Concept
Why the Purchaser's Knowledge Does Not Matter
Purchaser of chattel paper: proceeds claim
Why the Purchaser's Knowledge Does Not Matter
A purchaser of chattel paper can know that the dealer's inventory lender holds a security interest and still take priority over that lender. Section 9-330(a) produces this result by what it omits. It lists what a purchaser must show to prevail over a lender whose claim to the paper is merely as proceeds of inventory, and knowledge of the lender is not on the list.1 The first paragraph requires good faith, the ordinary course of the purchaser's business, new value, and possession or control of the authoritative copies.2 The second requires that the authoritative copies not indicate an assignment to an identified assignee other than the purchaser.3 Neither paragraph asks what the purchaser knew.
The standard floor-plan illustration shows the rule at work. Financer B knew that financer A was financing the dealer's inventory, yet B had priority in the buyer's security agreement over A's claim to it as proceeds of inventory. A kept only a claim to the proceeds of the dealer's sale of the paper to B.4 The rule reaches further than knowing that a lender exists: a purchaser that meets the conditions takes free even if it knows that the sale violates the lender's rights.5 The two kinds of knowledge differ. A purchaser may know that a security interest exists without knowing that any particular sale violates it, and a lender that expects its dealer to sell paper may have no complaint about a given sale. Subsection (a) makes neither fact a bar to priority.
The history shows what changed. Under former § 9-308, a buyer against whom the original secured creditor had only a proceeds claim took free if it gave new value and took possession in the ordinary course of business, even if it knew that the specific paper was subject to a security interest.6 Section 9-330 expands the purchaser's rights further. The purchaser may take free even when it knows that its purchase may violate the prior secured creditor's rights, and the only restriction on its knowledge is the requirement of good faith. The revision also gave the lender something in return. If the lender stamps the chattel paper to show that it has been assigned to the lender, the purchaser's claim is subordinated.7 The two changes point in opposite directions and work as a pair.
Business practice explains why the law tolerates a purchaser's knowledge. Many inventory lenders are content to protect their first-priority interest in the inventory itself. They expect that someone else will finance the receivables created when the inventory sells, and the cash from that financing often pays off the inventory loan.8 A financer that buys the dealer's paper is doing what such a lender expected someone to do, so awareness that the lender exists says little about wrongdoing. The legend supplies the second reason. A lender that wants to keep its priority can mark the paper, and the mark subordinates the purchaser, so the law does not need a knowledge test to protect the lender.
Examiners exploit the instinct that knowledge costs priority. A purchaser that searched the filing office before buying has learned of the lender, and under subsection (a) that discovery does not defeat it.
A second purchaser in the same market shows where the limit lies.
The two credit companies differ in what they did, not in what they knew. The first learned that a lender existed, and that is information. The second helped hide the contracts from the lender, and that is dishonesty. Good faith is the one condition in subsection (a) that speaks to a purchaser's state of mind, and a purchaser that joins the dealer's diversion does not meet it.9 Knowledge alone never costs the purchaser priority under subsection (a); bad faith can.
Subsection (b) governs the lender whose claim is something more than a proceeds claim, and there a knowledge requirement returns: the purchaser must act without knowledge that the purchase violates the secured party's rights.10 A legend on the paper is conclusive proof of that knowledge, so the legend protects the lender under either subsection, while the lack-of-knowledge requirement appears only under subsection (b).11