Concept
The Knowledge Requirement
Purchaser of chattel paper: other security interests
The Knowledge Requirement
The last condition in § 9-330(b) asks what the purchaser knew: it must act "without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party."1 The other conditions look at what the purchaser did or how it does business. It gave new value, took possession or control, and dealt in good faith in the ordinary course. Knowledge is also the one condition that subsection (a) leaves out.2 When the earlier lender claims more than proceeds, a purchaser that meets the first four conditions can therefore still lose on what it knew. A purchaser facing a mere proceeds claim meets no actual-knowledge test, although, as the second half of this section shows, a legend on the paper can still defeat it.
The statute's wording does most of the work. It asks about knowledge that the purchase violates the secured party's rights, and it does not ask about knowledge that the paper is encumbered.3 Two questions follow. What counts as knowledge of a violation, and when does the paper itself settle the matter? Knowledge is a fact about the purchaser's mind, and an earlier lender can rarely prove what a financer's staff actually knew. The statute therefore pairs an actual-knowledge test with an objective shortcut, the legend, and the two subsections below take them in that order.
Knowledge of a Violation
Subsection (b) makes a violation the object of the knowledge. The question is what the purchaser knew about the effect of this purchase on the earlier lender, not whether it knew that a lender existed.4 The standard has two features: the knowledge must be actual, and it must concern a violation rather than the bare existence of a security interest.
The first feature keeps suspicion from counting. Article 1 defines knowledge as actual knowledge, so a transaction can look somewhat suspicious and the purchaser still acts "without knowledge."5 The purchaser also need not search the filing records. Comment 6 to § 9-330 says that a purchaser of chattel paper is not required, as a matter of good faith, to search for prior security interests.6 A standard that charged the purchaser with whatever a search would have shown would reintroduce the burden the Comment disclaims. The purchaser's priority turns on what it in fact knew when it bought, not on what it might have learned.
The second feature rests on what a financing statement can tell a purchaser. A filing suggests that the debtor may have granted the lender an interest in the paper, but it does not show that the lender has forbidden this sale. An inventory lender may well expect the dealer to sell the chattel paper and remit the proceeds against the loan.7 A purchaser that knows only that the lender holds an interest knows something consistent with an ordinary sale. A purchaser that knows the sale breaches the dealer's obligations to the lender knows something different, because by buying anyway it joins in the breach. Comment 6 draws the same line: it is not enough to subordinate a purchaser that has merely seen a financing statement covering the paper.8
The cleanest application is a purchaser that saw the filing and nothing more. A lender takes a security interest in all of a dealer's chattel paper, and the dealer sells some of it to a purchaser that gives new value, takes possession, and acts in good faith in the ordinary course of its business. The purchaser has seen the lender's financing statement listing the chattel paper as collateral but knows nothing else about the arrangement between the lender and the dealer. It takes free of the lender's security interest.9 The lender claims the paper itself, so subsection (b) governs and the knowledge condition is live, yet the purchaser passes it because the filing establishes only that the interest exists.
The result reverses when the document says more. A purchaser that sees a statement in a financing statement to the effect that a purchase of chattel paper from the debtor would violate the filed secured party's rights has the knowledge the condition describes.10 The first filing identified the paper as collateral. This one adds the single fact that matters, that the purchase itself is forbidden. A financing statement is only one possible source of that knowledge, because the condition asks what the purchaser actually knew and does not confine where the knowledge may come from.
Suspicion short of that stays on the safe side of the line. A purchaser that wonders whether the dealer is quietly shopping its paper, with nothing in hand confirming a prohibition, lacks actual knowledge.11 The other conditions, including good faith, still apply to it.
The present wording is also kinder to purchasers than the wording it replaced. Under former § 9-308, a buyer facing a claim that reached beyond proceeds had to act without knowledge that the specific paper was subject to a security interest, while a buyer facing a proceeds-only claim took free even with that knowledge.12 Under subsection (b), a purchaser may know that the specific paper is subject to a security interest and still prevail, so long as it does not know that its purchase will violate the secured party's rights.13
Article 9 draws the same line elsewhere, and the parallels illustrate the logic even though they govern different transactions. A buyer in ordinary course fails to qualify only if it knows that the sale is in violation of the security interest, and a lender with an inventory interest normally intends the debtor to be able to sell.14 In one illustration, a retailer's security agreement prohibited sales to other retailers who might resell at a discount, and a buyer who knew of that prohibition and bought anyway took subject to the security interest.15 A nonexclusive licensee in the ordinary course, who takes without knowledge that the license violates another's rights, takes free of the licensor's security interests even when they are perfected and the licensee knows of them.16 The purchaser that saw only a filing resembles the buyer or licensee that merely knows of a security interest, and the purchaser that read a prohibition resembles the buyer that knows the sale breaks the security agreement.
The Legend Rule
Subsection (f) of § 9-330 turns what the paper shows into a conclusion about what the purchaser knows. If the authoritative copies of the record evidencing chattel paper or an instrument indicate that it has been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, the purchaser has knowledge that its purchase violates that secured party's rights.18 The previous subsection treated knowledge as a fact about this purchaser, proved by what it learned before buying. Subsection (f) stops asking that question. Once the indication appears, the knowledge condition fails, and testimony about what the purchaser's staff read or understood cannot reopen it, because the legend is conclusive proof of knowledge.19
The rule rests on the possession-or-control condition. Subsection (b) already requires the purchaser to take possession of each authoritative tangible copy and to obtain control of each authoritative electronic copy, so the records that subsection (f) examines are the records the purchaser must hold to claim priority at all.20 Comment 6 adds that for tangible paper the indication normally takes the form of a written legend.21 The earlier lender gains a safe harbor, because an inventory lender that stamps the paper to show assignment to itself subordinates the purchaser's claim without proving what any individual at the purchaser knew.22 A purchaser holding unmarked paper, with no other actual signal of a violation, can buy without searching the records.23
Stamped-paper problems often end with the purchaser insisting that nobody noticed the stamp, and the next example shows why the insistence fails.
Take the legend away and the analysis returns to the actual-knowledge test. If the contracts bear no marking and the only signal is a filed financing statement listing chattel paper as collateral, subsection (f) is silent, and a purchaser that has merely seen the filing still lacks knowledge that its purchase violates anything, because Comment 6 treats seeing a financing statement as insufficient to subordinate the purchaser.24 That purchaser can still qualify for priority under subsection (b) if it meets the other conditions.
The identity of the named assignee matters as much as the presence of a marking. A dealer that stamps contracts 'Assigned to Redwood Finance' because it has agreed to sell them to Redwood has not given Redwood knowledge of any violation, since the statute reaches only an assignment to an identified secured party other than the purchaser.25 A legend naming a rival claimant warns the purchaser that someone else holds rights in the paper, while a legend naming the purchaser identifies no rival at all. Redwood's knowledge is then tested by what it actually knew.
The legend also does its work under subsection (a), by a different route. Subsection (a) contains no knowledge condition, but it conditions the purchaser's priority over a proceeds-only claim on the paper not indicating that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser.26 A legend therefore defeats the purchaser however the earlier lender's claim is classified, so a lender that marks its paper does not need to win the argument over whether its claim goes beyond proceeds.27 Subsection (f) also reaches instruments. A purchaser of an instrument under subsection (d) is charged with the same knowledge when the instrument shows an assignment to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, as when a note bears notice of a prior assignment.28
Students often answer a stamped-paper problem by arguing that the purchaser lacked actual knowledge, or by asking first whether the lender's claim goes beyond proceeds. Neither argument helps the purchaser, because the legend supplies the knowledge as a matter of law and defeats the purchaser under either subsection.