Concept
Cross-Collateralization
Future advances
Cross-Collateralization
A lender can build two separate permissions from § 9-204 into one security agreement. The after-acquired property clause attaches the security interest to items the debtor acquires rights in after the agreement is signed, so long as those items fall within the collateral description.1 The future-advances clause lets the collateral secure advances made later, as well as obligations owed at signing.2 A well-drafted version of each in the same agreement provides for cross-collateralization of all the debtor's obligations to that secured party: every present and future debt stands behind every item of present and future collateral.3
Lenders want both clauses because a financed business changes along two lines at once. Its assets turn over as inventory is sold and replaced, and its borrowing grows as it draws more credit. The after-acquired clause keeps the collateral current along the first line, and the future-advances clause keeps the secured debt current along the second. Together they let present and future advances, often called revolving credit, be secured by present and after-acquired inventory or accounts, an arrangement known as a floating lien.4
The two clauses answer two separate questions of contract construction. First, does the security interest attach to collateral of the described type that the debtor acquires rights in after the agreement is authenticated? Second, does it secure obligations that arise after the agreement is authenticated?5 Each clause answers one question and leaves the other open, as a hypothetical shows.
The four results form a grid with two axes. The collateral axis asks which assets are in the pool, and only the after-acquired clause moves it from the dresser alone to the dresser and the chest. The debt axis asks which obligations the pool supports, and only the future-advances clause moves it from $10,000 to $15,000. A clause on one axis cannot do the other's work: an agreement that secures all obligations owed now or later has not reached the chest, and an agreement that reaches later-acquired goods has not secured the $5,000 loan.
Each clause also has limits of its own. On the collateral side, the clause attaches the interest only to items within the collateral description, so a description limited to goods would not reach accounts the debtor later acquires. Section 9-204(b) adds two statutory limits. An after-acquired clause does not attach the interest to a commercial tort claim that arises after the agreement is authenticated, and it does not attach to consumer goods, other than an accession, unless the debtor acquires rights in them within 10 days after the secured party gives value.6 Those limits shrink the pool of assets without touching the question of which debts the pool secures.
Cross-collateralization settles only what the lender's own security covers. How a later asset or a later advance ranks against another claimant to the same property is a separate question. The rest of this section takes it up claimant by claimant: other secured parties, lien creditors, buyers and lessees, and the bankruptcy estate.
Competing Secured Parties
Between two secured parties, the date of an advance does not control the ranking; the date of the earliest filing or perfection does. If future advances are made while a security interest is perfected by filing or possession, the interest that has priority under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule has the same priority for those advances.8 Under § 9-322, the priority of each advance relates back to the time of the original filing,9 and Official Comment 3 to § 9-323 confirms that in most cases the time an advance is made is immaterial.10
Old Bank files against the debtor on July 1, and New Bank files on August 1. On October 1, New Bank makes a nonpurchase-money advance against certain collateral, before Old Bank has lent anything. Old Bank has priority anyway: its place in line was fixed by its July 1 filing, not by the date of any advance it makes later.11 A line of credit works the same way. A creditor that files and then lets the debtor draw periodically holds its original filing priority for each draw, and § 9-323(a) does not come into play because the draws were perfected by a prior filing.12
The rule fits what a filing does. A financing statement is effective to cover security agreements that did not exist, and were not contemplated, when the notice was filed, and it perfects as to future advances whether or not it mentions them.13 A later lender that checks the record therefore finds a notice that already reaches loans not yet made, so the date of a later advance tells it nothing the filing had not already told it. One detail of the filing deserves a note: the debtor's name. For collateral held in a trust that is a registered organization, the registered-organization rules control the name. Otherwise the name is the one in the trust's organic record or, if that record gives none, the name of the settlor or testator.14
Two details that look important turn out not to be. Whether the earlier filer was obliged to make the later advance is immaterial in a contest between voluntary secured parties, so a committed advance and an optional one rank alike.15 The commitment distinction matters against lien creditors and buyers, discussed below. And the rule ranks advances that are secured without making any advance secured: the future-advances provisions apply only when the security agreement states that the interest secures obligations arising later.16
One narrow exception dates priority from the advance itself. If an advance is made while the secured party's interest is perfected only automatically (as under § 9-309) or temporarily (as under § 9-312(e), (f), or (g)), and the secured party has taken no other perfection step, the advance has priority from the date it is made.17 The exception disappears if the secured party has made a binding commitment to give value while perfected by some other method.18 With no filing in place, there is no earlier date for a later advance to relate back to.
A creditor takes a security interest in the debtor's certificated securities on day one and relies on 20 days of perfection without filing or possession under § 9-312(e). It advances $10,000 on day two and another $10,000 on day seven. On day five, a second creditor takes and perfects an interest in the same securities. The first creditor outranks the second for the day-two loan but not for the day-seven loan.19 Had the first creditor filed before day seven, that advance would have been made while the interest was perfected by filing. The exception would not apply, and the general rule would give the advance the same priority as the first.20
The exception is narrow in another way. It arises only for certificated securities, negotiable documents, and instruments, and only while perfection is temporary. It does not reach buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, or a consignor, who always get the benefit of an early filing.21
Lien Creditors and the 45-Day Window
A lien creditor, meaning a creditor that has obtained a lien on the debtor's property by judicial process, competes differently from a rival secured party, because against it the date of an advance matters again. Under § 9-323(b), a person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the extent it secures advances made before the lien arose, within 45 days after it, without knowledge of the lien, or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.23 The relation-back of the original filing date therefore gives way here. In rare circumstances, a lien creditor can achieve priority over some of the secured party's future advances.24
The rule gives the secured party two zones. During the 45 days after the lien arises, an advance has priority even if the secured party knows of the lien.25 Comment 4 to § 9-323 states the purpose: to give a perfected security interest priority for future advances during those 45 days, without regard to the secured party's knowledge.26 After the 45 days, an advance keeps its priority only if the secured party made it without knowledge of the lien or in fulfillment of a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.27 The comment adds that actual knowledge is presumably required, and that knowledge should not be imputed because a judgment lien was filed or the like.28
A secured party that lacks knowledge, or that lends under a commitment, can keep lending indefinitely and keep its first position. A secured party that lends voluntarily with knowledge of the lien falls behind the lien creditor as to advances made more than 45 days after the lien arose.29 Each ground tracks what the lender could have done differently. A lender that does not know of a lien has no reason to stop lending, and a lender already bound to lend cannot stop. A commitment made after the lender learns of the lien does not qualify, because the lender could have declined to make it.
The same 45 days work in the opposite direction when the competitor is a buyer. Against a lien creditor, the 45 days are a safe harbor, and a later advance made without knowledge of the lien still prevails. Against a buyer, they are a cutoff, and a later optional advance made without knowledge of the sale does not. Take a secured party that, unaware of the outsider's rights and bound by no commitment, advances $10,000 on the sixty-first day after those rights arise. It wins against a lien creditor and loses against a buyer.30
The federal tax lien statute has a parallel 45-day structure under 26 U.S.C. § 6323(d). SP-1 holds a perfected interest in the debtor's equipment and advances an additional $2,000 forty days after the tax lien filing, without actual notice or knowledge of the filing. SP-1 has priority over the tax lien for the initial and subsequent advances in equipment the debtor had rights in when the lien was filed. Its interest in a new item of equipment, however, is subordinate to the tax lien for both advances.31 The example builds in the secured party's lack of actual notice, a condition the ordinary lien-creditor window does not impose inside the 45 days, and it shows the after-acquired clause running into a limit of its own.
Buyers and Lessees of Collateral
A buyer of goods who takes subject to a perfected security interest takes free of it to the extent it secures advances made after the earlier of two moments: the time the secured party learns of the purchase, and 45 days after the purchase.33 A lessee gets parallel treatment through subsection (f), with the 45 days measured from the time the lease contract becomes enforceable.34 The rule gives the buyer a fixed point after which later loans cannot reach the goods.
These rules govern a buyer who takes subject to the interest. A buyer in ordinary course of business, or a lessee in ordinary course, who takes free of the interest the seller or lessor created, also takes free of an interest securing an advance made after the sale or lease.35 Other buyers take subject to a perfected interest unless § 9-317(b) frees them. That section protects a buyer who gives value and takes delivery without knowledge of the interest at a time when it is unperfected, and a buyer that is itself a secured party cannot use it.36 The 45-day cutoff is a rule for buyers of goods. For the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, only the general rule applies.37
Jones sells inventory to Smith on March 1. Jones then borrows $10,000 from Secured Party on April 1 and another $10,000 on May 1, each time on the representation that the money will buy more inventory. Secured Party learns of the sale on June 1. Its interest remains good against Smith for any indebtedness incurred before March 1 and for the April 1 advance, made 31 days after the sale. It is not good for the May 1 advance, made more than 45 days after the sale.38 Secured Party's ignorance of Smith until June 1 does not help, because the 45th day, and not the lender's later discovery, closed the window on the May advance.
A commitment changes the result. An advance remains secured against the buyer if it was made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the purchase and before the 45 days expired.39 Suppose a secured party perfected by filing under an agreement covering future obligations, and before the debtor sold the machine it committed to make a later $10,000 advance. If the machine brings $20,000 after default, the secured party keeps all of it, because the advance was pursuant to a commitment made within 45 days of the sale, indeed before it.40 Funding the advance after learning of the sale changes nothing, because the exception looks to the lender's knowledge when it made the commitment. In the Jones example, likewise, a binding commitment made on April 1 to advance $10,000 on May 1 would have kept the May advance good against Smith.41 A bound lender cannot stop lending, so cutting off the advance would force it to choose between breaching its promise and losing priority. A promise made after the lender learns of the sale does not qualify.
The 45-day rules also depend on the agreement, because they rank advances that are secured and do not make an advance secured. Suppose S's original agreement has no future-advances clause, and the debtor sells the machine to P, who gives value and takes delivery on October 1 without notice of S's interest. S lends another $10,000 under a new security agreement on November 1. The original financing statement covers the new loan, but the new interest does not attach, and so is not perfected, until November 1. P took delivery while that interest was unperfected and takes free of it, so S retains only $10,000 from a $20,000 repossession sale.42
Refinancing creates a related trap. A lender held a perfected purchase-money interest in a boat, and the debtor sold the boat. Many months later, the debtor borrowed again and used part of the new money to pay off the earlier loan. The new borrowing came more than 45 days after the sale, so it was a future advance, and because the new loan extinguished the former one, the entire new loan was a future advance. The buyer takes the boat free of the security interest to that extent.43 Rolling an old balance into a fresh note after the window has closed leaves the lender exposed against the buyer.
The Bankruptcy Cutoff
A future-advances clause that is valid under § 9-204(c) does not reach money the secured party lends after the debtor files for bankruptcy. An advance made to a debtor or debtor in possession after the case begins is not automatically secured by collateral that is part of the bankruptcy estate, even when the security agreement contains a valid future-advances clause. The court may approve a security interest in estate property to secure the new advance only after notice and a hearing.45 The petition thus divides the lender's advances by date. Advances made before it were secured under the clause when made, and advances made after it fall outside the clause unless the court approves.
Advances made before the filing keep their secured status, but the Bankruptcy Code limits the secured claim to the value of the collateral. The Code recognizes the secured party's property interest and treats its value as a secured claim. To size that claim, one determines the value of the collateral and the amount of debt it secures.46 A lender owed $1,000 when the petition is filed, with a security interest in equipment then worth $700, has a $700 secured claim and a $300 unsecured claim. Had the equipment been worth $1,200, the secured claim would be the full $1,000.
The Code stops the companion clause at the same point. If the debtor acquires property after the petition is filed, and the security interest would attach to it only under an after-acquired property clause, the interest does not attach unless the property is proceeds of collateral that was subject to the security interest. 11 U.S.C. § 552.47 Proceeds under the Bankruptcy Code may not be the same as proceeds under Article 9, so a lender cannot assume that whatever Article 9 calls proceeds qualifies.48 In the equipment example above, a machine bought after the filing with funds unrelated to the lender's collateral would not join the $700 of collateral.
The two cutoffs mirror the two clauses studied at the start of this section. A future-advances clause enlarges the secured debt, and an after-acquired property clause enlarges the collateral.49 The bankruptcy filing stops each of them, so neither reaches what comes afterward except through court approval or, for the collateral, through proceeds.
The cutoff also assumes the security interest survives the case, which is a separate question. With one exception, the trustee can avoid a security interest if the secured party had not, before the filing, qualified for priority over a lien creditor under § 9-317(a)(2). A purchase-money secured party may qualify under § 9-317(e) by filing an effective financing statement within 20 days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral.50