goods that become fixtures, inside Article 9. This sentence marks where that coverage stops. Because no interest exists, no care in drafting the security agreement can create one.
Two things must be true before the exclusion applies. The collateral must be ordinary building material, such as the lumber and brick consumed in putting up a structure, and it must have been incorporated into an improvement on land, meaning built into a building or other structure. If either element is missing, the exclusion does not apply.
The incorporation requirement matters because the same board changes its legal character over time. Lumber and bricks are personal property when they are delivered to a building site. Once they are used to construct the building, they become part of it and are no longer personal property, nor are they fixtures.2 That is why they fall outside Article 9. The Article reaches an "interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation,"3 and it was drafted as a comprehensive scheme for security interests in personal property and fixtures.4 Lumber built into a wall is neither. The point also ties back to the definition at the start of this chapter. The Code lists fixtures among the things that count as goods,5 so a fixture still carries some chattel character, and incorporated building materials have none left. A student who calls built-in lumber a fixture and then asks how the lender ranks against a mortgagee has skipped the threshold question, because there is no security interest to rank.
Three points on a spectrum are worth keeping straight, from the most chattel-like to the least:
- Goods that stay goods, such as a free-standing refrigerator or stove, never take on any aspect of real property and remain ordinary personal property.6
- Fixtures, such as an oven or dishwasher incorporated into kitchen cabinetry, an air conditioner built into a window, or a furnace or other heating unit, are the intermediate class. Real property law claims them, but a security interest may still exist in them.7
- Building materials so intimately associated with the real property that they are neither personal property nor fixtures fall outside Article 9, and other law governs disputes over them.8
A practical way to sort the second point from the third is to ask whether the item keeps an identity of its own after installation. A built-in dishwasher is still a dishwasher. It can be disconnected and carried out of the house as the same appliance that came in. A sheet of drywall that has been hung, taped, and painted cannot be removed as drywall, because pulling it off the studs leaves scrap and a damaged wall. That contrast explains why the Code can preserve chattel financing for the appliance and refuse it for the drywall. It also guards against a common slip: a furnace is built into the house, but it stays on the fixture side of the line, so calling it a building material is an error.
The exclusion removes the supplier's Article 9 protection once the goods are built in. When the collateral is building material that has become so intimately associated with the real property that it is no longer personal property or a fixture, Article 9 does not apply and other law governs the priority dispute.9 A supplier whose lumber has gone into the walls therefore has to look to real property law, and a filing under Article 9 will not help it.
The building-materials classification came up in Yeadon Fabric Domes, Inc. v. Maine Sports Complex, LLC, a dispute over a dome and its equipment. Had the dome and equipment been ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land, no security interest could have existed in them. But an earlier forcible entry and detainer proceeding, an action over possession of land, had found that the dome with its equipment was a fixture. Harriman and Kiser had been permitted to intervene in that proceeding, so the court held that its finding bound them.10 The lesson is about how the classification fight is won and lost. Moving an item from fixture to building material would eliminate the security interest, but a party that has already lost the fixture question in a proceeding it joined cannot reopen it. The case turns on that binding effect and offers no test for what counts as a building material.
Materials that have been delivered but not yet used stay on the other side of the line. Suppose a builder works most of a delivered supply of lumber into a structure and leaves the rest stacked unused on the lot. The incorporated lumber is no longer personal property and cannot be the subject of a security interest. It is too integrated into the structure to be a fixture, so it became part of the real estate.11 The stacked lumber is still personal property that was delivered to a site,12 so the exclusion has not reached it. The event that matters is incorporation, and one security agreement can therefore yield different results for boards that arrived on the same truck. The continuation rule in the first sentence of § 9-334(a) does not save the interest in the framed lumber, because it protects goods that become fixtures, and lumber built into walls has become neither goods nor a fixture.13
Step one decides most problems, because the timing of incorporation determines whether the exclusion can apply at all.