Concept
Security Interest Created by the Seller
Buyer in ordinary course of business
Security Interest Created by the Seller
Section 9-320(a) frees a buyer in ordinary course of business from only one kind of lien: “a security interest created by the buyer's seller.” The buyer takes free even when that interest is perfected and even when the buyer knows it exists,1 and the buyer takes free of an unperfected interest as well.2 The phrase “the buyer's seller” makes the lien condition a question about the history of the goods, because the interest must have come from the person who sold to this buyer, which is to say the debtor.3 A buyer can satisfy every other element of the definition and still lose here. The subsections that follow take up the other elements: whether the seller deals in goods of that kind, what the buyer knew, and whether the buyer made a true purchase.
The default rule shows why the source of the lien matters. When a debtor sells collateral without the secured party's authorization, the security interest continues in the collateral in the buyer's hands unless the buyer takes free under some other provision of Article 9, and the interest also attaches to the proceeds.4 Section 9-320(a) is one such provision, and its reach stops at the debtor's own customers. An inventory lender normally intends its debtor to be able to sell the inventory free and clear,5 so a lien that a dealer created on its own stock gives way to the dealer's customers. That intention runs between a lender and its own debtor. A dealer who bought the goods from someone else's debtor was never the lender's debtor, and the lien that the earlier owner granted stays on the goods. Article 9 marked a substantial departure from the separate pre-Code security regimes that varied widely among the states,6 and on this point it draws the line at the identity of the debtor, not at the innocence of the buyer.
B takes subject to M's security interest. M's interest was created by A, an earlier owner, and not by Y, the dealer who sold to B.7 The chain runs from A to Y to B, and the only link that counts under § 9-320(a) is the last one, between B and the seller who delivered the goods. M's interest survived the sale from A to Y because M never authorized it, and nothing later in the chain removed the lien.8
Bank N, B's own lender, takes subject to M's interest as well. A person who takes a security interest is not a buyer in ordinary course, but a lender that takes a security interest in collateral bought by a buyer in ordinary course takes free of any other security interest that the buyer cut off.9 B cut off nothing here, so N has nothing to inherit. Article 9's double-debtor priority rule points the same way: when a debtor creates a security interest in collateral that it acquired subject to an earlier lender's interest, the later lender ranks behind the earlier one even if it filed first and even if its interest is a purchase-money security interest. The ranking follows who could have protected itself. The later lender could have investigated the source of the collateral and found the earlier filing before it advanced funds, while the earlier lender had no reason to search the filings against anyone but its own debtor.10
A second chain puts a retailer in the middle. In one illustration, SP-1 held a security interest in Manufacturer's inventory and had not consented to the disposition of items to Retailer. Retailer therefore did not qualify as a buyer in ordinary course as to those items and took them subject to SP-1's interest. Retailer then sold one item to Buyer, who qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course from Retailer. Buyer still takes subject to SP-1's interest, because the rule protects a buyer only from security interests created by the buyer's own seller, and Manufacturer, not Retailer, created this one.11
A buyer who loses on the lien condition may look to the entrustment rule of Article 2 for a second route. Under § 2-403(2), any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives the merchant power to transfer all of the entruster's rights to the goods, and to transfer the goods free of any interest of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business. The official comment describes a single principle that protects persons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory, and that principle runs through §§ 2-403, 2A-305, 7-205, and 9-320.12
A trade-in produced the problem in a motor-home case, where a dealer sold a used motor home to a good-faith purchaser while the motor home was still subject to a security interest granted by the previous owner, who had traded it in to the dealer. The court correctly held that § 9-307(1), the predecessor of § 9-320, frees a buyer in ordinary course only from interests granted by its seller, here the dealer. Section 2-403 did not help, because the secured party had never entrusted the motor home to the dealer, and the purchaser took subject to the interest. The purchaser's own lender would have done no better. If the purchaser had bought on credit, that lender's interest would generally have ranked behind the previous owner's, even if it was a purchase-money security interest, which is the “double-debtor” priority problem that § 9-325 addresses.13
The entrustment argument succeeds when the secured party's own conduct supplies the missing link. In one illustration, Manufacturer sells equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment, and Buyer later buys from Dealer. On those facts the lien came from Manufacturer and not from Dealer, so § 9-320(a) alone would not free Buyer. But Lender learned of the sale and did nothing to assert its security interest, and that acquiescence amounts to an entrusting of the goods to Dealer within § 2-403(3). Buyer therefore takes free under § 2-403(2) if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course of business.14 The two cases differ in the secured party's conduct: in one the lender stood by while the dealer took the goods, and in the other it never entrusted them.
Goods that return to a seller after a credit sale raise the same condition. An inventory secured party and a secured party with an interest in the chattel paper or account may each claim the returned goods. If the seller resells them to a second buyer who is a buyer in ordinary course, that buyer is fully protected against both claimants.15 Each claimant's interest runs back to the seller, who is also the second buyer's seller, and that is why the buyer takes free of both.
Seller Must Deal in Such Goods
The definition of a buyer in ordinary course of business covers only a buyer “from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind,” and for that reason § 9-320(a) applies primarily to a buyer of inventory.17 Most sellers sort at a glance: a jeweler sells jewels, a haberdasher sells clothes, an automobile dealer sells automobiles, and an appliance dealer sells appliances.18 The hard case is the seller whose primary business is something else, such as renting automobiles, but who occasionally sells them.19
The condition fits the footing of the rule. An inventory lender normally intends its debtor to sell the inventory free and clear,20 and the customers who buy from a dealer's stock are the buyers that intention covers. A buyer who gets goods from a seller that does not sell them for a living stands outside that intention, and the definition sends such a buyer to other rules.
Only the seller's business counts. The buyer's own line of work does not disqualify it, and the only buyer excluded by the character of its business is a pawnbroker.21 A buyer of a car from an automobile dealer is a buyer in ordinary course and takes free of a security interest the dealer gave its lender, and the same rule may apply when one dealer buys from another, since dealers frequently sell cars to other dealers.22 Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc. shows the second point. Du Page was in the business of selling aircraft and sold a Cessna 414 to Skyways, which was itself an aircraft dealer, while Cessna Finance held a security interest in the plane. The court rejected Cessna Finance's argument that Skyways' dealer status kept it from being a buyer in the ordinary course of Du Page's business. Skyways bought in good faith and without knowing of the restriction on sale in Cessna Finance's mortgage, so it took the aircraft free of the interest.23
The condition fails when the seller sells the goods outside any business of selling them. A buyer of a car that a repair garage, which was not an auto dealer, used as equipment is not ordinarily a buyer in ordinary course and takes subject to a perfected security interest created by the garage.24 The same reasoning has been applied to a company in the business of renting cars that from time to time replaced its fleet and sold the old cars.25 In a New York case involving Andy's Car Rental System, Inc., the Appellate Division refused to find the rental agency “in the business of selling goods of that kind,” even though its cars were classified as inventory under § 9-102.26 Contrary authority holds that a car-leasing company that from time to time sells leased cars is in the business of selling cars and can confer title free of a security interest on a buyer in ordinary course.27 Inventory also reaches beyond goods that a store holds for retail sale: in Fordyce Bank and Trust Co. v. Bean Timberland, Inc., timber cut and sold to mills produced a buyer in the ordinary course of business.28
The Code's classes of goods help with the question but do not settle it. The classes are mutually exclusive: the same property cannot be both equipment and inventory at the same time, and goods change class as they change hands, so a radio is inventory in a dealer's hands and consumer goods in a consumer's.29 Whether the goods were inventory in the seller's hands is therefore a strong first clue that the seller deals in goods of that kind. The rental-agency decision marks the limit of the clue, because the cars there were inventory and the seller was still outside the condition.30
A buyer who fails this condition is not necessarily lost, but any rescue comes from a different rule with different conditions. In one illustration, Farmer Jones sold a tractor to Farmer Brown, who paid in full on February 2. Second State Bank, which had made a loan to Jones, filed a financing statement on February 3, and Brown took delivery on February 4. Jones defaulted on February 5. The bank prevails, because Brown took possession only after the bank perfected, and had Brown received possession before the bank filed, Brown could have kept the tractor.31 The result turns on the dates of delivery and filing and not on ordinary-course status.
Good Faith and Knowledge
The text of § 9-320(a) and the definition of a buyer in ordinary course appear to conflict about knowledge. The subsection frees the buyer “even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence,”33 yet the definition denies protection to a buyer who knows that the sale violates a third party's rights.34 Read together, the two texts distinguish two kinds of knowledge. The buyer fails to qualify only if it knows that the sale is “in violation” of the security interest.35 The official comment states the combined rule:
Reading the definition together with the rule of law results in the buyer's taking free if the buyer merely knows that a security interest covers the goods but taking subject if the buyer knows, in addition, that the sale violates a term in an agreement with the secured party.36
The line falls there because of how inventory lending works. A lender with a security interest in inventory normally intends the debtor to be able to sell it free and clear, so a buyer can know of a security interest and believe, consistently, that the sale does not violate it.37
Two buyers in the same position show the line. Retailer gave a manufacturer a security interest in its inventory, and the security agreement prohibited sales to other retailers who might buy in order to resell at a discount. Another retailer knew of the prohibition and bought some of the inventory anyway. That buyer takes subject to the security interest.38 Change one fact, so that the buying retailer knows only that the manufacturer has a security interest in the stock and knows nothing of the prohibition, and the buyer takes free, because a buyer who merely knows that a security interest covers the goods is not disqualified.39 The Skyways decision draws the same line in an aircraft sale. Skyways bought the Cessna 414 in good faith and without knowing that the sale violated any security interest held by Cessna Finance, and it did not know of the restriction on sale in Cessna Finance's mortgage, so it took the aircraft free.40
The disqualifying knowledge must be knowledge of a violation that exists, so a restriction that the secured party has waived disqualifies no one. A sale that the secured party authorizes ends its security interest under § 9-315(a)(1). The authorization may be express, or it may be implied from conduct, as where the debtor repeatedly made sales of the same kind of collateral that the secured party knew about and never objected to. A secured party may also be deemed, by words or conduct, to have waived a term of the security agreement that prohibits sale, and consent may arise through waiver and estoppel.41
The secured party cannot change this outcome by drafting. A term in a security agreement that waives Article 9's priority rules does not bind affected third persons unless they assent.42 A clause declaring that no buyer from the debtor will take free therefore binds the debtor, and it reaches a buyer only through the buyer's own knowledge that a sale violates it. For the same reason a public filing does not defeat the buyer, because the subsection frees the buyer even from a perfected interest.43
Good faith is a separate element, and what it adds beyond the knowledge test is unclear.44 It matters most when something other than the lien clouds the buyer's conduct: a buyer of trees that knowingly tendered a check that bounced would face a question of good faith under § 1-201(b)(9).45 A merchant buyer must also meet a higher standard on imputed knowledge, so a sale between dealers deserves a closer look than a retail sale. Even so, the disqualifying knowledge is knowledge that the sale violates a third party's rights, and knowing only that a third party has some interest is not enough.46
A True Purchase
The buyer in a buyer in ordinary course must actually buy. The definition accepts cash, an exchange of other property such as a trade-in, and secured or unsecured credit, and it lets the buyer receive goods or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale.48 It excludes a transfer in bulk, as where one business is sold to another, and a transfer as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.49 A person who takes a security interest is therefore not a buyer in ordinary course, and neither is a person who takes collateral in satisfaction of a debt.50
The exclusions share a single requirement: the buyer must give some form of new value.51 A foreclosing creditor does not qualify, and neither does a buyer who simply takes the goods in exchange for satisfaction or forgiveness of a debt, total or partial.52 The Article 2 rule on good-faith purchasers asks only that the purchaser give value, while the buyer-in-ordinary-course provision restricts the allowable consideration.53 A donee, who gives nothing, receives no protection from Article 9 at all, and the secured party prevails against the donee even if it never perfected.54
Two versions of one truck transaction mark the line. In the first, Seller-Dealer owed Contractor money from prior dealings and transferred a truck to Contractor in satisfaction of the debt. Contractor is not a buyer in ordinary course and takes the truck subject to the security interest that Creditor perfected. In the second, Contractor purchased a truck from Seller-Dealer partly for cash, partly through a trade-in of an older truck, and partly by cancelling a debt that Seller-Dealer owed Contractor, and Contractor is a buyer in ordinary course of business.55 The second transaction is a sale in which cash and a trade-in bring new value to the dealer and the cancelled debt is one component of the payment. In the first, nothing new changes hands.
The exclusion of persons who take a security interest does not leave a buyer's own financer unprotected. A lender that takes a security interest in collateral bought by a buyer in ordinary course takes free of any other security interest that the buyer cut off.56 The lender takes the buyer's rights in the goods, and those rights are already free of the dealer's lender's interest. A customer who finances a car through a bank thus passes freedom from the dealer's inventory lender through to that bank. The benefit reaches only as far as the buyer's own freedom reaches, which is why the lender in the earlier chain, B's Bank N, took subject to M's interest along with B.
A buyer who fails the definition is not out of the contest. The next step is to classify its status, which may be a purchaser for value who took delivery without knowledge of the security interest under § 9-317(b), a buyer in ordinary course under § 9-320(a), or a casual buyer under § 9-320(b), and the priority rules for that status then decide who wins.57 One rule limits even a losing buyer's exposure. When a buyer not in ordinary course takes subject to a security interest because it cannot take free under § 9-317(b), it still takes free of the interest that secures a later advance if the secured party made the advance with knowledge of the purchase or 45 days or more after it. The buyer remains subject to the advance if the secured party made it, or committed to make it, without knowledge of the purchase and before the 45 days ended.58