Concept
Committed Versus Optional Advances
Future advances
Committed Versus Optional Advances
Every future advance falls into one of two columns: the lender was bound to make it, or the lender could have refused. Both columns hold future advances, and the statutory phrase “pursuant to commitment,” which appears in the future-advances rules of § 9-204(c), names only the first.1 UCC § 9-102(a)(68) defines it. An advance is made pursuant to commitment when the secured party makes it under an obligation to lend, whether or not a later event of default, or another event outside the secured party’s control, has relieved or may relieve the secured party of that obligation. A commitment, in plain terms, is a promise to lend. The test asks whether the lender made that promise, and it disregards any later event that might excuse performance.
The two columns look like this:
- Committed advances are the ones the lender is obliged to make.
- Optional advances are the ones the lender may make but need not.
“Pursuant to commitment” is therefore not the opposite of “future advance.” Committed and optional advances are both future advances, and the true opposite of a committed advance is an optional one. Keep those two concepts separate and distinct in your mind.2
For attachment, the column does not matter. A future-advances clause covers additional loans on present collateral or collateral acquired later, “regardless of whether the secured party is obliged to make the advances,” and it makes a new security agreement unnecessary when the lender lends again.3
Whether the agreement must state this coverage in express terms is a separate question. In priority disputes among Article 9 claimants, some courts have held that a later advance is secured even though the agreement contains no express future-advance clause, while others have required an express clause.4 The next section takes up that requirement.
Other lien regimes answer the amount question differently. Mechanic’s lien statutes take one of two markedly different approaches to how much a lienor may recover, and some states, following the New York system, treat the lienor’s rights as derived from the general construction contract and limit recovery to the balance due on that contract when the lien is filed.5
The commitment label does not decide a contest between two voluntary secured parties. In such a contest, the first-in-time rule applies in most cases, the time the advance is made is immaterial, and so is whether the advance was made pursuant to commitment.6
That rule speaks only of voluntary secured parties. Contests with other claimants, covered in the later sections on lien creditors, buyers and lessees, and the bankruptcy cutoff, follow their own rules, and there the label may matter. Attachment asks whether the clause covers the advance, and priority asks who wins against a competing claimant, so the two inquiries stay separate.
A binding commitment has two further consequences. The first concerns attachment, which requires that the secured party give value (§ 9-203(b)(1)). Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract, and a secured party gives it when it loans or agrees to loan the funds. A lender that commits to a credit line therefore gives value when it makes the promise, before any money moves.8 A lender that has made no promise gives value only when it actually lends.
The second consequence concerns what a debtor can demand when the balance reaches zero. Most security interests are perfected by filing, so the filed record is the lender’s usual means of protection.9 A debtor who has paid the debt may usually demand a termination statement that clears that record (UCC § 9-513), but not while the secured party remains obligated to make future advances, even if nothing is presently owed. A paid-off term loan therefore calls for a termination statement; a revolving line with a zero balance and an outstanding commitment does not. A lender in that position may require the debtor’s agreement that the future-advances clause no longer binds before it releases the filing.